

*Forum for a New World Governance*

*File*  
*"Political and Institutional*  
*Governance"*

**Documentary Base**

**August 2008**

# *Presentation*

Globalization, in these first years of the twenty-first century, is an irreversible fact, consolidated in all of its various dimensions: cultural, economic, technological, citizenship, ecological... Under these circumstances the construction of a responsible global governance that will make it possible to adapt the political organization of society to this new situation implies forming a democratic legitimacy at all territorial scales (local, state, regional, global).

For this legitimacy to come about, it is necessary to rethink and to reform, all at the same time:

- the galaxy made up by the various international organizations, largely inherited as a result of World War II: a system of international organizations is needed, with greater resources and action capacity, more transparent, fairer, and more democratic;
- the Westphalia system, the very nature of states as well as the role that they play, as compared with other institutions, and their relations with each other: states will have to share part of their sovereignty with institutions and bodies at other territorial scales, and at the same time all will have to undertake important processes of democratic deepening and of organizational responsabilization.
- the meaning of citizen sovereignty in the different government systems, and the role of citizenship as a political protagonist: the sense of representation and political participation needs to be reconsidered, and the seed of a radical change in awareness needs to be planted, that will make it possible to move toward a future situation in which citizenship will have, in practice, the leading role at every scale.

How and in what measure have these challenges been approached recently? This file contains a series of discussions and proposals formulated in recent years around the political and institutional dimension of global governance. They have been categorized according to four themes: the architecture of global governance; new roles of the state and territorial scales; reappropriation by citizens of politics; and legal principles for a new global governance.

The architecture of global governance is approached on the basis of visions and general orientations, as well as of other more concrete aspects such as the nature and the structures of the organizations involved in global governance; the different visions of UN reform; proposals for new international institutions in the fields of environment and of debt; as well as new organizational processes.

As for the new roles of the state and of institutions at other territorial scales, documents have been included, among others, on the necessary adaptation to globalization by political bodies such as political parties; on the need for a more substantial citizens' participation as part of state reforms; and on the role of institutions at intermediate, such as regional scales.

The documents on citizens' reappropriation of politics highlights, among others, the role of non-state actors in general and that of social movements in particular, in the framework of alterglobalization and its strategies formed at meetings such as World Social Forums and potential emerging constructions such as citizens' assemblies. The file also includes proposals and network-cooperation experiences among institutions such as the global parliamentary forum and simultaneous politics; the stand to take before international institutions such as the G8; and the fundamental theme of legitimacy.

Finally, in the field of legal principles, proposals have appeared such as the formalization of the Ubuntu principle as a reference model for governance, the democratic legitimacy of the international production of standards, the pioneering character of the symbolic suits brought against multinational corporations by the Permanent People's Tribunal, an institution set up by civil society; and the need of a world constitution and a global social contract.

*The papers included in this file were taken from the database of the Forum for a New World Governance (FnWG) Web site. The FnWG documentary base contains articles and documents*

*related to the recent evolution of thinking on global governance, specifically connected with the themes developed in the various activities of the forum. The presentation methodology is inspired from the DPH (Dialogues for the Progress of Humanity) reports.*

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# *Executive Summary*

## **1. The Architecture of World Governance**

### *1 - Rethinking Global Governance*

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there are some who believe that the future of architecture of global politics will require setting up a global-governance system. The global-governance issue is characterized by the shift from a scenario where the power of the states is regulated to avoid disequilibrium and maintain the status quo, to one where international law and the role of international institutions need to be redefined in terms of their real arbitration potential in the management of global problems. To achieve this shift, the authors consider that rather than dreaming of a hypothetical global democracy or global government, it would be more reasonable to move gradually through the definition of the problems and objectives, in an approach similar to that adopted to build the European Union

### *2 - Redefining Global Governance to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century*

The current system of governance is no longer adapted to the challenges of tomorrow's world. Its architecture must be based on a new vision of the world and on universally acknowledged principles so that its legitimacy is accepted by all.

### *3 - For a Legitimate, Efficient, and Democratic Global Governance*

Interdependences among the world's societies and between humankind and the biosphere have developed at an accelerated pace without the powers' adapting their forms of organization to such change. Present global governance, based on relations among sovereign states, is not equipped to take up the challenges of today's world and suffers from lack of legitimacy. The global village seems devoid of rules, cohesion, redistribution of resources, and justice, as if it only existed for the benefit of its most powerful members. A new architecture is therefore necessary to institute democratic and legitimate global governance.

### *4 - The Future of Global Governance*

The problems with global governance—and the consequences of these problems—today are becoming better understood. The closer integration of the countries of the world—globalization—has given risen to a greater need for collective action. Unfortunately, economic globalization has outpaced political globalization. We are just beginning to develop an international rule of law, and much of the 'law' that has developed—for instance the WTO rules governing international trade—are grossly unfair; they have been designed to benefit the developed countries, partly at the expense of the developing countries. We approach international issues in an ad hoc, piecemeal manner.

### *5 - Structure of Global Governance: Explaining the Organizational Design of Global Rulemaking Institutions*

Global governance organizations (GGOs) create rules and regulations in a diverse array of policy domains from accounting to health to communications. This paper is part of a broader project considering the design and administration of such organizations. Specifically, the focus is on the structure of GGOs with attention to the scheme for representation of organization members and the bureaucracy charged with carrying out the organization's activities. The relationship between key aspects of GGO structure and a set of independent variables (including the sector, funding, "technicality" and rule type) is explored.

## *6 - The UN Reform and the Alterglobalization Movement*

The United Nations are at a crossroads. They have not really proven to be unworthy, they simply have not been at all convincing. Their reform is a critical issue, with several possible responses. For some, the United Nations should become the political system of neoliberal globalization. For the author, the issue is rather to define and to implement radical reform of the institution. The starting hypothesis is that the alterglobalization movement is the driving agent for broader alliances with other social and political forces, aiming at the transformation of the UN in the perspective of building a global democracy.

## *7 - Dialogues on Party Systems and Global Democratization*

Within the framework of the NIGD project on global political parties and in order to facilitate the inclusion of voices outside the world of writing, the NIGD organized four dialogues encouraging discussions on political parties, democracy and globalization. This Working Paper includes complete reports on the four dialogues, presentations of the Party Internationals, and selected background documents.

## *8 - Setting up an Arbitration Tribunal on Debt: An Alternative Solution?*

This memo is a brief analysis of a few proposals for the institution of an international arbitration tribunal on debt. The idea is to institute an independent international arbitration body that recognizes the respective responsibilities of debtors and creditors. Facing the seriousness of the problem of external debt, this tribunal is intended as a more realistic proposal than the proposals advocating plain and simple cancellation.

## **2. The New Roles of States and Territorial Scales**

### *9 - Citizen involvement in the process of state reform*

Democracy in Mexico, while making some significant progress, has not managed to demonstrate clearly its ability to govern, provide efficient responses to social demands and process institutionally the different conflicts inherent to any plural and diverse society.

### *10 - The New Republic will be democratic and socially oriented*

Before the 2007 elections in France, and since the political crisis is at the centre of public life, the level of debate on the institutions of the French Republic is weak. The proposals of the “major” candidates are particularly vague. In fact, everyone is cautiously sticking with what now constitutes a kind of weak consensus: strengthening the role of Parliament and expanding the procedures for citizen involvement. But what level of reform should be sought and, most importantly, what should be the spirit of the reform? At a time when confidence in institutions is being eroded, when voter abstention regularly breaks records, the sense of civic obligations is faltering and the far right is poisoning the public arena, homeopathic remedies are no longer called for.

### *11 - Declaration of the regions on their participation in governance and globalization*

The goal of this declaration is to manifest the decision of the partner regions of all the continents participating in the preparatory meeting of the global Forum of Regional Networks to launch the necessary steps for the creation of this new institutional cooperation arena.

### *12 - Democratizing borders*

National borders have drawn up anti-democratic conditions from a partial, limited, unreal democracy, obtained within the framework of some nations. The author has concentrated on these problems, sketching the possible course of the current potential violence through border, towards the concept of a democratisation

of these institutions, without which any project for creating a new citizenship in Europe would be contradictory and incomplete.

*13 - For global reform, a social democratic approach to globalisation*

This document is an attempt to formulate an approach of European socialists to globalisation, with a view to opening up a debate between political players and citizens. It is based on the discussions conducted within the past ten months in a think tank primarily consisting of elected European socialists and representatives of a certain number of civil society organisations. Far from being definitive, this contribution must help to stimulate future debate in a direction permitting the preparation of a more fully realised political document.

*14 - Political Parties and Global Democracy*

This paper examines the place of political parties and party systems in providing democracy for the more global world of the twenty-first century. It argues that recent intense globalisation has by no means rendered political parties and party systems irrelevant. However, political parties have lost substantial democratic impact by failing to move on with today's more global times. Parties could regain considerable stature as democratic forces if they altered a number of practices in line with emergent polycentric governance of a more global world. The paper advances a number of suggestions that could concurrently address the general stagnancy of political parties and the overall underdevelopment of global democracy.

### **3. Citizens' Reappropriation of Politics**

*15 - Non-state actors and world governance*

- ▀ Non-state actors have always played an essential role in global regulation, but their role will grow considerably in this, the beginning of the twenty-first Century.
- ▀ Non-state actors play a key role in world governance in different domains
- ▀ To better understand and develop the non-state actors' role, it should be studied in conjunction with the general principles of governance.

*16 - Alterglobalization, a long-term process leading to alternatives*

In this analysis of alterglobalism, the authors firstly highlight the victories earned by this barely 10-year-old movement, and secondly the hurdles it must still overcome versus the capital owners who destroy human beings and the planet a little more each day. This editorial was published in the daily newspaper *L'Humanité* on 21 January 2007

*17 - On the Road to a Citizens Assembly*

Interview by the NGO Traversées of Gustavo Marín, program officer at the Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation for the Progress of Humankind and member of the World Social Forum International Council. Taped in April 2007 at the preliminary South Cone Citizens Assembly in Antofagasta, Chile, the interview covers the beginnings, the nature, and the future of the different international civil-society deliberative processes.

*18 - Final Declaration Of The Sixth World Parliamentary Forum - Caracas 2006*

The Sixth World Parliamentary Forum met in the city of Caracas within the framework of the Sixth World Social Forum from January 24 to 29 2006 and was attended by parliamentarians representing the five continents. This declaration results from the Forum at the end of the sessions of 26 and 27 January 2006.

*19 - People-centered Global Governance: Making It Happen!*

As global problems such as global warming, global poverty, pollution, terrorism, and runaway corporate power increasingly outstrip the capacity of national and international governance institutions to solve them, the issue of global governance is rapidly moving up in the international political agenda. In this book, Buzl draws on the work of a number of leading evolutionary thinkers to show that both the process of globalization itself and the evolution of a binding system of global governance are natural parts of human evolution.

*20 - Do Space and Action Have to be Contradictory? Toward an Inclusive WSF Strategy*

Is the WSF still the most appropriate vehicle for the new stage in the struggle of the global justice and peace movement? Or, having fulfilled its historic function of aggregating and linking the diverse counter-movements spawned by global capitalism, is it time for the WSF to fold up its tent and give way to new modes of global organization of resistance and transformation?

*21 - Civil Society's Impact on the Multilateral Sphere: Lessons Learned and Future Directions*

This is a report of Forum International de Montréal's (FIM) Annual Forum "Civil Society's Impact on the Multilateral Sphere: Lessons Learned and Future Directions", held in March, 2007 in Montréal, Québec, Canada. Forum objectives were to: define the challenges and opportunities facing future Civil Society Organization/Non Governmental Organization (CSO/NGO) relations with multilateral bodies and systems; identify the present and emerging governance issues and priorities arising from these challenges and opportunities; and identify concrete means by which CSOs/NGOs can address these issues in the coming five years.

*22 - Global Democracy: Civil Society Visions and Strategies (G05) Conference Report*

Strategies (G05) Conference. Participants from civil society organizations—together with representatives of governments, private entities, and intergovernmental organizations—shared civil society perspectives on the key issues that determine the state of global democracy. They discussed how to democratize the international system of governance and developed proposals to tackle the democratic deficit plaguing global governance. They also devised visions and strategies to guide discussions and action leading up to the Millennium +5 Summit hosted by the United Nations in September and other relevant events.

*23 - Can Civil Society Influence G8 Accountability?*

This study outlines the mandate and activities of the Group of Eight (G8), examines for what and to whom the G8 is accountable, reviews the range and types of civil society groups interacting with the G8, and discusses how and to what extent this engagement has promoted or failed to promote G8 accountability through various actions: policy studies, evaluation and monitoring of commitments; petitions, lobbying, mobilisation and media campaigns; demonstrations and protests; dialogue; alternative summits; and participation in multi-stakeholder partnerships. The paper then analyses attitudes, procedures, structures and other factors that have helped or hindered civil society's contribution to G8 accountability.

*24 - Civil Society and the Legitimation of Global Governance*

Along with the general intensified globalisation of social relations in contemporary history has come an unprecedented expansion of regulatory apparatuses that cover planetary jurisdictions and constituencies. On the whole, however, this global governance remains weak relative to pressing current needs for global public policy. Shortfalls in moral standing, legal foundations, material delivery, democratic credentials and charismatic leadership have together generated large legitimacy deficits in existing global regimes.

#### **4. The Legal Principles of a New World Governance**

*25 - Giving Africa Voice within Global Governance: Oral History, Human Rights and the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council*

This paper seeks to present three key arguments that need to be taken into account during the process of remaking of the world order and recreation of a new global governance architecture. Firstly, it raises the key issue of the African continent and the African people being perceived as a problem to be solved rather than a voice to be heard within global politics. It calls for the African continent to transcend its current 'subaltern position' in international relations and make its voice heard within global governance. Secondly, it make a case for the use of oral history as an ideal medium to bring the voices of the subaltern to the notice of the Human Rights Council and as a key methodology in the current endeavour to understand different situations of human rights violations. Finally, it grapples with the important question of whose values and whose voice should underpin the universal human rights discourse and global governance.

*26 - The Democratic Legitimacy of Public-Private Rule Making: What Can We Learn from the World Commission of Dams?*

This article attempts to provide answers to one specific and one general question: How should we evaluate the performance of the World Commission of Dams in terms of its democratic legitimacy? And what does the evaluation of the commission's performance tell us about the legitimacy of global rule making in more general terms? Based on these questions, the article comes to two main conclusions. First, the democratic legitimacy of the World Commission of Dams' standard-setting process can be challenged in several ways. Second, the difficulties of determining the commission's legitimacy in relation to other mechanisms of rule making demonstrate that we still lack a theoretical understanding of what the idea of democratic governance beyond the nation-state will entail in practice.

*27 - Hearing on Neo-liberal Politics and European Transnational Corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean*

The EU-LAC bi-regional network requested to convene a session of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (PPT) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in Latin America on 2 February 2006, to investigate the increasingly dominant role of European TNCs in strategic areas, such as services, infrastructure, petroleum, water, finance and telecommunications. They particularly asked for an examination of the threats thereby posed to political sovereignty, development policy, economic autonomy, environmental sustainability and democratisation in Latin America.

*28 - The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)*

While investigating the extraterritorial scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), this paper introduces the threefold classification of internal, external, and international obligations applicable to all Human Rights treaties. Moreover, it emphasizes that most Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are duty-bound under Human Rights treaties and suggests steps to operationalize the related obligations of states. This paper looks at some relevant articles of the ICESCR, its interpretation, the nature of extraterritorial obligations, and offers some remarks and proposals.

*29 - Another System of International Relations*

The current international system is forcing the adjustment of every society to adapt the global market and to its dominant logic; it is barring all paths to social transformation. The search for alternatives to the transformation of every society requires another international system. To move along in the definition of a strategy, the author proposes guidelines organized around two imperatives: a new global constitution founded on global democracy; a global social contract founded on the respect and guarantee of rights, civil as well as political, economic, social, and cultural.

# ***Main Keywords***

**Agendas and roadmaps** – *cards 1, 6, 21*

**Democratic globalization** - *cards 4, 7, 11, 14, 26*

**Democratization** - *cards 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 26, 29*

**Evolution of the role of the state** - *cards 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 28*

**Global governance building strategies** - *cards 1, 15, 16, 17, 20, 27*

**Human security** - *cards 1, 13, 22, 25*

**International institutions** - *cards 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29*

**Legitimacy** - *cards 2, 3, 10, 15, 17, 24, 27*

**Market economy** - *cards 6, 16, 18, 27*

**New institutions** - *cards 8, 17, 19*

**Non-state actors** - *cards 3, 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26*

**Perspectives and scenarios** - *cards 1, 2, 16, 19, 20*

**Publics goods** - *cards 2, 4, 15*

**Political innovation** - *cards 14, 20, 25, 27*

**Regions' role** - *cards 11, 13, 25, 27*

**Rights** - *cards 25, 28, 29*

**Social and economic policies** - *cards 8, 18, 24, 28*

**Transparency, accountability** - *cards 15, 23, 26*

**United Nations** - *cards 4, 6, 22, 29*

**Values and principles** - *cards 2, 3, 9, 15, 25*

# Rethinking Global Governance

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**Agendas and  
roadmaps**

**Evolution of the role  
of the state**

**Global governance  
building strategies**

**Human Security**

**International  
institutions**

**Perspectives and  
scenarios**

**After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there are some who believe that the future of architecture of global politics will require setting up a global-governance system. The global-governance issue is characterized by the shift from a scenario where the power of the states is regulated to avoid disequilibrium and maintain the status quo, to one where international law and the role of international institutions need to be redefined in terms of their real arbitration potential in the management of global problems. To achieve this shift, the authors consider that rather than dreaming of a hypothetical global democracy or global government, it would be more reasonable to move gradually through the definition of the problems and objectives, in an approach similar to that adopted to build the European Union**

More than the shock of September 11, 2001, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of a very long period of international history, that of the "balance of powers." Since this historic event, the planet has been in a phase of geostrategic rupture. The "national security" model, although still in force for most governments, is gradually giving way to an emerging collective conscience that goes beyond this excessively restrictive framework.

There are some who believe, including ourselves, that the future of global architecture will require setting up a global-governance system. However, today the equation has become significantly more complicated: whereas previously, it was simply a matter of regulating - and limiting - the power of states in order to avoid disequilibria and maintain the status quo, it is hereafter imperative to shape the world's destiny collectively by setting up a system to regulate the numerous interactions that supersede state action.

The main problem of governance, a problem with which we must cope every day in our daily lives, is that institutions have been set up, which define their objectives in terms of their competences (and their limits), when they should be doing the opposite. The global-governance issue is characterized by the fact that objectives are being defined through an institutional void at the international level - with the UN, and more generally speaking public international law, playing the role of the tree that hides the forest - and as a result, it is the states that are forced to solve problems that are beyond their competence and even their comprehension. How can states, with institutions poorly designed to solve even their domestic problems, be expected to solve problems that go beyond their political framework? Seen as such, the concept of "collective security" does no more than magnify the problem, as this security is only an aggregate of state institutions. It is significant that the concept of governance itself is perceived as a whole that makes little distinction between local, national, and global governance, the objectives of these different levels often being close or interconnected.

How can governance and global governance be conciliated? There is the root of the problem, since the key of the history of international relations is precisely in the fact that these two problems have been approached in radically different, even opposite ways.

The problem facing those who would like to see a true global-governance architecture emerge is that making such construction dreams come true does not in any way resemble anything that could possibly be built, given the constraints, limitations, and obstacles that we are often tempted to overlook or minimize. Thus, rather than dreaming of an illusory global democracy or a hypothetical global government, it would be more reasonable to move gradually through the definition of the problems and objectives with a view to design the type of structures and institutions likely to take vigorous action to solve specific, given problems. It is only through this sort of gradual progress that a "global governance" worthy of its name might take shape, and there is no way of knowing beforehand what it will look like as, by definition, it will take the shape of the objectives that it will set progressively.

This approach is entirely different from that adopted by the architects of the League of Nations after World War I, or of the UN after World War II, as well as, moving further back in history, from the internationalist dream that France's Henri IV maintained with his "Grand Design" for Europe. From a philosophical and political point of view, our approach would be closer to that adopted by Jean Monnet and the first architects of what was going to become the European Union.

# Redefining Global Governance to Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century

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2001/10/12

**The current system of governance is no longer adapted to the challenges of tomorrow's world. Its architecture must be based on a new vision of the world and on universally acknowledged principles so that its legitimacy is accepted by all.**

## **Evolution of the role of the state**

The rudiments of global governance have been instituted in the course of the past 50 years. At the same time, however, interdependences among the world's societies and between humankind and the biosphere began to develop at a much faster pace.

## **Global ethos**

## **International institutions**

Present global governance, which has remained founded on relations among sovereign states, is not equipped to take up the challenges of today's world and in addition, suffers from lack of legitimacy. A new architecture is necessary. It should be founded on principles applicable to every level of governance and on the thinking and innovations that have appeared over the years and in the greatest variety of domains.

## **Legitimacy**

## **Perspectives and scenarios**

These include six dimensions:

## **Public goods**

- the development of ethical and constitutional foundations for legitimate governance;
- the establishment of a global community;
- the definition of common foundations for the management of the different categories of goods;
- the regulation of trade and sharing, and of the pace of evolution;
- the organization of relations among the different levels of governance and among actors;
- the renewal of discussion, decision-making, auditing, and management methods.

## **Values and principles**

Thirty-six proposals here give concrete expression to these different dimensions.

# For a Legitimate, Efficient, and Democratic Global Governance

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2003/01

**Interdependences among the world's societies and between humankind and the biosphere have developed at an accelerated pace without the powers' adapting their forms of organization to such change. Present global governance, based on relations among sovereign states, is not equipped to take up the challenges of today's world and suffers from lack of legitimacy. The global village seems devoid of rules, cohesion, redistribution of resources, and justice, as if it only existed for the benefit of its most powerful members. A new architecture is therefore necessary to institute democratic and legitimate global governance.**

## **Democratization**

## **International institutions**

## **Legitimacy**

## **Non-State Actors**

## **Values and principles**

In June 2001, some twenty experts closely related to the Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation and competent in fields as diverse as finance, water, energy, soils, security, the environment, met to think about the lessons each had drawn regarding the range and limits of international regulations in their respective expertise area. The sum of these roughly constitutes the present state of global governance. Each was asked to state the limits of present governance and perspectives for the future. This Proposal Paper compares the findings of this meeting with the ten principles for governance, from local to global, as presented in the corresponding Proposal Paper. The group's participants regrouped the proposals under a more limited number of principles (six) and gave them concrete expression by correlating each of these general principles with a number of specific proposals, for a total of thirty-six. Following are the thirty-six proposals classified according to the corresponding principle:

Principle 1: Providing a foundation for legitimate global democracy  
Proposal 1: State the objectives of global governance in constitutional form.  
Proposal 2: Make the Charter of Human Responsibilities the third constitutional pillar of the international community.  
Proposal 3: Set up a ranking of norms and rules that is common to all multilateral institutions.  
Proposal 4: Define the limits of global-governance intervention on the basis of the Charter of Human Responsibilities.  
Proposal 5: State the "big global causes" that are the subject of the global policies implemented by all international agencies.  
Proposal 6: Present an annual report on the state of the world.  
Proposal 7: Set up a democratic framework in which to draw up international agendas.  
Proposal 8: Guarantee equity of treatment and sanctions in all international agreements.  
Proposal 9: Set up an independent international institution to counsel and support the weaker players.  
Proposal 10: Make the responsibility of international-institution agents effective.

Principle 2: Institute a democratic global community  
Proposal 11: Institute regional communities.  
Proposal 12: Institute socioprofessional communities.

Proposal 13: Institute regional federations and a world federation of parliaments.

Proposal 14: Organize a constituent assembly for the planet in 2008.

Proposal 15: Set up a global tax base.

Principle 3: Define common rules for the management of the different categories of assets

Proposal 16: Agree on a typology of goods and services and define the limits of those that can come under market control.

Proposal 17: Define the global common goods and finance their protection.

Proposal 18: Establish common global rules for the management of natural resources.

Proposal 19: Organize the global pooling of goods that are increased when shared.

Principle 4: Manage trade and sharing, and manage the pace of evolution

Proposal 20: Structure independent information systems on a global scale.

Proposal 21: Support the emergence of Internet-based learning communities

Proposal 22: Set up a system to measure trade and sharing and the actual degree of development.

Proposal 23: Institute regular sabbatical periods for the international community.

Proposal 24: Make the precautionary principle a common model of responsibility.

Proposal 25: Draw up very long-term strategies in the vital fields.

Principle 5: Privilege and organize relations

Proposal 26: Train players in an integrated and partner-based approach.

Proposal 27: Organize the relationship between global governance and states according to the active subsidiarity principle.

Proposal 28: Recognize the privileged role of international networks of territorial authorities.

Proposal 29: Systematize cooperation among multilateral agencies.

Proposal 30: Set up the conditions for partnership between public and private players.

Proposal 31: Build the contractual framework for partnership among players.

Principle 6: Renew the methods

Proposal 32: Set up global public forums for citizen debates.

Proposal 33: Grant the General Secretariat of the United Nations

Proposal monopoly for international decisions.

Proposal 34: Entrust to a council of the wise the responsibility of drawing the attention of governing players.

Proposal 35: Hold an annual world parliament.

Proposal 36: Set up a permanent audit of multilateral institutions.

Although these proposals are not all immediately operational, the general principles constitute a good framework for the absolutely indispensable promotion of a legitimate, democratic, and efficient global governance.

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# The Future of Global Governance

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**Democratic  
globalization**

**Global knowledge**

**International  
institutions**

**Legal infrastructure**

**Multilateralism**

**Natural resources**

**Public goods**

**United Nations**

**The problems with global governance—and the consequences of these problems— today are becoming better understood. The closer integration of the countries of the world— globalization—has given risen to a greater need for collective action. Unfortunately, economic globalization has outpaced political globalization. We are just beginning to develop an international rule of law, and much of the ‘law’ that has developed—for instance the WTO rules governing international trade—are grossly unfair; they have been designed to benefit the developed countries, partly at the expense of the developing countries. We approach international issues in an ad hoc, piecemeal manner.**

After analyzing the current state of the global institutions, and identifying the current forces for change, the author establishes a 8 points list for a possible global reform.

The institutions that do exist have undemocratic governance, and suffer from ‘smokestack syndrome.’ A single country, for instance, has effective veto at the IMF; votes are allocated on the basis of economic power, and not even based on current economic standing.<sup>2</sup> Even though the policies of the IMF (or other international economic institutions) have enormous implications for many aspects of society—for education, health, or the environment, it is only the finance ministers and central bank governors that have a direct say. By contrast, within western democracies, when important economic issues are being discussed, typically all of those who are affected have a voice in the decision, even if some voices are stronger than others. Today, few democracies limit voting to those with property, or apportion voting rights on the basis of economic wealth.

After giving an idea of the undemocratic nature of the International Institutions nowadays, Stiglitz analyses in this clearminded essay, which are actually the current "forces for change", from the self-interested motives and the need of mutual cooperation, to the need of recognition of a rule of law and the democratic forces. In a late section the author proposes a list of reforms concerning the International Institutions internal organization and external role in the framework of the global governance architecture. He also deals with global taxation, the management of global resources and the environment, the production and protection of global knowledge, and the need for a Global legal infrastructure.

Source: IPD Web site - Columbia University

Citation: Stiglitz, Joseph. E. (2004; The Future of Global Governance; Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD); IPD Working Paper.

# Structure of Global Governance: Explaining the Organizational Design of Global Rulemaking Institutions

**Jonathan GS  
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2007/03/01

**Democratization**

**Institutional  
cooperation**

**International  
institutions**

**Legal infrastructure**

**Global governance organizations (GGOs) create rules and regulations in a diverse array of policy domains from accounting to health to communications. This paper is part of a broader project considering the design and administration of such organizations. Specifically, the focus is on the structure of GGOs with attention to the scheme for representation of organization members and the bureaucracy charged with carrying out the organization's activities. The relationship between key aspects of GGO structure and a set of independent variables (including the sector, funding, "technicality" and rule type) is explored.**

Global governance organizations are at once captive to and free from a wildly diverse set of expectations. They are captive to sets of beliefs regarding the proper design of governmental systems with normative understanding of proper schemes of representation and bureaucratic process. Failure to comply with such norms will almost certainly bring scolds of disapproval (or worse).

And yet, in a perverse way, this may be liberating because it is clear that any global governance organization facing the world's expectations will almost certainly disappoint the vast majority of people. This paper explores the structural choices made by global governance organizations (GGOs) in two senses. First, the political-representational structure is considered. Second, the bureaucratic-administrative structure is examined.

Many global governance organizations resemble self-contained narrow-purpose governments; they include a legislative (representational) and executive (bureaucratic) function within the overall organization. In considering the design of GGOs, therefore, it makes sense to consider both the "political" and "bureaucratic" elements of the organization. In other entities, these functions are not clearly distinguished; participants are represented within the apparatus of the organization itself and it is harder to make a sharp distinction between the bureaucracy and representative elements of the entity.

# The UN Reform and the Alterglobalization Movement

**Gustave MASSIAH**

Association internationale de techniciens, experts et chercheurs (AITEC)

2005/02/28

**Agendas and roadmaps**

**Democratization**

**International institutions**

**Market economy**

**Non-State Actors**

**United Nations**

**The United Nations are at a crossroads. They have not really proven to be unworthy, they simply have not been at all convincing. Their reform is a critical issue, with several possible responses. For some, the United Nations should become the political system of neoliberal globalization. For the author, the issue is rather to define and to implement radical reform of the institution. The starting hypothesis is that the alterglobalization movement is the driving agent for broader alliances with other social and political forces, aiming at the transformation of the UN in the perspective of building a global democracy.**

These positions play different roles in awareness raising and critical analysis. In terms of proposals, the thinking focuses on the positions that structure the arena of discussions and confrontations on the needed reforms. For some, the UN should become the political system of neoliberal globalization, a mix of institutions of the World Bank, IMF, and WTO type on the one hand, and a military alliance of the NATO type on the other. The advocates of moderate reformism consider that the existence of regulation, even partial and poorly effective, is an objective in itself. The idea is to be careful not to break the machine which risks handing over all the power to US unilateralism, and to be content with adjustments whenever possible. The advocates of radical reform consider that it is necessary to accept the risk of challenging the system and to mark the new departure that is needed, considering the nature of the challenges. This is the author's perspective.

Knowing whether it is possible or not to reform the United Nations does not appear to be decisive in itself. The question is to define a radical reform and make its implementation possible. Defining guidelines and the current situation is a fairly easy way to define the necessary reforms. But these reforms will not be implemented automatically. The United Nations have shown their capacity to change. Set up in the context of the Cold War, they were also capable of taking up the decolonization issue and contribute to it. There is a strategic question. The hypothesis that the alterglobalization movement can be the vector of this transformation brings up the question of alliances to impose it. There is also a question of method, one that makes it possible to link a general perspective with the fights and mobilizations for particular reforms.

The proposed approach is the following: start from the current stakes and challenges involved in the international institutions, globalization, wars, and international law; define the guidelines for building a new foundation, global democracy and a global social contract, as well as the strategic position of international law; formalize a strategic line, that of the movements and fights for the democratization of the international system, with a twofold requirement, to place each of the democratization proposals in the perspective of global democracy and to place each of the fronts for

democratization in a broader alliance for a new foundation of the international system; and clarify the proposals for radical reform and consider the social and political forces that can bring them about as well as possible alliances.

Source: CADTM  
[www.cadtm.org](http://www.cadtm.org)

# Dialogues on Party Systems and Global Democratization

**Katarina SEHM-PATOMÄKI,**  
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Network Institute for  
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Democratization  
(NIGD)

2006/02

**Democratic  
Globalization**

**Democratization**

**International  
institutions**

**Non-State Actors**

**Within the framework of the NIGD project on global political parties and in order to facilitate the inclusion of voices outside the world of writing, the NIGD organized four dialogues encouraging discussions on political parties, democracy and globalization. This Working Paper includes complete reports on the four dialogues, presentations of the Party Internationals, and selected background documents.**

In September 2005, the Network Institute for Global Democratization (NIGD) launched the project "Elements for a Dialogue on Global Political Party Formations." The objective of the project was to hear views on the idea of global political parties from a diverse political and social spectrum. NIGD invited experts to write analyses on a certain theme, based on a background paper. This background paper was written by Heikki Patomäki and Teivo Teivainen.

In order to facilitate the inclusion of voices outside the world of writing, the NIGD organized four dialogues encouraging discussions on political parties, democracy and globalization. The first dialog took place in Helsinki in September 2005, a second one followed in New Delhi in November. The third and fourth dialogues were held in January 2006 in conjunction with the polycentric World Social Forum in Bamako, Mali, and Caracas, Venezuela. This Working Paper, "Dialogues on Party Systems and Global Democratisation," includes complete reports on the four dialogues, presentations of the Party Internationals, and selected background documents.

Two main aims inform this project: first, the political aim, providing tools that may be conducive to comprehensive democratization and just transformation, and second, the intellectual aim, enhancing our self-understanding. The links and tensions between these aims are an ongoing reflective concern.

Some of the important issues and questions dealt with during the dialogues were: the history and future of the parties; global governance; relations of political parties, civil social actors and social movements, including the World Social Forum; the dichotomy between political-party and non-party kind of political actors in global politics; elitism, lack of legitimacy and erosion of the traditional national parties; ideological global movements and their evolution; and the fight against global disparities as a cause to be defended by global parties, among others.

Source: Network Institute for Global Democratization (NIGD)  
[www.nigd.org](http://www.nigd.org)



# Setting up an Arbitration Tribunal on Debt: An Alternative Solution?

**Hugo RUIZ DÍAZ**

Comité pour  
l'Annulation de la  
Dette du Tiers Monde  
(CADTM)

2003/06

**This memo is a brief analysis of a few proposals for the institution of an international arbitration tribunal on debt. The idea is to institute an independent international arbitration body that recognizes the respective responsibilities of debtors and creditors. Facing the seriousness of the problem of external debt, this tribunal is intended as a more realistic proposal than the proposals advocating plain and simple cancellation.**

**Debt**

The proposals aim at an in-depth solution through a perfectly natural and traditional means existing in international law: arbitration, an institution extensively used by states and individuals, particularly in private law in international trade. In this sense, it should be noted that arbitration constitutes a much more flexible legal means with a lighter and therefore more accessible procedure than in other types of tribunal. Moreover, the cost of this procedure would be accessible to states, including the poorest ones.

**Global finance**

**New institutions**

**North-South relations**

**Social and economic policies**

The proposals themselves aim at using a jurisdiction characterized by its neutrality of principle and intended as more advantageous to debtor states. The point is in the end to correct an inequitable and unfair legal relation. The central issue on which the tribunal is to focus is the evaluation of a country's debt in its entirety in order to determine which part is licit and which illicit.

The memo is mainly intended for the international network of the NGO Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt (CADTM) in order to clarify its position and at the same time provide its members with a few working elements. It describes the proposals, the motivations in favor of an arbitration tribunal on debt, its jurisdiction, the practical difficulties, the responsibility of international financial institutions and private creditors, and finally, the position of the committee and the course decided upon.

Source: CADTM

[www.cadtm.org](http://www.cadtm.org)

# Citizen involvement in the process of state reform

**Iniciativa Ciudadana para la Cultura del Diálogo**  
Mexico

**Democracy in Mexico, while making some significant progress, has not managed to demonstrate clearly its ability to govern, provide efficient responses to social demands and process institutionally the different conflicts inherent to any plural and diverse society.**

2008/04/14

The evidence of the exhaustion of this governability model based on an authoritarian presidential system is increasing. Given this reality, the organisations of the *Public Observatory Council for State Reform* aim to promote a wide process of transformation in the State institutional structure of Mexico, in order to facilitate democratic governability and to introduce a new model with room for State - Society relations.

**Democratization**

**Evolution of the role of the state**

**Non-State Actors**

**Values and principles**

By law, the Executive Committee for Negotiation and Building of Agreements (CENCA), should have acted according to the guideline of reaching agreements based on the widest general consensus possible. In practice, however, and contrary to the rule of obtained the widest consensus possible, the political parties understood the work groups to the quasi legislative bodies and, rather than seeking to obtain consensus, developed strategies to veto possible agreements.

The specific dynamics of reaching agreements has not evolved in line with what had been set out in the Law on State Reform. Based on this observation it is essential to decide which strategies should be adopted by citizens' organisation in order to promote their ideas and move discussion and negotiation beyond political party logic.

The authors of this paper, from the stance that State reform is also the responsibility of the people, propose the creation of a space for reflection and generation of public opinion, directed at strengthening the influential capacity of civil society. The purpose should be to promote a reform to the Union Congress Law in order to set forth the recognition of civil society as a party with the right to express and promote their points of view and proposals.

Source: Collectif 29 Mai  
[www.collectifdu29mai.org](http://www.collectifdu29mai.org)

# The New Republic will be democratic and socially oriented

**Evelyne SIRE-MARIN**  
Syndicat de la magistrature, Francia  
**Roger MARTELLI**  
www.regards.fr

2008/04/14

**Before the 2007 elections in France, and since the political crisis is at the centre of public life, the level of debate on the institutions of the French Republic is weak. The proposals of the “major” candidates are particularly vague. In fact, everyone is cautiously sticking with what now constitutes a kind of weak consensus: strengthening the role of Parliament and expanding the procedures for citizen involvement.**

But what level of reform should be sought and, most importantly, what should be the spirit of the reform? At a time when confidence in institutions is being eroded, when voter abstention regularly breaks records, the sense of civic obligations is faltering and the far right is poisoning the public arena, homeopathic remedies are no longer called for.

**Democratization**

**Evolution of the role of the state**

Institutions will only be able to recover their sense of direction within a brand-new architecture that measures up to what our complex and unstable societies have become. A Sixth Republic in France is the order of the day... But it's still necessary to explain the rationale behind it.

**Legitimacy**

**Territorial organization**

Let's assume that it will, of course, be less “presidentialist”, but not merely more representative (even though improving representation is appropriate). Being the sixth in a long republican succession, the New Republic must be the first of a new type: clearly organized along social and participatory lines, explicitly democratic and rooted in solidarity.

If the left does not want to give free rein to the unholy union of order and “free and unbiased” competition, it must not therefore abandon the institutional restructuring which must be made consistent with the vision of a society in which the development of people takes precedence over financial imperatives. This assumes several strong initiatives capable of giving a clear direction to a political vision.

Source : Collectif 29 Mai  
[www.collectifdu29mai.org](http://www.collectifdu29mai.org)

# Declaration of the regions on their participation in governance and globalization

Forum de réseaux  
de régions du  
monde

2007/03/07

**The goal of this declaration is to manifest the decision of the partner regions of all the continents participating in the preparatory meeting of the global Forum of Regional Networks to launch the necessary steps for the creation of this new institutional cooperation arena.**

Some of the principal objectives of the global Forum of Regional Networks include:

**Actors' networking**

**Democratic  
Globalization**

**Evolution of the role  
of the state**

**Institutional  
Cooperation**

**Regions' Role**

- Making the voice of the Regions heard in globalization;
- Organizing new strategic governance rules including the infrastate levels;
- Working between Regions to promote and increase competitiveness and knowledge sharing as factors in social and territorial cohesion;
- Adopting the principle of full consideration of the effects of development and the environment based on the principles of sustainable development;
- Supporting national policies at the regional level and preparing for the adoption of a Regional Charter in the public governance systems;
- Promoting, within the organizations in the Regions, the practice of paradiplomacy between the Regions of the world;
- Ensuring the solidarity and the transfer of knowledge and best practices between rich Regions and poor Regions.

# Democratising borders

Etienne BALIBAR

1997/05/05

**National borders have drawn up anti-democratic conditions from a partial, limited, unreal democracy, obtained within the framework of some nations. The author has concentrated on these problems, sketching the possible course of the current potential violence through border, towards the concept of a democratisation of these institutions, without which any project for creating a new citizenship in Europe would be contradictory and incomplete.**

**Democratization**

**Evolution of the role of the state**

**Migrations**

**Regional integration**

What is a border? This question is old and new at the same time, and has no simple response. In the case of the modern European states, one can see the conceptual, legal and technical difference between the frontiers of a 15th century monarchy in the era of foundation and the so-called European balance, of the community borders instigated by European treaties, first in Rome later strengthened by the Schengen and Dublin agreements. We also know that the border itself can be multiple; it is not the same process crossing a border on an American passport as on a passport from the Balkan states.

The author claims that the fundamental challenge for any project of new citizenship in the era of economic trans-nationalisation, of communications and culture, is to propose political projects and initiatives which tackle this new, violent complexity, as any attempt to re-create a “Leviathan”, a single central authority sacred under law and armed with the monopoly of legalised violence, has only served to cause the very opposite: widespread anarchy at world level.

The different types of border institutions have given the border the opportunity of multiplicity of national institutions, as the border is defined as a simplifying invention. The consequence of this has been the following contradiction: inside borders a certain amount of democracy could be achieved, as a result of fights, movements, negotiations, and historical commitments. But borders were still in themselves utterly anti-democratic institutions which escaped any form of collective control, political practice, or form of negotiation.

Source: Rete Civica di Roma

[www.romacivica.net](http://www.romacivica.net)

# For global reform, a social democratic approach to globalisation

"Europe - Globalization" Think Tank

1997/05/05

Evolution of the role of the state

Fighting poverty and inequalities

Human Security

Regions' Role

Views on Global Governance

**This document is an attempt to formulate an approach of European socialists to globalisation, with a view to opening up a debate between political players and citizens. It is based on the discussions conducted within the past ten months in a think tank primarily consisting of elected European socialists and representatives of a certain number of civil society organisations. Far from being definitive, this contribution must help to stimulate future debate in a direction permitting the preparation of a more fully realised political document.**

In view of the current state of the world, there is no positive alternative other than a policy of global reform to control globalisation and open up a prospect for progressive globalisation. This reform of globalisation is very difficult and complex, but indispensable if we wish to avoid a permanent drift towards more instability and violence in the world. Today, there are already proposals, consensus and movements which form the embryonic basis of a global reformism which must develop and be implemented politically.

The European Union, which, at the regional scale, is the first successful experiment in response to the challenges of globalisation, must make a determined commitment to this prospect of global reformist governance, in the interests of its security and the development of its social model, as well as to fulfil its responsibilities to its own citizens and the rest of the world.

The modernisation of European social democracy is necessary. Its agenda must include as a priority the strategic project of constructing a protagonist Europe of global governance. This requires a political change with regard to globalisation and its challenges. It is necessary to move from the stage of defining "what should be done" to a new period of the concrete implementation of what must be done and how, and with whom it should be achieved, so as to then make a resolute attempt to transform it into actions.

It is in this general perspective that this document proposes a list of 14 theses as elements in the debate. The latter concern, among other things, the security of societies and its correlation with the need for global reforms; a controlled economy based on the law, oriented towards stability, growth, full employment and North-South convergence; equal rights for all, involving the establishment of a logic of redistribution on a global scale; the eradication of poverty in all countries; sustainable development on a global scale as the absolute imperative in political action at all levels; acting at the grass-roots level in the battle against terrorism and crime; international institutions which are consistent, effective and fully democratic; and, finally, a Europe which must share its experiences in responding to the challenges of globalisation and establishing true partnership strategies from the perspective of a new multilateralism.

Source: Nou Cicle  
[www.noucicle.org/left/globalref\\_f.html](http://www.noucicle.org/left/globalref_f.html)

# Political Parties and Global Democracy

Jan Aart  
SCHOLTE

2006/04

Democratic  
Globalization

Democratization

Evolution of the role  
of the state

Political innovation

**This paper examines the place of political parties and party systems in providing democracy for the more global world of the twenty-first century. It argues that recent intense globalisation has by no means rendered political parties and party systems irrelevant. However, political parties have lost substantial democratic impact by failing to move on with today's more global times. Parties could regain considerable stature as democratic forces if they altered a number of practices in line with emergent polycentric governance of a more global world. The paper advances a number of suggestions that could concurrently address the general stagnancy of political parties and the overall underdevelopment of global democracy.**

What is the place of political parties and party systems in providing democracy for the more global world of the twenty-first century? If contemporary globalisation has shifted the contours of governance – that is, the ways that societal rules are formulated, applied and reviewed – do political parties need to reinvent their organisation and practices to fulfil their democratic role? If so, what kinds of adjustments are required? Or has globalisation so transformed politics that party formations have become obsolete in the democratic process, no longer being able to deliver adequate public participation in, and public control over, the decisions that shape collective destinies?

This paper argues that the past half-century of intense globalisation has by no means rendered political parties and party systems irrelevant. However, political parties have lost substantial democratic impact by failing to move on with today's more global times.

Official circles and civil society quarters have generally made considerably more progress to recognise, and adjust their activities to, the shift from a statist towards a polycentric mode of governance that has accompanied contemporary globalisation. In contrast, political parties have for the most part retained a now obsolete statist-territorialist-nationalist modus operandi. Parties could regain considerable stature as democratic forces if they (belatedly) altered a number of practices in line with emergent polycentric governance of a more global world.

The paper also advances a number of measures that could benefit party organisations and wider democracy alike. Greater attention to global affairs, global rules and global institutions by parties could contribute significantly to their revival as democratic players. In turn, more globally oriented political parties could provide a much-needed boost to the broader democratisation of globalisation. The current general stagnancy of political parties and the overall underdevelopment of global democracy would thereby be addressed at the same time. Reinvigorated party systems are not a panacea for public participation and public accountability in global politics, but they could bring major advances.

Source: CSGR Working Paper No 200/06. April 2006

# Non-state actors and world governance

**Pierre CALAME**  
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Switzerland - France

2008/06

- **Non-state actors have always played an essential role in global regulation, but their role will grow considerably in this, the beginning of the twenty-first Century.**
- **Non-state actors play a key role in world governance in different domains**
- **To better understand and develop the non-state actors' role, it should be studied in conjunction with the general principles of governance.**

## **Democratization**

A- Non-state actors have always played an essential role in global regulation, but their role will grow considerably in this, the beginning of the twenty-first Century.

## **Global governance building strategies**

1) Non-state actors have always been important in world governance.

## **International Law**

## **Legitimacy**

2) Developments in the theory of governance places growing importance on the role of non-state actors at every level of regulation.

## **Non-State Actors**

3) In the modern-day world, non-state actors face ever-increasing opportunities, which are often difficult for them to assume.

## **Public goods**

## **Territorial organization**

4) Non-state actors, due to their vocation, size, flexibility, methods of organisation and action, interact with states in an equal manner; however this does not mean that their action is better adapted.

## **Transparence, accountability**

- 4.1. Some non-state actors have an international vocation.
- 4.2 The size of non-state actors is similar to that of many states.
- 4.3 Non-state actors have more flexibility than states.
- 4.4 Non-state actors' organisation is better suited for the realities of the world.
- 4.5 They have a better command of the Internet.
- 4.6 Non-state actors are in a good situation to be influential.

## **Values and principles**

B- Non-state actors play a key role in world governance in different domains

- 1) Security and defence
- 2) International co-operation
- 3) Economy
- 4) Commerce
- 5) The Information society
- 6) Health
- 7) Environment

C- To better understand and develop the non-state actors' role, it should be studied in conjunction with the general principles of governance.

- 1) Legitimacy based on objectives, values, and methods.

2) The elements of democracy and of world citizenship.

3) The ability to design better institutional arrangements.

- ✦ 3.1. A more global approach to governance.
- ✦ 3.2. Contribution to the emergence of a world community.
- ✦ 3.3. The combination of different regulatory modes.
- ✦ 3.4. The ability to get all the different parties around the table.
- ✦ 3.5. An efficient evaluation system.

4) The conception of regimes of governance adapted to the different types of goods and services.

5) The possibility of better articulating scales of governance, from local to global.

# Alterglobalization, a long-term process leading to alternatives

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**Susan GEORGE**  
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2008/04/14

**Global governance  
building strategies**

**International  
institutions**

**Market economy**

**Non-State Actors**

**Perspectives and  
scenarios**

**In this analysis of alterglobalism, the authors firstly highlight the victories earned by this barely 10-year-old movement, and secondly the hurdles it must still overcome versus the capital owners who destroy human beings and the planet a little more each day. This editorial was published in the daily newspaper *L'Humanité* on 21 January 2007.**

Ten years after the emergence of alterglobalism, how far have we got? We can claim two victories. Firstly, we have shattered the consensus of opinion surrounding the international institutions under the control of which people were enslaved. This is because the International Monetary Fund, as well as the World Bank, have seen their structural adjustment plans force the poorest nations into bankruptcy. The myth of a G8 concerned with the fate of humanity has vanished and been replaced with the defense of the sordid interests of the large economic and financial groups and their masters who meet in a conclave every year in Davos.

The second victory was to create places where people can voice their opinions, where involved citizens are able to share their analyses and their experiences. In the world social forum, the continental social forums and the local social forums, a type of popular expression was formed. It was original in the diversity of the players it involved, and rooted in the greatest tradition of self-management through the desire for participatory democracy.

On the other hand, the social forums must provide support in overcoming the problems of transitioning from a phase of criticism of neo-liberal capitalism to a phase of advancing alternative proposals. We have arrived at a turning point in alterglobalism. It must not lose any of the radical character of its criticism while constructing, around strategic objectives, a consistent approach to the alternatives being elaborated and working on the convergence of the movements devising those alternatives.

# On the Road to a Citizens Assembly

**Gustavo MARIN**  
Fondation pour le  
progrès de l'Homme,  
Switzerland - France

2007/05

**Interview by the NGO Traversées of Gustavo Marín, program officer at the Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation for the Progress of Humankind and member of the World Social Forum International Council. Taped in April 2007 at the preliminary South Cone Citizens Assembly in Antofagasta, Chile, the interview covers the beginnings, the nature, and the future of the different international civil-society deliberative processes.**

## **Democratization**

Gustavo Marín tells of the birth and the encouraging, albeit uneven development of the first global citizen deliberative processes. He talks about the global counter-summits of the 1990s, the World Social Forums of the 2000s and a unique network developed throughout the whole period, the Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and United World.

## **Global governance building strategies**

## **Legitimacy**

## **New institutions**

## **Non-State Actors**

## **Regional integration**

For the Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation and some of its partners, the goal is to build constituent processes, where different social actors and sectors (young people, women, labor unions, the military, parliamentarians, farmers, teachers, etc.) can succeed in implementing another policy at the international, or even global scale, where others have failed so far: international institutions and governments, because of their compartmentalized interests; civil society and social movements, which, although they demonstrate and make proposals, have not been capable of changing the policies of the major powers, starting with the United States.



# Final Declaration Of The Sixth World Parliamentary Forum - Caracas 2006

## World Parliamentary Forum

2006/01

**The Sixth World Parliamentary Forum met in the city of Caracas within the framework of the Sixth World Social Forum from January 24 to 29 2006 and was attended by parliamentarians representing the five continents. This declaration results from the Forum at the end of the sessions of 26 and 27 January 2006.**

### Economic globalization

Claimed to be in keeping with the World Social Forum Charter of Principles and with the commitments adopted in the forums of previous years in the firm belief that "another world is possible," the text states among others the need to engage in the promotion of participatory democracy at all levels, from the local to the global. Otherwise, achieving peace is considered the only way of achieving coexistence among the people of the world. Hence, it is necessary to promote mechanisms capable of resolving conflicts peacefully and to denounce any attempt at military, political, or economic dominance by one state over another. A few special demands were made in this sense, concerning among others the military withdrawal from Iraq and Palestine; the prohibition of nuclear weapons; and the military withdrawal from Guantánamo and other NATO and US bases.

### Market economy

### Non-State Actors

### Peace building

### Social and economic policies

### Sustainable development

The parliamentarians will also promote the right to an education that expands horizons and to health as social rights of a public nature. They recognize and support the opposition by social movements to discrimination and racism of all kinds and their efforts to achieve social justice. They welcome several initiatives to resist against neoliberalism, such as the rejection by France and the Netherlands of the draft of the European Constitution, and the European workers' resistance to attempt to liberalize public services.

They reject free-trade treaties such as those of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Round, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreement. They reject the pressures exerted on developing countries to force them to open up their markets and liberalize their public services. They demand the removal of mechanisms subsidizing the export of agricultural products.

This declaration contains several other considerations on issues such as water as a human right, not to be subjected to privatization; integration as cooperation for reducing poverty, hunger and disease; the immediate review of the economic relations among the countries and bodies of the world system of governance; support to the Kyoto Protocol and a new model of sustainable economic, social, and cultural development; a strong presence of grassroots movements to be recognized; opposition to the construction of a wall along the border between Mexico and the United States; among others.

The signers reaffirm their commitment to consolidating the international

parliamentary network as a forum for thinking and for the in-depth study of relations and the adoption of a common agenda, and for debating and identifying specific mechanisms set out in an action plan that reflects our peoples' views on imperialism and neoliberal globalization.

Source: The International Endowment For Democracy  
[www.iefd.org](http://www.iefd.org)

# People-centered Global Governance: Making It Happen!

John BUNZL  
International  
Simultaneous Policy  
Organisation (ISPO)

2005/07

**Democratization**

**Evolution of the role  
of the state**

**New institutions**

**Non-State Actors**

**Perspectives and  
scenarios**

**As global problems such as global warming, global poverty, pollution, terrorism, and runaway corporate power increasingly outstrip the capacity of national and international governance institutions to solve them, the issue of global governance is rapidly moving up in the international political agenda. In this book, Bunzl draws on the work of a number of leading evolutionary thinkers to show that both the process of globalization itself and the evolution of a binding system of global governance are natural parts of human evolution.**

The central dilemma of achieving a healthy form of global governance, Bunzl shows, is that its implementation must be by popular consent, and yet it must also be consented to and implemented by nation-states. For only nation-states have the authority and capacity to do so. But present inter-governmental efforts to solve global warming and other global problems are proving wholly inadequate and are showing the nation-state system to be incapable of such a move. The solution, Bunzl argues, is to devise a way for global citizens to use their votes in their respective national elections to drive their politicians and governments to implement global governance and to do so in a way that does not require nations to act against their own self-interest. Furthermore, he presents the Simultaneous Policy as one means by which this can be achieved, arguing it to be the world's first genuine form of global electoral politics.

Beyond this, if the evolution of global governance is a natural, albeit by no means assured, evolutionary phenomenon, Bunzl argues that any organization purporting to become the world's over-arching institution of global governance would likely have to display characteristics which are in substantial accord with the dynamics of evolutionary transformation. These dynamics have, after all, already been set out very clearly by the prominent American philosopher, Ken Wilber, in his "20 Tenets of Holons and Holarchies." The value of Wilber's 20 Tenets is that they provide reasonably objective criteria against which to analyze and compare the various existing and emergent global governance initiatives (as well as existing institutions such as the United Nations) to assess their potential, or otherwise, for evolving to become the world's organization of binding global governance.

Bunzl proceeds to analyze the International Simultaneous Policy Organization (ISPO), tenet by tenet, making a convincing argument as to its congruity with Wilber's Tenets and its potential for effecting global transformation at all levels of the human social holarchy towards a system of people-centered global governance.

Source: Simultaneous Policy  
[www.simpol.org](http://www.simpol.org)

# Do Space and Action Have to be Contradictory? Toward an Inclusive WSF Strategy

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Science Network

2008/04/14

**Global governance  
building strategies**

**Non-State Actors**

**Perspectives and  
scenarios**

**Political innovation**

**Is the WSF still the most appropriate vehicle for the new stage in the struggle of the global justice and peace movement? Or, having fulfilled its historic function of aggregating and linking the diverse counter-movements spawned by global capitalism, is it time for the WSF to fold up its tent and give way to new modes of global organization of resistance and transformation?**

The major problem in the present strategic debate regarding the future of WSF is that those who feel that it has outlived its utility, or has become stagnant as a 'space', have not provided a compelling alternative, except rather lamely proposing that it become a platform for action, rather than reflection.

Which is not to deny that there persists an unease regarding the outcome of the seven year old WSF process; whether it has been successful in denting the neoliberal World order, particularly when one considers the enormous resources, time and energy that goes in organizing each World forum. It is true that many participating movements have been beset with the question: Is it worth it?

It has been pointed out by many that the immense diversity and plurality present in the forum process would make it not only difficult, but most likely a divisive exercise to work out joint actions. Joint action requires a certain amount of ideological cohesiveness; to demand that from a platform of political diversity like the WSF would most certainly bring in sectarian considerations to the fore, thereby diminishing the broad-based nature of the forum. Others have countered that joint action does not have to be carved out for more than a few issues – like global peace, trade regimes and so on, which may not pose insurmountable sectarian problems.

The space the WSF provides is vital to enlarge the existing action forums and forge new ones; therefore the WSF has not exhausted its historical role. The potential for 'space – action' symbiosis that the WSF has innovated should in fact not be a transitory phase at all, but an ongoing new form of political organization. What is necessary is to pay heed to the organizational and political shortcomings and limitations of the WSF process, rather than suggest abandoning it altogether. These shortcomings and limitations relate to the participation in the decision making processes of the WSF, the restricted nature of its IC, the organizing principles of the various forums, and the facilitation and liaison processes of the WSF.

Source: Alternatives International  
<http://alternatives-international.net/article1780.html>

# Civil Society's Impact on the Multilateral Sphere: Lessons Learned and Future Directions

2007/03/13

Agendas and  
roadmaps

Fighting poverty and  
inequalities

International  
institutions

Multilateralism

Non-State Actors

**This is a report of Forum International de Montréal's (FIM) Annual Forum "Civil Society's Impact on the Multilateral Sphere: Lessons Learned and Future Directions", held in March, 2007 in Montréal, Québec, Canada. Forum objectives were to: define the challenges and opportunities facing future Civil Society Organization/Non Governmental Organization (CSO/NGO) relations with multilateral bodies and systems; identify the present and emerging governance issues and priorities arising from these challenges and opportunities; and identify concrete means by which CSOs/NGOs can address these issues in the coming five years.**

For two days, leading civil society practitioners and academics focused on these objectives. They examined the challenges and opportunities for civil society relations within the contexts of the changing, often nebulous and opaque, "post-911", global and regional multilateral systems and of emerging new phenomena such as the rise of a global civil society, resource capture, and politics of identity. Important patterns of change were discerned in these discussions, including: the growing rich/poor gap; the power of information technology to change global civil society; the growing priority of climate change; the erosion of global multilateralism; the rising southern powers; the new, more visible, role of Islamic civil society; and the emergence of China as a superpower. Participants identified two major interrelated issues critical to successful CSO/multilateral engagement: closing the existing knowledge gaps on all aspects of multilateralism and civil society and strengthening issue-based, proactive CSO leadership. These two means of engagement were seen to be critical for strengthening CSO legitimacy and accountability.

In their efforts to see beyond the horizon, participants were able to put into focus some quasi-invisible trends that are bound to shape FIM's work in the immediate future and beyond.

Three major observations stand out. First, international civil society is increasingly moving its advocacy from global multilateral bodies to regional bodies, a shift which FIM will investigate more closely in preparation for next year's Forum in Addis Ababa. Second, there is a growing need for stronger civil society leadership, an issue many NGOs are reluctant to face, but which is a clear prerequisite for dealing in a complex and changing environment. Third, the entry of China into Africa, coupled with clear evidence of a burgeoning and autonomous civil society within China, opens up new concerns and opportunities for FIM and similar bodies.

Source: Montréal International Forum  
[www.fimcivilsociety.org](http://www.fimcivilsociety.org)

**Montréal  
International  
Forum**

2005/06/01

**Democratic  
Globalization**

**Democratization**

**Human Security**

**International  
institutions**

**Non-State Actors**

**United Nations**

# **Global Democracy: Civil Society Visions and Strategies (G05) Conference Report**

**Close to 400 participants from 45 countries gathered in Montréal, Québec, Canada from May 29 to June 1, 2005 for the Global Democracy: Civil Society Visions and Strategies (G05) Conference. Participants from civil society organizations—together with representatives of governments, private entities, and intergovernmental organizations— shared civil society perspectives on the key issues that determine the state of global democracy. They discussed how to democratize the international system of governance and developed proposals to tackle the democratic deficit plaguing global governance. They also devised visions and strategies to guide discussions and action leading up to the Millennium +5 Summit hosted by the United Nations in September and other relevant events.**

This report is the result of a collective effort by conference reporters and volunteers. Their work has been combined to produce a report that highlights the varied discussions and themes of the conference, and reflects its participatory nature.

Two background papers provided gist for the discussions. Dr. Rajesh Tandon, President of the FIM (Forum International de Montréal) Board and President of PRIA (Participatory Research in Asia) prepared a framing document entitled “Democratization of Global Governance,” in which he provided five principles on which civil society actions ought to be based:

- Global institutions and agenda should be subjected to democratic political accountability.
- Democratic policy at the global level requires legitimacy of popular control through representative and direct mechanisms.
- Citizen participation in decision making at global levels requires equality of opportunity to all citizens of the world.
- Multiple spheres of governance, from local to provincial to national to regional and global, should mutually support democratization of decision making at all levels.
- Global democracy must guarantee that global public goods are equitably accessible to all citizens of the world.

In the other background paper, “Promising Visions and Strategies to Advancing Global Democracy: Policy Brief,” James V. Riker addressed emerging trends in global democratic governance. He proposed questions through which to assess the main possibilities for enhancing democratic participation, empowerment, and governance during the opening-day discussion panel.

Participants considered the viability of these and other possibilities throughout the conference in plenaries and breakout sessions that touched on the major crosscutting themes for advancing global democracy in G05’s following six tracks:

- Track 1: Civil society engagement: Changing territorial priorities?
- Track 2: International treaties/International law: A hierarchy of values?
- Track 3: Global security: Undermining democracy?
- Track 4: Civil society participation; Opportunities and responsibilities
- Track 5: How to democratically regulate the global economy?
- Track 6: Maintaining cultural diversity in global solidarity?

In addition, papers were presented within the self-organized workshops, dealing with a several issues, most of them related to the Civil Society role for promoting democratic regulation of global governance, its relationship with International Institutions, the reform of these ones, the solidarity economy, the Charter of Human Responsibilities, etc.

Source: Forum International de Montréal  
[www.fimcivilsociety.org](http://www.fimcivilsociety.org)

# Can Civil Society Influence G8 Accountability?

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2007/11

**Democratization**

**International  
institutions**

**Non-State Actors**

**Transparency,  
accountability**

**This study outlines the mandate and activities of the Group of Eight (G8), examines for what and to whom the G8 is accountable, reviews the range and types of civil society groups interacting with the G8, and discusses how and to what extent this engagement has promoted or failed to promote G8 accountability through various actions: policy studies, evaluation and monitoring of commitments; petitions, lobbying, mobilisation and media campaigns; demonstrations and protests; dialogue; alternative summits; and participation in multi-stakeholder partnerships. The paper then analyses attitudes, procedures, structures and other factors that have helped or hindered civil society's contribution to G8 accountability.**

The G8 is a powerful club of what is usually called the major industrial democracies - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Several economic shocks and other major events in the early 1970s led to the emergence of the group. Since that beginning, when the G7 focused on economic and financial issues, the G7/G8 agenda has grown incrementally to embrace more and more topics: political concerns, and later a great number of diverse transnational, global issues from the environment to terrorism and infectious diseases.

The main roles today are deliberation, direction-giving, and decision-making as well as global governance and domestic political management functions. The summit allows the attending heads of state and government to exercise political leadership, reconcile domestic and international concerns, develop collective management, and integrate economics and politics in their negotiations and decisions.

The support apparatus of each G8 leader is led by a personal representative (sherpa), as well as (since 2001) an Africa Personal Representative, two sous-sherpas (one economic, the other financial), a political director, and, of course, a large retinue of logistical, security and other staff. Because the G8 is not based on a founding charter -unlike the UN Charter or similar constitutive intergovernmental agreement - there are no built-in institutional mechanisms to set out or regulate the nature of interaction with other actors. Nor does the G8 have a secretariat (although G8 member countries do have their own administrative structures related to the G8); so there can be no structured, continuing machinery through which civil society and other non-state players can interact with the G8.

But those institutional and structural constraints have not prevented substantial and on balance positive interaction between the G8 and civil society. This paper aims to show, in a historical and pragmatic context, how that complex interaction has promoted or failed to promote G8 accountability.

The study concludes that the concept of accountability, although problematic, is applicable to the G8: leaders are individually accountable to their national electorates, to the global community, to regional and global governance agencies and to their fellow leaders. G8 transparency is still

inadequate, but answerability for actions is stronger. Accountability for other global governance agencies is weaker, and accountability to the leaders' peers is nebulous. Accountability to those affected by G8 decisions varies by issue area but generally is not particularly strong. The greatest accountability gap is the lack of an enforcement mechanism. The most important conclusion is that civil society has enhanced G8 accountability but that this role has not yet reached its potential.

Source: CSGR Working Paper Series 235/07. October, 2007

# Civil Society and the Legitimation of Global Governance

Jan Aart  
SCHOLTE

2007/03

International Law

Legitimacy

Non-State Actors

Social and economic  
policies

**Along with the general intensified globalisation of social relations in contemporary history has come an unprecedented expansion of regulatory apparatuses that cover planetary jurisdictions and constituencies. On the whole, however, this global governance remains weak relative to pressing current needs for global public policy. Shortfalls in moral standing, legal foundations, material delivery, democratic credentials and charismatic leadership have together generated large legitimacy deficits in existing global regimes.**

This fragile overall legitimacy has in turn constituted a major obstacle to achieving the substantial further growth of global-scale regulation that is required to secure decent human lives for all in a more global world. Insufficient capacities for global governance and insufficient legitimacy of global governance are thus coupled in damaging mutual reinforcement.

This paper argues that – although there are of course considerable variations across different global governance institutions and different civil society initiatives – the general picture has been one of but partially realised potentials of legitimacy promotion. Like the tip of the proverbial iceberg, civil society activities concerning global regulation have so far made visible only a fraction of the total mass of possibilities. Hence prescriptions for the future centre on ‘more’ and ‘better’.

Regarding more quantity, urgently required greater positive legitimation of global governance can be promoted with more civil society engagement, covering more regulatory institutions and extending through more stages of the policy process. Regarding better quality, to have greater positive legitimation effects civil society relations with global governance generally need to be more inclusive, more competent, more coordinated, and more accountable. Both sides to the interchange – civil society associations on the one hand and global regulatory bodies on the other – can take a range of measures to further these ends.

Source: CSGR Working Paper No. 223/07. March 2007

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2007/03

Human Security

Political innovation

Regions' Role

Rights

Values and principles

Views on Global  
Governance

# Giving Africa Voice within Global Governance: Oral History, Human Rights and the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council

This paper seeks to present three key arguments that need to be taken into account during the process of remaking of the world order and recreation of a new global governance architecture. Firstly, it raises the key issue of the African continent and the African people being perceived as a problem to be solved rather than a voice to be heard within global politics. It calls for the African continent to transcend its current 'subaltern position' in international relations and make its voice heard within global governance. Secondly, it make a case for the use of oral history as an ideal medium to bring the voices of the subaltern to the notice of the Human Rights Council and as a key methodology in the current endeavour to understand different situations of human rights violations. Finally, it grapples with the important question of whose values and whose voice should underpin the universal human rights discourse and global governance.

The setting up of the United Nations Human Rights Council with a responsibility for promoting universal human rights at this crucial moment in human history must be appreciated as long as it will manage to facilitate dialogue and in the process breaking the strong bonds of Western hegemonic monologue and cultural imperialism.

The current universalism is not a product of democracy and consensus, but was largely created through conquest and violence. The main crisis in the current human rights regime is that it has taken the form of Euro-American neo-liberalism masquerading as universalism, imposing its core values across the world as global values, and inevitably provoking contestations and resistance. Universalism should take the form of an achievement of progressive human efforts rather than a product of conquest and domination.

As the human globe reconstitute itself into a 'global village,' the emphasis on individual rights is no longer adequate and sufficient as the basis of peaceful human co-existence for this extended global family. The image of the human globe as a 'village' raises the question of the importance of communal rights if this village is to be habitable. It also raises the issue of values to underpin life in this village.

This village should be governed by the spirit of ubuntu which emphasises interdependence of human beings. Under ubuntu there is space for the subaltern to survive. Ubuntu emphasises the importance of empathy, sharing and cooperation.

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2005/11

**Democratic  
Globalization**

**Democratization**

**Non-State Actors**

**Transparency,  
accountability**

## **The Democratic Legitimacy of Public-Private Rule Making: What Can We Learn from the World Commission of Dams?**

**This article attempts to provide answers to one specific and one general question: How should we evaluate the performance of the World Commission of Dams in terms of its democratic legitimacy? And what does the evaluation of the commission's performance tell us about the legitimacy of global rule making in more general terms? Based on these questions, the article comes to two main conclusions. First, the democratic legitimacy of the World Commission of Dams' standard-setting process can be challenged in several ways. Second, the difficulties of determining the commission's legitimacy in relation to other mechanisms of rule making demonstrate that we still lack a theoretical understanding of what the idea of democratic governance beyond the nation-state will entail in practice.**

The author argues that the World Commission on Dams (WCD) serves as a good starting point for learning about the legitimacy of global rule making. Established in 1998 as a trisectoral network that included members of governments, civil society, and business, the WCD in its two-year deliberations developed a catalog of principles and guidelines for future dam building.

The WCD process has a mixed record if evaluated according to absolute or ideal standards of democratic legitimacy. On the one hand, the process achieved a relatively broad participation of affected actors, and its recommendations rest on the support of the major stakeholder groups. On the other, the three categories of (inter)governmental, business, and civil-society actors do not adequately reflect the actual patterns of affectedness. The fact that a small and select group of insiders decided what constituted stakeholder groups can, from the perspective of democratic theory, hardly be legitimated. In addition, the WCD process granted all interests equal treatment, whereas a rights-based approach would have required a much more differentiated consideration of whom to include and in what ways.

Evaluation of the WCD from a democratic-legitimacy perspective should also involve a comparison between the WCD as an instance of public-private rule making and an intergovernmental negotiation process as an instance of public rule making. The result of any such comparison is thus likely to be that both processes suffer from different kinds of democratic deficits. For example, whereas public-private rule making may be more inclusive than intergovernmental processes, it suffers from the lack of formal accountability, specially for NGOs and corporations.

These difficulties demonstrate that we are still far from a theoretical understanding of what the idea of democratic governance beyond the nation entails in more practical and concrete terms. Thus, the normative evaluation of world politics faces similar challenges as its empirical analysis. For the latter, it is suggested that we reconsider our conceptual frameworks. The

author puts the example of James Roseneau's proposal to speak no longer of international politics, but rather of global governance.

Source: *Global Governance*, 11 (2005), 65-83.

**Permanent People's  
Tribunal**

2006/02/02

**Environmental  
Governance**

**Global governance  
building strategies**

**Legitimacy**

**Market economy**

**Political innovation**

**Regions' Role**

**Transnational  
Corporations**

# Hearing on Neo-liberal Politics and European Transnational Corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean

The EU-LAC bi-regional network requested to convene a session of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (PPT) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in Latin America on 2 February 2006, to investigate the increasingly dominant role of European TNCs in strategic areas, such as services, infrastructure, petroleum, water, finance and telecommunications. They particularly asked for an examination of the threats thereby posed to political sovereignty, development policy, economic autonomy, environmental sustainability and democratisation in Latin America.

The network of organizations represented in Enlazando Alternativas 2 (EA2) requested a hearing of many cases from Latin American countries on aspects of life and work, rather than a formal judgment. The hearings of the PPT took place in three sessions following an opening session, each lasting around 4 hours. A detailed dossier of case studies and complaints was submitted to the jury. Witnesses and experts presented orally the documented cases and also answered questions posed by members of the jury.

The members of the jury of the PPT heard testimony and case studies concerning several European TNCs and banks and in particular, of the complicity of European governments that aid and abet their own TNCs, as well as that of several International Financial Institutions and bilateral free trade agreements and investment treaties, that pave the way for the exploitative activities of the TNCs.

The cases covered several areas of TNC activities and their impact on: natural resources, labour rights, public services with particular emphasis on water provision, sewage and electricity, the role of global finance and the role of TNCs active in financial services in Latin America, the food chain and agricultural diversity, the oil and gas industry. The cases concerned abuses of human, social, cultural and workers' rights, their irresponsible and sometimes irreversible actions towards the environment and their complete disregard for the welfare of local communities.

The cross-fertilization of action and analysis, that this Tribunal seeks to foster, makes its work more than a mere academic exercise, but rather a genuine effort to contribute with its experience to a common endeavour of social, environmental and labour movements in both regions.

Source: Enlazando Alternativas 2  
[www.enlazandoalternativas.org](http://www.enlazandoalternativas.org)

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2001/10

**Evolution of the role  
of the state**

**International  
institutions**

**Rights**

**Social and economic  
policies**

**Sustainable  
development**

# **The Extraterritorial Scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)**

**While investigating the extraterritorial scope of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), this paper introduces the threefold classification of internal, external, and international obligations applicable to all Human Rights treaties. Moreover, it emphasizes that most Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are duty-bound under Human Rights treaties and suggests steps to operationalize the related obligations of states. This paper looks at some relevant articles of the ICESCR, its interpretation, the nature of extraterritorial obligations, and offers some remarks and proposals.**

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is perhaps the most violated international treaty of all. This includes both internal, external, and international obligations. For the victims, and for all of us as fellow human beings whose rights have been recognized in the Covenant, it offers an important point of departure toward a new world order where our economic, social, and cultural rights are realized. Such a realization requires a Human Rights accountability of international institutions and external business activities. For this to happen, the extraterritorial scope of the ICESCR must be allowed to bear fruits. The political challenge is there.

The paper first looks at some relevant articles of the ICESCR and considers the interpretative work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It then draws some conclusions on the nature of the different types of extraterritorial obligations. It makes some concluding remarks along with recommendations for next steps.

The ICESCR offers a wide extraterritorial scope, which has been largely under-utilized. The Covenant was conceived as a centerpiece for a new world order in the aftermath of a devastating war - a world based on universal rights and global cooperation. Today, almost 60 years later, this new world order is still far from being achieved. One of the reasons might very well be the failure to fully utilize the extraterritorial scope of the International Bill of Human Rights.

One of the main tasks of the new century will be the transition to sustainability: this will mean drastic changes both in the North and in the South: population growth will have to come to an end. The same is true for a contradictory economic paradigm based on the endless destruction of finite natural resources. The paradigm of aggressive growth - aggressive towards Nature, including our fellow human beings, ourselves, and our children - will have to be replaced by a culture of peaceful and regulated sharing.

The extraterritorial scope of the ICESCR provides an opportunity for state

parties to meet these global challenges of the twenty-first century. The first step will be to start operationalizing extraterritorial obligations. They entail institutional consequences - for example the reform of the United Nations Organization.

Source: FIAN  
[www.fian.org](http://www.fian.org)

# Another System of International Relations

**Gustave MASSIAH**

Association  
internationale de  
techniciens, experts et  
chercheurs (AITEC),  
Francia

2004/10

**The current international system is forcing the adjustment of every society to adapt the global market and to its dominant logic; it is barring all paths to social transformation. The search for alternatives to the transformation of every society requires another international system. To move along in the definition of a strategy, the author proposes guidelines organized around two imperatives: a new global constitution founded on global democracy; a global social contract founded on the respect and guarantee of rights, civil as well as political, economic, social, and cultural.**

## **Democratization**

### **International institutions**

### **Rights**

### **Territorial Representation**

### **United Nations**

The guidelines for global democracy and a global social contract give direction and perspective for building a new foundation for the international UN system. The proposal is to take as a strategic vector for their implementation the movements and the fights for the democratization of international relations. Let us mention five: the fights and movements for international law, for debt cancellation, for an international taxing system, for corporate social and environmental responsibility, and for the reform of the international financial institutions.

Leaning on the fights for democratization, a radical platform for an international system can be proposed. It includes: democratization of the institutions that are to implement international regulations; the institution of arbitration bodies and efficient recourses; an international claims system open to court referral by citizen organizations; the fight against impunity made a priority in the international system; the effective integration into the United Nations system of the international financial and trade institutions - the IMF, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the WTO; a new global architecture possibly founded on regional cooperation ensembles and a system of regional representation; obligation of agreements and international pacts, and for all international institutions to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Source: L'autre campagne  
[www.lautrecampagne.org](http://www.lautrecampagne.org)

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