

Forging A World Of Liberty Under Law

U.S. National Security In The 21st Century
Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security

G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter
Co-Directors

The Princeton Project Papers

The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Princeton University

THE
PRINCETON
PROJECT
ON NATIONAL SECURITY

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The Princeton Project on National Security is a three-year, bipartisan initiative to develop a sustainable and effective national security strategy for the United States of America. Under the stewardship of honorary co-chairs George Shultz and Anthony Lake, the Princeton Project brought together leading thinkers on national security from government, academe, business, and the non-profit sector to analyze key issues and develop innovative responses to a range of national security threats.

Through the generous support of the Ford Foundation, Mr. David M. Rubenstein, and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, the Princeton Project has:

- Convened and published the findings of seven working groups that addressed different aspects of national security—including grand strategy, state security and transnational threats, economics and national security, reconstruction and development, anti-Americanism, relative threat assessment, and foreign policy infrastructure and global institutions;
- Held nine conferences in the United States and abroad to explore major issues pertaining to U.S. national security ranging from the use of preventive force to the role of the private sector;
- Commissioned seventeen working papers on critical security topics that hitherto had received scant attention.

The Princeton Project culminates with the release of this final report by project co-directors G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Over the next nine months the co-directors will present their findings at a series of events in the United States, Europe, and Asia.

For copies of Princeton Project working group papers or to learn more, visit the Princeton Project website at www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns. Please direct inquiries to ecolagiu@princeton.edu.

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FOREWORD

For the past two years we have served as the honorary co-chairs of the Princeton Project on National Security. During that time the project has undertaken a far-reaching examination of U.S. national security strategy and the international security environment, with the goal of strengthening the intellectual underpinnings of American strategy. The Princeton Project has pursued this goal in a remarkably bipartisan spirit, drawing broadly on the experiences and insights of Republicans and Democrats to produce a report articulating core principles to guide the nation in the decades ahead.

We had the privilege to hold leadership positions in the formation of U.S. national security policy during the Cold War and its aftermath – periods when the formulation of clear strategic principles was essential for the protection of U.S. security. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. policy was grounded in the doctrine of containment, first articulated by George Kennan, which aimed to prevent the spread of communism. The containment doctrine influenced all aspects of national security strategy, from the formation of strong alliances with other democracies to support for anti-communist groups around the world. In the end, Kennan was proved right; contained from without, the Soviet Union ultimately crumbled from within.

The United States must deal with series of profound changes in the international landscape, including rising new powers, a tightening energy market, increasing anti-Americanism, and a globalized economy. Serious security threats emanate from instability in the Middle East, Islamic radicalism, global terrorist networks, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the spread of infectious diseases, and global warming. At the same time, tremendous opportunities exist for the advancement of democracy, prosperity, and respect for human rights in much of the world.

Despite this altered landscape and the many changes in U.S. policy since 9/11, the United States lacks a clear statement of national security principles with broad bipartisan support. The George W. Bush administration has issued two national security strategies since 2002; Democratic groups from the Congress and various think tanks have put forward national security reports and sets of principles. The Princeton Project has benefited from all of these and has tried to build on overlapping areas of consensus in charting America's future course.

As Colin Powell observed in his 2004 address at Princeton University in honor of Kennan's 100th birthday, "because Kennan could see more deeply, he could predict more accurately." Following Kennan's example, the Princeton Project sets forth a security strategy grounded in a systematic and probing assessment of current trends and likely future conditions.

This important report is a testament to the outstanding leadership of project co-directors Anne-Marie Slaughter and G. John Ikenberry and a talented and broad-gauged steering committee. It argues for an American grand strategy of forging a world of liberty under law by supporting popular, accountable, and rights-regarding governments; building a liberal international order; and updating rules on the use of force. The strategy's principles transcend partisan lines. Although their implementation would differ across administrations, their application would strengthen the capacity of the United States to protect the American people and the American way of life for years to come.

Anthony Lake
Georgetown University

George Shultz
Hoover Institution

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Princeton Project's aim was to write a collective "X article," to do together what no one person in our highly specialized and rapidly changing world could hope to do alone. Arguably, even someone of George Kennan's caliber could not tackle the breadth of issues required to formulate a successful national security strategy today. While we are the authors of the ultimate report and take sole responsibility for its views – and any vices – our thinking has been shaped by a tremendous collective effort on the part of leading policymakers, scholars, and private sector professionals with a wide range of expertise in traditional security fields as well as emerging issues.

Nearly four hundred individuals contributed their time and talents to the Princeton Project over the past two years. We are deeply grateful. The project participants have come together in many different places in many different ways, for conferences, workshops, roundtable discussions, and working group meetings. We are pleased and proud to recognize the institutions that hosted or co-sponsored these events. The full list of participants and partner institutions appears in Appendix C.

A very special thanks to honorary co-chairs George Shultz and Anthony Lake for their stewardship of this endeavor. As graduates of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs who have made their careers shaping our country's national security strategy in various ways, their spirit and their service has animated the project from the beginning. They came to Princeton, actually and virtually, to launch the project in May 2004 and have both participated in the substance of our discussions in many ways since then. We hope that many present and future Princeton students will read this report and be inspired to follow in their footsteps.

We are particularly indebted to our steering committee members, who also served as co-chairs of the project's seven working groups. Frederick Barton, Peter Bergen, Christopher Chyba, Harold Feiveson, Michael Froman, Francis Fukuyama, Laurie Garrett, Tod Lindberg, Suzanne Nossel, Joseph Nye, Adam Posen, Daniel Tarullo, and David Victor were instrumental in providing overall direction, authoring working group reports, chairing roundtable discussions, and providing detailed feedback on previous drafts of this report. They have been with us from the beginning, and through countless phone calls and email exchanges. Their ideas and their prose appear in many places in the final report.

Others whose comments and reactions to the draft report were particularly helpful include: Hans Binnendijk, Kurt Campbell, John Caves, Charles Cunningham, Ivo Daalder, Richard Falkenrath, Peter Feaver, Stephen Flanagan, James Keagle, Rachel Kleinfeld, Charles Kupchan, Daniel Kurtzer, Steven Miller, Michael Oppenheimer, Kenneth Pisel, Christopher Preble, Mitchell Reiss, Phillip Saunders, Brad Setser, Matthew Spence, Allison Stanger, Simon Strauss, Robert Wright, and the roundtable participants at the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Defense University, the Truman National Security Project, and the University of Tokyo.

We owe a special debt to Leslie Gelb, whose early support of the project and active participation in our conferences was inspiring and invaluable. Candid conversations with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Madeleine Albright were critical to shaping the final report. Finally, we benefited greatly from the wisdom and insights imparted by Henry Kissinger during two visits to Princeton.

The project would not have been possible without the tireless efforts of our core project staff. Many thanks to William Burke-White and Dawn Yamane Hewett for their drafting assistance, logistical wizardry, and substantive ideas during the first phase of the project. Sarah Saxton-Frump and Jordan Tama did yeoman service in the final editing process. But our greatest debt is to Thomas Wright, our principal drafter over the life of the project, and Elizabeth Colagiuri, our indispensable executive director. The mistakes are ours; the credit is theirs.

The Princeton Project has reached out to scholars and practitioners from across the country and around the world, but we would be remiss if we did not recognize the valuable contributions of our colleagues here at Princeton: Gary Bass, Thomas Christensen, Christina Davis, Mickey Edwards, Edward Felten, Aaron Friedberg, Sheldon Garon, Edmund Hull, Robert Hutchings, Harold James, Stanley Katz, Peter Kenen, Robert Keohane, Paul Krugman, Zia Mian, Paul Miles, Helen Milner, Andrew Moravcsik, Gilbert Rozman, Kim Lane Scheppele, Burton Singer, Joshua Tucker, Richard Ullman, and Frank von Hippel. At every stage, our work was aided also by the Woodrow Wilson School's terrific staff. Special thanks to Steven Barnes, Betteanne Bertrand, Lincoln Crosley, Rebecca Dull, Karyn Olsen, Cynthia Parvesse, and Patricia Trinity.

Finally, we are particularly grateful to David Rubenstein, who believed in this project from the beginning and has funded it generously all the way through. Many thanks are also due to the Ford Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs for their financial support of the project at key stages.

G. John Ikenberry
Project Co-Director

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the first decade of the 21st century the United States must assess the world not through the eyes of World War II, or the Cold War, or even 9/11. Instead, Americans need to recognize that ours is a world lacking a single organizing principle for foreign policy like anti-fascism or anti-communism. We face many present dangers, several long-term challenges, and countless opportunities. This report outlines a new national security strategy tailored both to the world we inhabit and the world we want to create.

OBJECTIVES: The basic objective of U.S. strategy must be to protect the American people and the American way of life. This overarching goal should comprise three more specific aims: 1) *a secure homeland*, including protection against attacks on our people and infrastructure and against fatal epidemics; 2) *a healthy global economy*, which is essential for our own prosperity and security; and 3) *a benign international environment*, grounded in security cooperation among nations and the spread of liberal democracy.

CRITERIA: To achieve these goals in the 21st century, American strategy must meet six basic criteria. It needs to be: 1) *multidimensional*, operating like a Swiss army knife, able to deploy different tools for different situations on a moment's notice; 2) *integrated*, fusing hard power – the power to coerce – and soft power – the power to attract; 3) *interest-based rather than threat-based*, building frameworks of cooperation centered on common interests with other nations rather than insisting that they accept our prioritization of common threats; 4) *grounded in hope rather than fear*, offering a positive vision of the world and using our power to advance that vision in cooperation with other nations; 5) *pursued inside-out*, strengthening the domestic capacity, integrity, and accountability of other governments as a foundation of international order and capacity; and 6) *adapted to the information age*, enabling us to be fast and flexible in a world where information moves instantly, actors respond to it instantly, and specialized small units come together for only a limited time for a defined purpose – whether to make a deal, restructure a company, or plan and execute a terrorist attack.

FORGING A WORLD OF LIBERTY UNDER LAW

America must stand for, seek, and secure a world of liberty under law. Our founders knew that the success of the American experiment rested on the combined blessings of order and liberty, and by order they meant law. Internationally, Americans would be safer, richer, and healthier in a world of countries that have achieved this balance – mature liberal democracies. Getting there requires:

BRINGING GOVERNMENTS UP TO PAR: Democracy is the best instrument that humans have devised for ensuring individual liberty over the long term, but only when it exists within a framework of order established by law. We must develop a much more sophisticated strategy of creating the deeper preconditions for successful liberal democracy – preconditions that extend far beyond the simple holding of elections. The United States should assist and encourage Popular, Accountable, and Rights-regarding (PAR) governments worldwide.

To help bring governments up to PAR, we must connect them and their citizens in as many ways as possible to governments and societies that are already at PAR and provide them with incentives and support to follow suit. We should establish and institutionalize networks of national, regional, and local government officials and nongovernmental representatives to create numerous channels for PAR nations and others to work on common problems and to communicate and inculcate the values and practices that safeguard liberty under law.

BUILDING A LIBERAL ORDER: The system of international institutions that the United States and its allies built after World War II and steadily expanded over the course of the Cold War is broken. Every major institution – the United Nations (U.N.), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – and countless smaller ones face calls for major reform. The United States has the largest stake of any nation in fixing this system, precisely because we are the most powerful nation in the world. Power cannot be wielded unilaterally, and in the pursuit of a narrowly drawn definition of the national interest, because such actions breed growing resentment, fear, and resistance. We need to reassure other nations about our global role and win their support to tackle common problems.

However, it is clear that America can no longer rely on the legacy institutions of the Cold War; radical surgery is required. The United Nations is simultaneously in crisis and in demand. Its structures are outdated and its performance is inadequate, yet it remains the world's principal forum for addressing the most difficult international security issues. America must make sweeping U.N. reform a political priority. Necessary reforms include: expanding the Security Council to include India, Japan, Brazil, Germany, and two African states as permanent members without a veto; ending the veto for all Security Council resolutions authorizing direct action in response to a crisis; and requiring all U.N. members to accept “the responsibility to protect,” which acknowledges that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from “avoidable catastrophe,” but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the international community.

While pushing for reform of the United Nations and other major global institutions, the United States should work with its friends and allies to develop a global “Concert of Democracies” – a new institution designed to strengthen security cooperation among the world's liberal democracies. This Concert would institutionalize and ratify the “democratic peace.” If the United Nations cannot be reformed, the Concert would provide an alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective action, including the use of force, by a supermajority vote. Its membership would be selective, but self-selected. Members would have to pledge not to use or plan to use force against one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept the responsibility to protect.

The United States must also: revive the NATO alliance by updating its grand bargains and expanding its international partnerships; build a “networked order” of informal institutions, such as private networks and bilateral ties; and reduce the sharply escalating and politically destabilizing inequalities among and within states that result from the generally beneficial process of globalization.

RETHINKING THE ROLE OF FORCE: At their core, both liberty and law must be backed up by force. Instead of insisting on a doctrine of primacy, the United States should aim to sustain the military predominance of liberal democracies and encourage the development of military capabilities by like-minded democracies in a way that is consistent with their security interests. The predominance of liberal democracies is necessary to prevent a return to destabilizing and dangerous great power security competition; it would also augment our capacity to meet the various threats and challenges that confront us.

America must dust off and update doctrines of deterrence. The United States should announce – preferably with our allies – that in the case of an act of nuclear terrorism, we will hold the source of the nuclear materials or weapon responsible. We must also ensure that our deterrent remains credible against countries with different strategic cultures and varied military national security doctrines. And we must find ways of deterring suppliers of nuclear weapons materials from transferring them – deliberately or inadvertently – to terrorists.

America should develop new guidelines on the preventive use of force against terrorists and extreme states. Preventive strikes represent a necessary tool in fighting terror networks, but they should be proportionate and based on intelligence that adheres to strict standards. The preventive use of force against states should be very rare, employed only as a last resort and authorized by a multilateral institution – preferably a reformed Security Council, but alternatively by the existing Security Council or another broadly representative multilateral body like NATO.

MAJOR THREATS AND CHALLENGES

THE MIDDLE EAST: Preventing the cradle of civilizations from becoming the cradle of global conflict must be a top priority. Any long-term solution in the Middle East must include a comprehensive two-state solution in Israel and Palestine; the United States should take the lead in doing everything possible to advance this goal or get caught trying. This push for peace should be accompanied by a steady process of institution building to establish a framework of liberty under law among Middle Eastern nations. In an effort to combat radicalization in Middle Eastern states, the United States should make every effort to work with Islamic governments and Islamic/Islamist movements, including fundamentalists, as long as they disavow terrorism and other forms of civic violence.

America must take considerable risks to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapons capacity. However, we must also be prepared to offer Iran assurances that assuage its legitimate fears, such as a negative security assurance, the reliable provision to it of peaceful fissile materials, and international influence commensurate with its position. On the other hand, the United States should make it clear that life as a nuclear weapons power, if it came to pass, would be a thoroughly miserable experience for Iran.

The United States should make it clear to Iraqis that we remain willing and ready to do everything we can to rebuild Iraq and to train and support a government that is up to PAR, but that this will not be sustainable in the context of a full-scale civil war. In cooperation with the Iraqi government, America

should establish a series of benchmarks that would allow U.S. forces to redeploy inside Iraq – to places where they can be useful in building order and avoid becoming entangled in internecine civil conflict – and outside Iraq. The United States must also work with the European Union and Russia to prevent a spillover of the Iraqi conflict into the rest of the region; this effort should include the provision of incentives to regional powers to behave responsibly and the imposition of costs on those countries that exacerbate the crisis.

GLOBAL TERROR NETWORKS: Framing the struggle against terrorism as a war similar to World War II or the Cold War lends legitimacy and respect to an enemy that deserves neither; the result is to strengthen, not degrade, our adversary. Labeling terrorists as Islamic warriors has a similar effect. Terror networks represent a global insurgency with a criminal core; our response must take the form of a global counterinsurgency that utilizes a range of tools, particularly law enforcement, intelligence, and surgical military tools, such as special forces. Our priorities must be to prevent the formation of a nexus between terror networks and nuclear weapons, to destroy the hard core of terrorists, and to peel away terrorist supporters and sympathizers. The ability of terror networks to dictate the agenda of the world's leading powers is a crucial source of their strength; the United States must not dance to this tune. In the longer run, building a world of liberty under law will make it harder for specific grievances and fanatical ideologies to take root and grow into global violence.

THE PROLIFERATION AND TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: The world is on the cusp of a new era of nuclear danger. Life in a nuclear crowd promises to be unstable and fraught with peril, from the risk of the collapse of a nuclear state to the potential failure of deterrence in a sea of uncertainty. These problems are not separate but part of a general breakdown of the global non-proliferation regime. Thus, we must reform and revive the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by revising Article IV to allow non-nuclear weapons states nuclear energy but not nuclear capacity and by taking concrete steps to live up to our commitment under Article VI to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons. We should also use aggressive counter-proliferation measures, including locking down all insecure nuclear weapons and materials, building on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict the trade in nuclear materials, and developing plans to intervene effectively if a nuclear-weapons state like Pakistan or North Korea collapses.

THE RISE OF CHINA AND ORDER IN EAST ASIA: The rise of China is one of the seminal events of the early 21st century. America's goal should not be to block or contain China, but rather to help it achieve its legitimate ambitions within the current international order and to become a responsible stakeholder in Asian and international politics. In Asia more broadly, America should aim to build a trans-Pacific, rather than pan-Asian, regional order – that is, one in which the United States plays a full part. The U.S.-Japan alliance should remain the bedrock of American strategy in East Asia, but the United States should also seek the creation of an East Asian security institution that brings together the major powers – China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and America – for ongoing discussions about regional issues. At the same time, we should continue to strengthen ties with Asia's other emerging power, India, and should formulate policies throughout the region based on the principle that sustained economic growth in Asian countries other than China is the key to managing China's rise.

A GLOBAL PANDEMIC: Highly infectious diseases represent a national security threat of the first order – even though they are not guided by a human hand. Health experts currently warn of the apocalyptic danger of an avian influenza pandemic, which has the potential to kill hundreds of millions of people. Indeed, AIDS already poses a grave security threat. To combat the threat of a another global pandemic, we must invest more in our public health system, provide adequate resources and training to our first responders, build the capacity of foreign governments that are least equipped to deal with disease outbreaks, and create an incentive structure in at-risk countries to ensure that they take necessary public health measures in a timely fashion.

ENERGY: Massive U.S. consumption of oil threatens American security by transferring an enormous amount of wealth from Americans to autocratic regimes and by contributing to climate change and degradation of the environment. The only solution to these problems is to decrease our dependence on oil and provide incentives for investments in energy alternatives. Toward this end the United States should adopt a national gasoline tax that would start at fifty cents per gallon and increase by twenty cents per year for each of the next ten years. This measure should be accompanied by stricter automobile fuel efficiency standards. The United States should also lead international efforts to deal with climate change, seeking a third way between the Kyoto Protocol's requirements for emission reductions and opposition to any binding constraints.

BUILDING A PROTECTIVE INFRASTRUCTURE: The United States must build a stronger protective infrastructure – throughout our society, our government, and the wider world – that helps prevent threats and limits the damage once they materialize. In our society, we must strengthen our public health system, repair a broken communications system, and reform public education so that students attain the skill sets required to achieve our national security objectives. In our government, we need to create “joined-up government;” de-politicize threat assessment; integrate relevant but neglected portfolios, such as economics and health, into the national security policy-making process; and reach out to the private sector. In the wider world, we must work through networks of security officials to contain immediate threats before they reach our shores and should consider defining our border protections beyond our actual physical borders.

INTRODUCTION

On the fifth anniversary of September 11, the world seems a more menacing place than ever.

- Americans and scores of Iraqis are dying daily in an Iraqi conflict that is moving steadily closer to all-out civil war.
- Iran is seeking nuclear weapons; the rise of Iran and the groups it supports threatens to plunge the entire Middle East into chaos.
- Al Qaeda and its associated terrorist networks, many operating within Europe, remain a potent threat, while other groups sponsoring terrorism, such as Hezbollah, are growing in strength.
- Russia, riding high on oil prices approaching \$80 a barrel, has proclaimed that the era of unipolarity is over and is seeking to reclaim its sphere of influence.
- In Asia, North Korea is actively producing nuclear weapons and flexing its military muscle. South Korea is increasingly anti-American. Sino-Japanese political relations are extremely tense, while China is building economic and political relations with the rest of Asia in ways deliberately designed to exclude the United States.
- In Latin America, populist Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez is fomenting a continent-wide anti-U.S. coalition which reflects a deeper anti-globalization backlash fed by dramatic levels of economic and social inequality.
- Large parts of Africa remain riven by conflict, desperately poor, and decimated by AIDS.
- Equally frightening is the prospect of still other global pandemics, such as avian flu, stalking millions of victims across continents.
- The potential security consequences of climate change, from natural disasters to a fierce scramble for territory, are coming into focus.
- At home, long-term U.S. federal budget deficits may lead to an underperforming economy that undermines American global leadership and increases the risks of international financial instability and crises.

These dangers arise against a backdrop of profound changes in the international system.

- Private networks of extremists threaten to gain access to violence capabilities that previously only some states could acquire, thus allowing them to inflict catastrophic damage upon the world and dictate the political agenda of the world's greatest powers in enduring ways. The author Robert Wright has called this the increasing lethality of hatred.
- In a globalized world, threats that are not politically motivated – including climate change, infectious disease, and nuclear meltdown – are increasingly dangerous. Our national security infrastructure is oriented to deal only with threats deliberately directed by a human hand.
- Danger now emanates from weakness as well as strength; distant lands can have a mighty reach, even if they lack modern technology. Failed and failing states can give rise to catastrophic terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional aggression, global instability, massive human rights abuses, AIDS, drug trafficking, and countless other evils. Not all failed and failing states, to be sure, but some, and enough to matter.
- The shifting distribution of power to, and within, Asia is likely to give rise to new problems and exert pressure on an international order that was largely designed to accommodate Atlantic powers. This power shift is a geopolitical event of immense importance, especially given that America has greater interests and commitments in East Asia now than we had in Europe before World War I or World War II.
- The interconnectedness of the global economy has reached heights previously unseen. The world's advanced industrialized societies are heavily dependent on, and sensitive to, each others' decisions, health, prospects, and troubles. Increasingly, America's economic peers may also be political rivals and developing economies with a low per capita gross domestic product, rather than wealthy allies – a development that is likely to have serious implications for managing the global economy and international politics.

The United States has been groping to orient itself in this new world, first after 11/9, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and then after 9/11, the coordinated terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that told Americans we could no longer be safe within our own borders. The Clinton and George W. Bush administrations agreed on the importance of democracy promotion, through their respective strategies of enlarging the democratic community (Clinton) and of ending tyranny wherever and whenever possible (Bush). But promoting democracy is a complicated task; moreover, it does not translate clearly or readily into a specific plan for confronting the roster of threats and challenges listed above.

At the same time, politicians, government officials, scholars, experts, and business leaders differ greatly on our place in the world and how to proceed. The Pentagon proclaims that we have moved from the Cold War to the Long War, meaning a decades-long struggle against what President Bush calls “Islamic fascism.”¹ Meanwhile, our business leaders contend that we are living in the Asian Century, a time when the rise of China and India present enormous economic and political challenges. Foreign policy realists recommend a strategy of “off-shore balancing,” arguing that the scope and scale of America’s overseas security commitments cause more harm than good and need to be reduced considerably. And a growing number of Americans would prefer to try to shut themselves off from globalization itself, with its mass migrations of people, economic disruptions, and ever-lengthening list of dangers.

Complicating matters further, we have repeatedly fallen into a security trap whereby America’s response to threats and dangers exacerbates our predicament. By periodically using our status as the sole superpower to flex our military might, to disdain multilateral institutions, and particularly to try to unilaterally transform the domestic politics of other states, we have triggered a backlash that increases extreme anti-Americanism, discourages key actors from fully cooperating with us, and weakens our global authority. The result undermines our hard power – the power to coerce – and destroys our soft power – the power to attract. As the United States feels increasingly alone in the world, our perception of threats increases and domestic support for unilateral action to address those threats grows, creating a vicious circle. In other words, no matter how well-intentioned our strategy, it can at times contain within it the seeds of its own destruction.

In the first decade of the 21st century, the United States must assess the world not through the eyes of World War II, or the Cold War, or even 9/11. Instead, Americans need to recognize that ours is a world with no single organizing principle like anti-fascism or anti-communism. We face many present dangers, several long-term challenges, and countless opportunities. Much is painfully familiar – ethnic conflict, religious strife, and belligerent nationalism – but much else is strangely new, including technological advances and the emergence of powerful non-state actors. Indeed, as Henry Kissinger has observed, in many ways several geopolitical worlds coexist, with Western Europe and North America in the 21st century, East Asia in the 19th, and the Middle East rooted in the 17th.²

In this world, what does the United States seek – for all Americans, and for all human beings? How do we define our objectives, and what kind of a strategy will we need to achieve those objectives in the 21st century? What principles will serve as our anchor in the coming decades, and what policies will guide us? The answers to these questions must ultimately be the subject of sustained national debate. This report seeks to begin it.

¹ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: 2005); President George W. Bush (remarks to the press, August 10, 2006).

² Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Touchstone, 2002).

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

A national security strategy for the 21st century must address all the dangers we face – diffuse, shifting and uncertain as they are – and seize all the opportunities open to us to make ourselves and the world more secure. It must begin with a clear set of objectives to be achieved and must be shaped according to a set of criteria that will maximize its likelihood of success. It must also be based on a set of overarching premises and principles that will allow us to chart a consistent general course in the world while still adapting individual policies to the context of individual countries, problems, and crises.

OBJECTIVES

In 1948 George Kennan defined national security as “the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers.”³ We are accustomed to thinking about national security threats as politically motivated behavior by a foreign actor, but increasingly we need to think of them as emanating from multiple sources, not just other states. The basic objective of a national security strategy seems obvious: to protect the American people and the American way of life. This report breaks down that overarching goal into three more specific goals: a secure homeland, a healthy global economy, and a benign international environment.

A SECURE HOMELAND

The starting point of any national security strategy must be to protect the United States from foreign conquest, attacks on our people and infrastructure, and fatal epidemics.

Just when a conventional military attack on U.S. territory by a rival state, whether by land, sea, or even air, seems unthinkable, the likelihood of an unconventional attack has put our homeland at greater risk than at any time since our early history. As we know from painful experience, terrorists can wreak death and destruction on a growing scale; moreover, the threat of nuclear terrorism looms greater than any other nuclear threat because of the limits of traditional concepts of deterrence against adversaries who would willingly martyr themselves. We also cannot discount the possibility that a regime hostile to the West may develop the capability to launch a few devastating salvos of revenge against the United States or our allies in a future regional conflict involving American forces.

The security of the homeland extends beyond basic protection from direct violent attacks. It also means securing our economy, our utilities, our health care system, and our principal means of communication

³ George F. Kennan, “Comments on the General Trend of U.S. Foreign Policy,” (George F. Kennan Papers, Princeton University, August 20, 1948).

from a catastrophic cyber-attack. An attack on our food and water supply could lead not only to widespread death, but also to the forced destruction of crops, livestock, and even processing plants, as well as the closing of aquifers. Our reliance on space technology (e.g. satellites) as the linchpin of our civilian and military infrastructure means that an attack in space could severely disrupt our daily lives. Finally, the combination of the rapid global spread of new human diseases, antibiotic-resistant strains of old diseases, and the possibility of bioterrorist attack designed to spread disease means that our population must grapple with the threat posed by an old enemy, one we thought vanquished by the medical advances of the 20th century.

A HEALTHY GLOBAL ECONOMY

Beyond the natural ups and downs of the business cycle, American national security depends on a healthy national economy. More than ever before, however, the strength of our national economy is integrally connected to the health of the global economy. We compete with other countries on a daily basis and rightly seek advantages and a competitive edge; ultimately, though, the prosperity of other nations, open markets, and free trade are critically important to sustaining the American way of life.

Over the longer term, global economic development and international economic integration contribute to stability and peace within countries and regions. They do not make positive outcomes inevitable, but they certainly make these outcomes more likely. By contrast, economic hardship can be immensely destabilizing. It is no accident that after World War II the Truman administration made the development of an open Western economy its top strategic priority – to avoid the fate of the 1930s and to provide a bulwark against communism.

In the 21st century, reaping the economic and political benefits of a healthy national and international economy means being prepared to deal with the risks inherent in globalization, including financial crises, supply shocks, and recessions in important markets. One of the most important ways that the United States is dependent on the global economy is that America has a low savings rate and therefore has to import savings from abroad, leading to a large and growing current account deficit. An additional problem is that managing the global economy, the foundations of which date back to the 1940s, will become increasingly difficult. Although the global economy has long been multipolar, during the Cold War the other poles in the global economy were close allies of the United States. Today, however, China is a potential adversary and India, which has traditionally been neutral, is hardly as close a friend as Japan or the European Union (E.U.). Moreover, the contemporary economic concerns that stem from the rise of new economic powers – such as outsourcing, state financing of corporate takeovers, or increased energy consumption – are not even within the mandates of existing institutions.

The economic development of China and India, which together account for over one-third of the world's population, as well as other potentially large economies like Brazil, Russia, Mexico, and ultimately South Africa and Nigeria, is a positive-sum game, offering enormous opportunities to the world's consumers and producers alike. But managing these countries' growth, integrating them fully into

evolving regional and global economic institutions, and addressing their concerns will be a challenge that we must meet. As Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa wrote in his novel *The Leopard*, “if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.”

A BENIGN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In 1941 Americans learned that the security of their homeland and the viability of the American way of life as a free society depended upon developments in the rest of the world, thus settling an argument that had raged for two generations and had its roots in the nation’s founding. Simply put, we learned that aggressors in far away lands, if left unchecked, would some day threaten the United States. The implications of this lesson were profound. Rather than recoiling in isolation from great power politics, we decided as a nation that it was imperative to play an active and leading role in the world.

Conventional wisdom describes this shift as a necessary response to the very real expansionist threat posed by the Soviet Union. And indeed, the transformation of the Soviet Union from ally to adversary helped overcome what would otherwise almost certainly have been greater domestic resistance to the depth and scale of America’s global involvement in the early years of the Cold War. But American post-war engagement with the world also reflected deeper lessons of the 1930s, lessons that transcended any particular geopolitical configuration.

The crystallization of this shift in American thinking came in NSC-68, the seminal 1950 memo that reorganized and reoriented our national security policy for the Cold War. It laid out the doctrine of containment, but also emphasized our need “to build a healthy international community,” which “we would probably do even if there were no international threat.” We needed then, and we need now, a “world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish.”⁴

In the 1940s the United States advanced this goal by building international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with initiatives like the Marshall Plan, and by encouraging European integration. We also routinely sacrificed our short-term economic and commercial interests to our longer-term security interests, seeing a value in providing global public goods that helped to support and stabilize both regional and global institutions. The results served the interests of many other countries, making it easier for us to pursue our interests as well.

The international system that existed in the late 1940s has changed dramatically; what is needed to make it benign has also changed. However, the objective of creating and maintaining a benign international environment remains crucial to our long-term security, today more than ever due to increasing global interdependence. In practice, it means safeguarding our alliances and promoting security cooperation among liberal democracies, ensuring the safety of Americans abroad as well as at home, avoiding the emergence of hostile great powers or balancing coalitions against the United States, and encouraging liberal democracy and responsible government worldwide.

⁴ NSC-68 as published in Ernest May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 40.

CRITERIA FOR A SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY

A successful national security strategy for the 21st century must meet six basic criteria. It must be:

1. **MULTIDIMENSIONAL:** Post-9/11, America has understandably been focused overwhelmingly on terrorism. But a successful long-term national security strategy must be a post-post-9/11 strategy. It must take into account the totality of America's interests and be able to meet multiple threats and challenges simultaneously. It must be coherent and based on a set of overarching principles, but must also function like a Swiss army knife, able to deploy different tools for different situations on a moment's notice. We must be serious about terrorism but serious too about East Asia, pandemic disease, and globalization. It is neither safe nor wise to identify only one enemy and to prepare single-mindedly to confront it. We must instead identify an entire range of threats, hone our capacity to assess their relative risk, and then develop a diversified portfolio of strategies to address them as they arise.
2. **INTEGRATED:** U.S. strategy must integrate our hard power with what Joseph Nye has called our soft power, allowing us to use all of our assets in pursuit of our objectives. This effort requires devoting as much attention to bolstering the civilian components of our national security infrastructure as to strengthening the military. Our soft power is our power to get what we want by attracting others to the same goals, rather than bending them to our will. It requires careful attention to how others may perceive us differently than we perceive ourselves, no matter how good our intentions. It also requires regular communication and engagement among U.S. officials and their foreign counterparts in formal and informal networks, listening as well as talking. Finally, it means drawing not only on government, but also on the assets and initiative of both the private and non-profit sectors.
3. **INTEREST-BASED, NOT THREAT-BASED:** To create maximum points of engagement and leverage, a successful strategy must begin by identifying and pursuing common interests with other states rather than insisting that they accept our prioritization of common threats. Even where other nations agree, for instance, on the need to fight terrorism, they may rank the rise of a neighboring power, environmental dangers, disease, disruption of their energy supply, or other threats as higher priorities. Finding ways to develop frameworks of cooperation based on common interests with individual nations or groups of nations minimizes frictions, maximizes common assets, and increases the likelihood of cooperative deployment of those assets to achieve common objectives.
4. **GROUNDING IN HOPE, NOT FEAR:** Focusing on threats, and above all insisting on the preeminence and global scope of one specific threat, feeds a pervasive sense of fear. U.S. strategy must advance the larger and more positive purposes behind our power. America has never defined those purposes in purely defensive or protective terms. We have also sought to stand for a particular set of values in the world and to promote those values in ways consistent with our security and our morals. That is why Americans so readily see U.S. power as a force for good.

The most enduring source of American national security is to do everything possible to ensure that citizens of other countries see U.S. power the same way, not only so that they do not perceive us as a threat and balance against us, but also so that they are willing to join their power with ours in the service of larger common goals.

5. **PURSUED INSIDE OUT:** Increasingly, what happens inside states matters to the United States as much as what happens between them. Our vulnerability to terrorist attacks, for instance, depends upon the capability and intentions of police forces in countries like Pakistan and Indonesia, while our vulnerability to global pandemics depends upon the strength of the public health systems in China and Thailand. However, the United States is often ill-equipped to influence the domestic development of an adversary or rival, both because other states are suspicious of American motives and because of the limits of relying primarily upon military power. Squaring this circle is a necessary and critical step. U.S. strategy must include the creation of institutions and mechanisms whereby the international community as a whole can help strengthen government capacity and encourage sound practices within states without using force or illegitimate modes of coercion.
6. **ADAPTED TO THE INFORMATION AGE:** A national security strategy for the 21st century must operate in a world where information moves instantly and actors respond to it instantly. Where all the major actors are connected in real time, allowing individual decisions to become mass movements in weeks and months rather than years. Where specialized small units come together for only a limited time for a defined purpose – whether to make a deal, restructure a company, or plan and execute a terrorist attack. In this world, we need to be fast, flexible, and nimble, capable of grouping and regrouping as necessary and capable of coordinating many different actors engaged in a common effort. We also need to be able to “know what we know:” to figure out quickly and efficiently what information we have and to transmit it to everyone who needs to know it and to figure out what information we do not have and how to get it.

A WORLD OF LIBERTY UNDER LAW

America must stand for, seek, and secure a world of liberty under law. Our nation’s founders knew that the success of what George Washington called “the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people” rested on the combined blessings of order and liberty. And by order they meant law, or, as our second president John Adams put it in the Massachusetts Constitution, a “government of laws not of men.” Our laws, in turn, are “the wise constraints that set men free.”

The framers of our national constitution hoped that it would stand as an example to other nations. Our earliest heroes, men like Daniel Webster, saw the fate of our republic as a test of whether government by the people could succeed anywhere in the world. We have long imagined ourselves as a beacon of liberty to the world, and we have fought for that liberty in our own country and other nations.

More recently, however, we have promoted liberty under the banner of democracy, and too often at the point of a gun, making it possible for anti-democratic forces to equate “democracy” with American imperialism. Democracy is the best instrument that humans have devised for ensuring individual liberty over the long term, but only when it exists within a framework of order established by law. The legal framework that orders a successful democracy, in turn, must apply equally to all citizens, guarantee basic human rights for individuals and minority groups, and provide the means for citizens to hold their governors accountable. Without such order, democracy becomes chaos or a mad scramble for power by competing factions – conditions that invite a return to tyranny.

America has sought to promote democracy in the world for decades and even centuries. Not only as a matter of values, but also because history and social science give us good reason to believe that Americans would be safer, richer, healthier, and happier in a world of mature liberal democracies. However, in standing for democracy, we must be far more attentive to our own history and to the ways in which our system and others combine liberty with the rule of law. We must develop a much more sophisticated strategy of recognizing and promoting the deeper preconditions for successful liberal democracy – preconditions that extend far beyond the simple holding of elections.⁵ It must be a strategy of promoting liberty under law, not only for individual nations in accordance with their distinctive history, culture, and stages of development, but also for the international system as a whole.

Over the past few years, the Bush administration has identified the absence of democracy as a key driver of evil around the world and made promoting democracy the centerpiece of its national security strategy. Yet focusing exclusively on tyranny can lead us to overlook the dangers posed by hostile ideologies and belligerent nationalism – threats every bit as lethal to human liberty. Democracy *per se* will not cure these dangers. On the contrary, recent research indicates that belligerent nationalism and religious extremism may thrive in emerging democracies and modernizing states respectively.⁶ Indeed, some of our most intractable problems, including the Iranian nuclear program, may well be problems of nationalism that would remain, and might even be exacerbated, if democracy took hold tomorrow.

Labeling countries as democracies or non-democracies, much less as good or evil, also needlessly complicates our relations with many nations and often undermines the very goals we seek to achieve. Promoting liberty under law, by contrast, requires sufficient economic prosperity to give individuals a stake in the existing legal and political order. It requires a legal system capable of enforcing individual rights – from the right of contract to the right of free expression. It requires sufficient transparency and integrity in government to ensure that the legal system exists in practice as well as on paper. Each of these dimensions of liberty under law offers a positive point of contact between the U.S. government – or an international or regional institution in which the United States plays a role – and a foreign government.

⁵ Fareed Zakaria has made a similar argument in *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003).

⁶ Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

Elections remain important as a long-term goal, but a grand strategy of forging a world of liberty under law means broadening our approach by bolstering the many elements that underpin a stable and sustainable democratic government and by countering the multiple ills that may destroy it. The United States cannot implement this strategy alone; nor indeed could any one country working on its own. Liberty under law within nations is inextricably linked with a stable system of liberty under law among them, a system that provides effective restraints in some areas and enables effective cooperation in others. Finally, building and maintaining a world of liberty under law requires a mix of sticks and carrots. Liberty requires order, and order, at some level, must be able to harness force.

The following sections outline the subcomponents of this strategy. First is deploying the resources and developing the mechanisms to support Popular, Accountable, and Rights-regarding (PAR) governments worldwide. Second is building a liberal international order that fosters cooperation between nations, an open international economy, and collective efforts to ensure peace and security. Third is the role of force in international affairs, including revising international and national rules regarding the use of force.

BRINGING GOVERNMENTS UP TO PAR

In a world of Popular, Accountable, and Rights-regarding governments, the United States would have many more, and more effective, partners in our efforts to fight terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemic disease, economic crises, and a host of other threats. Popular government requires both popular participation in government institutions and sufficient pluralism to allow for the representation of the spectrum of different voices across the population. PAR governments are more transparent, due to the checks and balances that naturally result from pluralist, participatory systems. They are more effective, because accountability reduces corruption and increases competence. And they are more trustworthy, because they are constrained by the laws governing their behavior toward their own citizens.

Further, PAR governments provide many more opportunities for their citizens to achieve their goals through ordinary political processes and to make better lives for themselves through economic opportunity. Providing such political and economic opportunities is the best hope of harnessing the energies and passions of the hundreds of millions of young people around the world – for example, 68 percent of Saudi Arabia’s population is under thirty – into far more constructive channels than ideologies of violence and revolution.

The best way to help bring governments up to PAR is to connect them and their citizens in as many ways as possible to governments and societies that are already at PAR and to provide them with incentives and support to follow suit. Creating these myriad points of contact, in turn, requires focusing precisely on the common interests shared by the United States and any particular country or group of countries and then devising the policies and mechanisms necessary to pursue those interests.

Take China as an example. The United States has a multi-pronged relationship with China, from trading partner to potential strategic rival to opponent on many human rights issues. At the same time,

China and the United States have a strong common interest in securing stable energy supplies, as the world's first- and second-largest consumers of energy. They have an equally strong interest in finding global solutions to climate change and other environmental problems related to the carbon emissions and other pollutants caused by that energy consumption. They also have a strong common interest in developing means of detecting, stopping, and preventing avian flu. And they have a nascent common interest in finding ways to stop the widespread Chinese violation of intellectual property laws, in part because Chinese companies will also need the protection of these laws as they become innovators and producers of intellectual property themselves.

Engaging China successfully on these various fronts requires institutionalizing what are now a series of informal contacts among counterpart officials from the two governments and some non-governmental organizations, preferably through more formal networks that include other participants from the trans-Pacific region. Those networks, in turn, can serve to transfer knowledge, technical expertise, and ultimately resources to strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of far-flung Chinese regional officials in tackling environmental and health threats. Making effective use of expertise and resources, however, will require Chinese officials and institutions to develop a degree of transparency and integrity comparable to the level of other participants in the network. Further, collective regulations and practices agreed on by network members will have to be enforceable through local administrative agencies or courts. Similar networks in areas such as securities regulation or antitrust enforcement routinely collect and disseminate best practices, which serve to transmit the values and practices of rights-regarding governments to other governments.

At the same time, these networks can reach out to ordinary citizens' groups and private-sector companies to tackle problems affecting health and the environment. The result will be to create many points of contact across societies as well as governments – points of contact that speed communication and gradually foster trust through deepening relationships. Communicating attractive values and practices by the United States and other liberal democracies to developing countries also enhances our soft power.

Only these types of networks – at the national, regional or provincial, and even local levels – can reach far within states in the ways necessary to address domestic conditions and problems that produce global threats. They must be issue-specific and based on common interests with specific countries. At the same time, they must become the conduits for communicating and inculcating the values and practices that safeguard liberty under law. And they must coexist with an open commitment by the United States and as many other governments as will join us to bring all governments up to PAR and to ensure that all governments, even those of established liberal democracies, remain at PAR.

The United States must also do more to bolster vulnerable states through foreign aid. As this project's working group on reconstruction and development pointed out, foreign aid is an indispensable component of a national security strategy.⁷ Poverty increases the likelihood of civil conflict, state collapse, authoritarian leadership, environmental catastrophe, and pandemic diseases – all of which can knock governments below PAR and threaten American security.

⁷ See *Report of the Working Group on Reconstruction and Development* (Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005), <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/RD.pdf>.

BUILDING A LIBERAL ORDER

The system of international institutions that the United States and its allies built after World War II and steadily expanded over the course of the Cold War is broken. Every major institution – the United Nations (U.N.), the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – and countless smaller ones face calls for major reform. This should not be surprising. Decision-making procedures that were originally designed for a world of some fifty nations must now accommodate almost two hundred. Hierarchies based on the global configuration of power in 1945 must now operate in a world in which the defeated enemies of World War II are now major powers, in which twenty-five European nations conduct their economic policy and increasingly their foreign policy through the European Union, and in which former colonies are now rising powers themselves. Missions such as stabilizing currencies are now irrelevant in a world of floating exchange rates, while new missions focused on addressing transnational threats have no institutional home.

What may be more surprising, at least to some, is that the United States has the largest stake of any nation in fixing this system, precisely because we are the most powerful nation in the world. The United States cannot just wield power unilaterally and in pursuit of a narrowly drawn definition of the national interest, because such actions breed resentment, fear, and resistance. As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said in his final State of the Union address, “in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend itself within the framework of the general good.”

Building on this principle, the Truman administration created an international order with institutions, alliances, and programs like the United Nations, NATO, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Marshall Plan. The United States led but listened, gained by giving, and emerged stronger because its global role was accepted as legitimate. Leading Americans across the political spectrum understood that we are far better off if American power is exercised within an international framework of cooperation, where others have a voice – although not a veto – and nations endeavor to work in concert towards common ends. Such a world is one in which other nations bandwagon with the United States rather than balance against us, and where they seek to facilitate American goals, not to inhibit them. That is the world we must rebuild today.

In addition to reassuring other nations and thereby securing our own power and position, we need a system of effective global institutions to harness cooperation on problems we simply cannot tackle unilaterally or even bilaterally. These institutions cannot all be formal organizations. On the contrary, harnessing cooperation in the 21st century will require many new kinds of institutions, many of them network-based, to provide speed, flexibility, and context-based decision making tailored to specific problems. This combination of institutions, and the habits and practices of cooperation that they would generate – even amid ample day-to-day tensions and diplomatic conflict – would represent the infrastructure of an overall international order that provides the stability and governance capacity necessary to address global problems.

Finally, however, we need to build, or rebuild, not simply an international order but a liberal international order. The genius of the post-war system, led by America with strong bipartisan domestic support, was that its international institutions were integrally connected to the domestic conditions necessary for liberty under law. The second clause of the Preamble to the U.N. Charter, for the first time in an international security organization, spoke of the need “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and of “the dignity and worth of the human person.” The Bretton Woods institutions – the IMF and World Bank – were deliberately designed to allow all members sufficient latitude to reconcile the demands of an open international economy with the vital needs of domestic constituencies at home. And the mandates of NATO, the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Union all had provisions aimed at building and shoring up domestic democratic institutions.

Today this intersection between international institutions and domestic governments is more important than ever. To forge a world of liberty under law requires building as many structures as possible to help individuals, civic groups, political parties, and government officials on the ground within nations to ensure that democracy can deliver a route to a better life. That requires global institutions devoted to strengthening the world economy and managing the crises of globalization, institutions providing incentives and pressure to help conquer dysfunctional levels of corruption and bolster the rule of law, and institutions that enhance the power of attraction of the world of liberal democracies.

A NEW UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is simultaneously in crisis and in demand. The U.N. secretary general launched several years ago, with the agreement of many of the most powerful U.N. members, a process of major U.N. reform, calling for nothing less than a remaking of the basic bargains forged at San Francisco in 1945. At the same time, crises in Iran, North Korea, Israel, and Lebanon demonstrate the central importance of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) as the principal forum for reaching a solution or ratifying a solution reached elsewhere.

The United Nations is failing to live up to its potential, though. Security Council resolutions are often unenforced or under-enforced. Troops under U.N. command are not adequately trained, equipped, authorized, or available to accomplish the tasks given to them. The Security Council itself often simply proves incapable of responding to a specific crisis promptly and effectively. And other parts of the United Nations suffer from excessive bureaucracy, rigidity, and atrophy, even as some agencies and sub-departments, such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the U.N. Development Program, prove their worth time and again.

Blueprints for major reform exist, but the political will has been lacking – above all on the part of the United States. Without U.S. leadership and determination, the best we can hope for is a series of half measures. And even with U.S. leadership, the achievement of serious reform will take sustained effort and major American political capital.

The United States should make U.N. reform a top foreign policy priority through the end of the decade, as part of a broader effort to rebuild a liberal international order for the 21st century. We should begin with nothing less than Security Council reform. Two possible plans have been proposed by the U.N. High Level Panel convened by the secretary general.⁸ The first would invite India, Japan, Brazil, Germany, and two African states to join the Security Council as permanent members without a veto. The second plan would achieve roughly the same membership, but through a regular system of rotating members rather than the addition of new permanent members. Either plan should be acceptable to the United States; what matters most is that a sensible plan is adopted and implemented.

On the substance of U.N. reform, the United States should insist on updating the rules governing the use of force in ways that reflect the realities of the 21st century. Once again, the groundwork has already been laid by the High Level Panel, which recommended that all U.N. members accept the principle of “the responsibility to protect.” States upholding this principle recognize that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from “avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberative starvation and exposure to disease” – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the international community.⁹

Acceptance of this principle throughout the United Nations will open the door to a far more active Security Council in cases involving serious and sustained human rights violations, crimes against humanity, or genocide committed by a government against its own people. U.N. involvement in such cases is not simply a matter of altruism or morality; the searing lesson of World War II – and again in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Iraq in the 1980s – is that governments willing to brutalize their own people on a massive scale are sooner or later likely to turn on their neighbors. And as one of the countries most likely to be called in to put out the fire once humanitarian crises spiral out of control, we have every incentive to create an effective international mechanism to hold governments to account.

More broadly, UNSC reform should be accompanied by reconsideration of when and how permanent members of the Security Council use their veto and how they respond to threats to international peace and security more generally. The United States has never accepted the principle that it can only use force with Security Council approval – we and all nations retain an inherent right of self-defense in the event of armed attack, a doctrine that must be updated in line with the capacity of attackers to deal blows so devastating that no defense is possible. In other cases, such as the intervention in Kosovo, an independent international commission found that the use of force was legitimate even though it was not approved in advance by the Security Council.¹⁰ Nevertheless, military action by the United States or any other state receives less support and is perceived by many states to be illegitimate when it occurs

⁸ *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the U.N. High Level Panel (New York: United Nations, 2004). The High Level Panel was composed of sixteen members from around the world, including a former American national security adviser from the first Bush administration.

⁹ *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (2001), <http://www.iciss.ca>; *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, 64-5.

¹⁰ See *The Kosovo Report: Report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

without Security Council backing. As a result, the United States has made it clear that we would prefer to have Security Council approval for our actions whenever possible.

The United States should thus lead the way toward a more responsive and effective Security Council decision-making process in response to international crises. One possibility would be to develop rules and procedures for authorizing the use of force retroactively in cases demanding immediate action or in which political stalemate has effectively blocked all action.¹¹ The veto should be abolished for UNSC resolutions authorizing direct action in response to a crisis. It makes no sense, in 2006, for five countries that represent the distribution of power at the end of World War II to have individual vetoes over what constitutes legitimate action.

The current veto process does not serve the interests of the United States. America does not need it to block action of which we do not approve; we are almost always pushing the Security Council to take action rather than not, and in those cases where we are unpersuaded of the wisdom of a particular course, we prefer to use diplomacy rather than the veto. Instead, the veto is a license for prevarication, obstructionism, and disillusionment. The veto should be replaced by a supermajority vote – of perhaps three-quarters of voting members – in an enlarged Security Council.¹²

A CONCERT OF DEMOCRACIES

Neither America nor the world can wait forever for U.N. reform, no matter how desirable it is. The United States must take the lead and invest the time, energy, and resources to accomplish significant reform, on the principle of “mend it, don’t end it.” At the same time, however, we should work with our allies to develop a new global institution dedicated to the principles underpinning liberal democracy, both as a vehicle to spur and support the reform of the United Nations and other global institutions and as a possible alternative to them.

This alternative body would be a global “Concert of Democracies.” Its purpose would be to strengthen security cooperation among the world’s liberal democracies and to provide a framework in which they can work together to effectively tackle common challenges – ideally within existing regional and global institutions, but if those institutions fail, then independently, functioning as a focal point for efforts to strengthen liberty under law around the world. It would also serve as the institutional embodiment and ratification of the “democratic peace.”¹³

¹¹ Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal,” *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 2004): 1-22.

¹² There are a number of potential models here. For instance, the threshold could be higher for a resolution where a permanent member opposes a resolution than one where the permanent members are united.

¹³ The ratification of the democratic peace by treaty was proposed by Tod Lindberg at a Princeton Project for National Security review session (remarks, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, May 25, 2006) and elaborated upon in “The Treaty of the Democratic Peace,” *Weekly Standard* (forthcoming).

The membership of the Concert of Democracies would be selective, but self-selected. Membership would be predicated not on an abstract definition of liberal democracy or on the labels attached by states to other states, but rather by the obligations that members are willing to take on themselves. Members would have to: pledge not to use force or plan to use force against one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept that states have a “responsibility to protect” their citizens from avoidable catastrophe and that the international community has a right to act if they fail to uphold it. A possible charter for the Concert is offered in Appendix A.

In one sense, the Concert would serve as an informal gathering of democratic states that are already allies, as it would include the United States, NATO and non-NATO European democracies, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. However, it would also include new democratic partners like India, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico. This aspect of the Concert would constitute a major effort to integrate non-Western democratic powers into a global democratic order. At the same time, the Concert would be more substantial and exclusive than the already existing “community of democracies,” which is a broad but shallow organization that seeks to strengthen democracy within states.

The Concert of Democracies would not be – at least for the foreseeable future – a new alliance system or a substitute for America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia. Nor would it be a substitute for the United Nations or other global institutions, as long as those institutions can be successfully reformed. If UNSC expansion and reform proves impossible by the end of this decade, however, the Concert could become an alternative forum for the approval of the use of force in cases where the use of the veto at the Security Council prevented free nations from keeping faith with the aims of the U.N. Charter.

Should this necessity arise, Concert members would undertake an additional set of agreements approving the use of force by a supermajority of member states, with no veto power. They would have to seek approval at the United Nations first, but they would commit to accept authorization by the Concert as an equally legitimate and acceptable alternative. In this sense, the creation of the Concert would follow in the tradition of the creation of NATO, which was seen as a means of achieving the goals of the U.N. Charter, rather than undermining them.

A REVIVED NATO

In a related step, the United States should revive the NATO alliance by revisiting and updating the grand bargains that lie behind it. America and Europe have reason to be humbled in their visions of more autonomous security. The failure of the European constitution provides an opening for us to approach Europe about strengthening NATO and making it more useful in out-of-area crises – which it is already doing in Afghanistan. Likewise, the United States has learned a hard lesson in Iraq about the limits of a go-it-alone approach. So the time is ripe to develop a vision of NATO’s next 50 years.

To revive NATO, the United States and Europe will need to make new bargains. We will need to bind our nation to and share decision making with our European partners. For their part, Europeans will need

to work closely with Washington to define common strategic goals. NATO itself will need institutional reform to eliminate the veto rights of smaller NATO states and other impediments to collective action. A revived NATO will also need to find ways to accommodate an E.U. role or voice within its councils. This initiative should form part of an American effort to gain the cooperation of Western Europe and other liberal democracies in coping with the East Asia challenge and the terrorist threat. That effort must also move forward with current NATO plans to build relationships and partnerships with a number of Asian allies of the United States, including Australia, South Korea, and Japan.

ORDERING GLOBALIZATION

This is not the place to offer a blueprint for reforming every international institution that needs reform. But the original Bretton Woods institutions require significant changes to meet the challenges posed by the current global economic system.¹⁴ Global trade negotiations are at a standstill, just when they are most necessary to aid developing countries seeking to integrate their economies into the global economy and to harness the benefits of the global forces that have buffeted their societies.

These defects and even failures of the international economic system come when the challenges of globalization are mounting. Most worrisome is the rising inequality of income and access to health care, education, and technology within and among countries around the world. This dramatic increase in disparities of income distribution is partly the result of globalization, which produces *aggregate* gains both for national populations and for the international system as a whole, but also typically results in a very skewed distribution of those gains among groups within a particular nation and among countries across the international system. Winners tend to win big, but losers tend to drop even further behind.

The perception of unfairness, even in situations of aggregate benefit, is a fundamental motivator of human behavior, often leading people to reject aggregate gains if those gains would cause them individually to fall farther behind relative to others. This phenomenon is playing out today in the politics of renewed populism in many Latin American countries, in rising demonstrations by dispossessed rural peasants against the development that is lifting the incomes of urban elites in China and India, in rising protectionism and opposition to immigration in the United States, in the rise of right-wing parties in Europe, and in the tinderbox that is the widespread sense of humiliation among many Muslims all too aware of their relative lack of human development in contrast to the rest of the world. More generally, U.S. policymakers too often assume that economic development abroad always enhances American security. In many cases the liberalization of a traditional or state-dominated economy can be economically and socially destabilizing in ways that can undermine U.S. national security in the short or medium term.¹⁵

¹⁴ See Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, “Reform of the International Monetary Fund” (speech, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, India, February 20, 2006).

¹⁵ See *Report of the Working Group on Economics and National Security* (Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005), 5-6, <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/ENS.pdf>.

Meeting these challenges means managing globalization. Managing globalization also requires integrating our economic and political policies. Containing the Soviet Union gave us an overarching principle that drove our political and economic decisions in tandem. Today, an affirmative commitment to forge a world of liberty under law should make us equally attentive to the economic and political considerations that can either undermine or bolster a combination of liberty and order. We thus face a political as well as an economic imperative to overhaul our international economic institutions and to create as many mechanisms as possible to harness the forces of globalization within an international order.

Equally important, the United States must take the lead in these reform efforts, proving itself once again willing to subordinate its immediate commercial interests to its longer-term interest in being a global public goods provider. As the project's working group on economics and national security pointed out, when the rest of the world develops confidence that the United States is genuinely seeking an economic system that responds to the needs of, and promises benefits for, all countries, U.S. credibility and goodwill are likely to be enhanced in other areas. Even when other countries have reservations about U.S. proposals on issues such as countering terrorist financing, they will be more inclined to acquiesce at least partially on those issues in return for U.S. economic leadership.

More than just adequate economic growth is required to sustain long-term capacity for economic and technological leadership, as well as to provide sufficient resources to pursue American national security interests. At home, we must rectify our irresponsible fiscal policies, including taking steps to: reduce the current account deficit and increase our savings rate, as will be discussed later in the context of relations with China; reallocate enough of our limited public resources to provide sufficient economic security for American workers to assure equitable and politically sustainable global economic integration; modulate the post-9/11 restrictions on foreign visitors, especially students in technical fields; and replace outdated practices in education, training, and research and development. Investment in public education today will repay itself ten-fold in the contribution it makes to technological innovation in the future.

A NETWORKED ORDER

Building a liberal order does not mean placing our faith in any one institution, such as the United Nations, or even a set of institutions. The U.S. commitment at the heart of a liberal order should be to work with other nations, to constrain our own power in order to reassure others, and to be able to demand the same restraint of them. That commitment to multilateralism can be realized through a wide range of formal and informal multilateral tools: alliances, institutions, bilateral relations, treaties, public and private networks, rules, norms, and shared expectations – all of which provide multiple arenas for cooperation and action.

Finding ways to link these different types of institutions, arrangements, mechanisms, and networks is central to the construction of a liberal order. They must be linked in ways that avoid centralization and hierarchy and encourage flexibility and innovation. The habits of cooperation and stable expectations that comprise an order ultimately reside in the minds and movements of individuals – individuals who can only benefit from being aware of one another's knowledge and activity in the service of common goals.

The best way to create a liberal international order in the information age is to link as many individuals and institutions together as possible through networks – forming a world wide web of cooperation. Formal treaty-based institutions need the eyes and ears that can be provided by issue-based networks of national officials; those networks, in turn, can often benefit by creating one or more central nodes that provide a secretariat function. And networks of corporate and non-governmental actors can be connected as well. Taken together, a networked order can provide the global collaboration we need while preserving the national freedom we want.

THE ROLE OF FORCE

At their core, both liberty and law must be backed up by force. Domestically, this is why the state maintains a police force and a military. At the international level, of course, no such enforcement mechanism exists. A national security strategy dedicated to forging a world of liberty under law must reckon with the necessity and perils of the use of force both within nations – to safeguard liberty and uphold the rule of law – and among them – to ensure that some nations cannot destroy the liberty of all.

This section outlines proposals on some of the major issues of military doctrine, including America's global role, deterrence, and the use of force. It does not offer a comprehensive defense policy. A comprehensive policy would detail how America can continue to meet its alliance commitments, specify the number of conflicts the military should be ready to fight simultaneously, explore how to maintain a balance between the necessity of transformation and the importance of retaining a capability to carry out traditional missions, and address the challenge of procurement. However, these recommendations constitute a serious effort to advance thinking on some of the most controversial doctrinal issues related to national security strategy.

MILITARY PREDOMINANCE

The Bush administration's 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* argued that the United States should prevent the emergence of peer competitors.¹⁶ This was inopportune; elevating primacy to the level of doctrine served to antagonize, offend, and alienate others. The statement also misunderstood the strategic imperative of our era, which looks not to power alone but to the purposes to which that power is put. For instance, a prosperous, powerful, and democratic Europe is very different than a prosperous, powerful, and hostile dictatorship. It would augment rather than erode U.S. power.

The United States should work to sustain the military predominance of liberal democracies and encourage the development of military capabilities by like-minded democracies in a way that is consistent with their security interests. The predominance of liberal democracies is necessary to prevent a return to great power security competition between the United States and our allies, on the one side, and an autocracy or a combination of autocracies, on the other – the sort of competition that led to

¹⁶ Office of the President, *National Security Strategy for the United States of America* (The White House, November 2002).

two World Wars and one Cold War. In addition, this predominance would allow us to work with our allies to underwrite the security components of a cooperative rules-based order – an effort that must include providing for a large part of the defense of other states, assuring friends that they will remain free, generally dissuading aggression and revisionism, and keeping sea lanes of communication open.

Maintaining a balance of power in favor of liberal democracies is likely to require a continued high level of U.S. defense spending, together with substantial contributions from our allies. European countries and Canada have over 100,000 troops deployed outside of their home countries, including in support of U.S.-led missions in the Balkans, the Congo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Add to this the many current U.S. military commitments – fighting counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, preparing for action against terrorist groups, deterring aggression on the Korean peninsula, acting as a stabilizer in the Balkans, readying for contingencies in Iran and Taiwan, and working with the military forces of allies and partners – and the military burden of underpinning a liberal order is substantial.

DETERRENCE

Deterrence is out of fashion. Many defense planners believe that it is obsolete in the face of terrorists willing to martyr themselves for a cause. However, an updated version is an indispensable tool in countering proliferation and a possible nexus between nuclear powers and terrorist organizations. Specifically, American nuclear posture and doctrine should be changed in three ways.

First, recent years have seen considerable advancements in technology that allow the United States to attribute a fingerprint to all nuclear materials, thus allowing for after-the-fact detection of the source. The United States should announce – preferably with our allies – that in the case of an act of nuclear terrorism, we will hold the source of the nuclear materials or weapon responsible.

Second, the United States must ensure that our deterrent remains credible. This means tailoring it for the cultural characteristics of each adversary; we should not assume that North Korea will behave exactly like the Soviet Union. It also means maintaining a safe and flexible nuclear arsenal. However, the United States should exert great care and caution to ensure that nothing is done that would erode the global norm of nuclear non-use. Specific steps that America should take to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy are discussed further in the section on combating proliferation.

Finally, we should work with our allies and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to find ways to target deterrence against potential deliberate or inadvertent suppliers of nuclear weapons to terrorists. Deterrence saw the United States successfully through the Cold War, even with our share of frightening incidents. It is a tool of prevention rather than retribution, one that should be used again to the extent possible.

PREVENTIVE AND PREEMPTIVE USES OF FORCE¹⁷

The debate surrounding the preventive and preemptive use of force was given impetus by the Bush administration's 2002 *National Security Strategy* and reached a fever pitch with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The controversy over Iraq notwithstanding, other nations and international institutions have wrestled with the rules governing the use of force in a world in which a terrorist group could destroy a city with a nuclear weapon. In one particularly notable contribution, the U.N. High Level Panel acknowledged that new types of threats had emerged since the adoption of the U.N. Charter that need the attention of the international community – threats that under certain security and humanitarian circumstances could justify the preventive use of force.¹⁸

On these issues it is important to distinguish between preemption and prevention and between the preventive use of force against terrorists and against states. Preemption involves the use of force in the face of an imminent danger. The most prominent example of preemption is Israel's strike against Arab armies in 1967. This form of action, against state or non-state actors, has always been widely accepted as legitimate and appropriate. What is really at issue in the current debate is the preventive use of force – attacking a state or non-state actor before a threat fully materializes. As a matter of strategy, it is unhelpful either to rule the preventive use of force out completely or to identify it as the policy of choice. Our interests would be better served by outlining the conditions under which we may wish to have the preventive use of force as an option.

Preventive Force against Terrorists

The preventive use of force against terrorists is a necessary tool in fighting global terrorist networks. Suicide terrorists cannot be reliably deterred by the threat of arrest or punishment, and preventive arrest is often not an option because the suspects are out of reach. In such cases, the use of special operations forces, predator drones, and other indirect and covert measures may be employed to neutralize the threat.

However, the preventive use of force comes with serious costs and risks: intelligence can be faulty and the resulting military action can result in the death of innocents; a mistake can prove to be diplomatically and politically counterproductive; the extrajudicial nature of preventive force raises legitimate international concern about safeguards; and a policy of prevention could be used to justify illegitimate action by other states.

Thus, the preventive use of force should not be used indiscriminately or as a first resort. The United States should put in place strong internal controls to ensure that policymakers have their facts right and

¹⁷ This section draws on a paper commissioned by the Princeton Project. See James Steinberg, "The Future of Preemption and Prevention" (working paper, Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005); http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/Steinberg_Preemption.pdf. The authors have also benefited from the discussions and conclusions reached by the Hoover Institution's working group on preventive force. See *Preventive Force: The Issues* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2006); http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/pf_paper.pdf.

¹⁸ *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*.

that any particular action is proportionate. We should also work actively with other liberal democracies to establish a set of agreed guidelines on uses of force against terrorists. These steps will help ensure that the preventive use of force against terrorists remains a viable and effective tool.

Preventive Force against States

The preventive use of force against states is far more problematic than that against terrorist organizations. The rationale is weaker because states have a return address and equities that can be threatened with retaliation. Moreover, the risks are generally higher, including the costs of dealing with the aftermath and the possibility that military action might lead to state collapse and the transfer of WMD to terrorists in the resulting chaos.

Other considerations, however, favor maintaining the option of such preventive action. First, some states simply cannot be trusted with nuclear or biological weapons capable of creating mass destruction.¹⁹ Second, the threat of preventive strikes may help to deter a potential acquirer from pursuing the dangerous capability, or lead it to the negotiating table, as happened with North Korea in 1994. Third, some elements of dangerous intent may be hard to detect, such as the transfer of nuclear weapons from a state to terrorist organizations. In the case of states with ties to terrorists, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by that state might be the closest sign to a warning that we get.

The preventive use of force against states should not be ruled out, but the following conditions should be met before it is seriously considered: 1) it should be a last resort; 2) we must have overwhelming confidence in the intelligence and in the prospects for success; 3) we must be prepared to deal adequately with the aftermath; and 4) we must gain approval from the U.N. Security Council or at least from another broadly representative multilateral body, such as NATO.

¹⁹ Rationality cannot be assumed in a totalitarian state with no checks and balances; possession of WMD may free some states to act more dangerously because they believe that their new military capabilities insulate them from attack; and, in some cases, the acquisition of WMD may lead others to seek similar capabilities, leading to destabilizing proliferation.

MAJOR THREATS AND CHALLENGES

The American pursuit of a world of liberty under law would reassure friends and neutrals that U.S. power serves the general interests of all free states as well as the U.S. national interest, would legitimize American action, and would enable the United States to deal effectively with present dangers. The second half of this report turns to assessing how this strategy plays out with respect to major threats and challenges that now confront the United States and the wider world – the collapse of order in the Middle East, global terror networks, the proliferation and transfer of nuclear weapons, the rise of China and order in East Asia, global pandemics; energy, and the need for a protective infrastructure within and around the United States.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The threats emanating from the Middle East are becoming too numerous to count. The greatest one is the complete breakdown of regional order. Before the Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006, the most likely triggers of such a scenario seemed to be: 1) the eruption of a full-scale civil war in Iraq that draws in neighboring states and causes broader Shi'ite-Sunni conflict in the region; 2) the emergence of belligerent and expansionist nationalism in Iran, leading to intense security competition with Arab states and/or Israel; and 3) actions by Hamas that lead to all-out war between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Now that list must include the possibility of a renewed proxy war between Israel and Iran in south Lebanon, with Hezbollah acting semi-independently, possibly leading to a full-scale conflagration between Israel on one side and Iran and Syria on the other, with Lebanon prostrate between them.

The mixture of oil, religion, ethnicity, historic grievances, non-state actors, nuclear weapons, and great power interests is so volatile that the Middle East rivals the Balkans at the turn of the last century in explosiveness. Preventing the cradle of civilizations from becoming the cradle of global conflict must be our first priority. Beyond putting out fires, however, America's longer-term strategic goal in the region should be to establish liberty under law within and among nations – that is, to create a peaceful, free, and stable region where Israelis, Arabs of every stripe, and Persians are able to prosper and flourish. We must aim to empower those in every country whose primary concern is the welfare of the people and to help them establish systems of government in which, in Madison's words, "ambition is made to counter ambition" – in order to disable tyranny and enable Popular, Accountable and Rights-regarding government.

Achieving that goal requires achieving a two-state solution in Israel and Palestine that is the cornerstone of a wider Middle East peace settlement and that allows for the normalization of relations with Israel, new security partnerships, and regional institution-building.

A LASTING TWO-STATE SOLUTION IN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

Any long-term solution in the Middle East must include a comprehensive two-state solution in Israel and Palestine based on mutually agreed borders and the settlement of contentious issues, such as the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem. Ideally, an Israeli-Palestinian settlement would allow the conclusion of a broader set of peace agreements between Israel and other nations in the region, creating the basis for a stable and lasting regional order that would both permit and pressure governments to focus on the welfare of their people. A broader settlement would also enable other regional powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to help improve the lives of Palestinians.

More generally, the continuing violence between Israel and the Palestinians is used throughout the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world to forestall debate about domestic issues, such as individual freedom and human rights, economic growth, access to information, education, and overall government accountability – all of which are necessary to bring governments up to PAR. Repressive governments in the region fan anti-Israeli sentiment to deflect attention from their own records; non-state groups like Hezbollah focus on Israel as a common enemy. The resulting nationalist, religious, and ethnic sentiment forces societies to close ranks and denies any space for building the pluralism, accountability, or regard for rights necessary to create stable and successful long-term societies. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also a tangible symbol of Muslim humiliation and oppression that is easily exploited by demagogues, terrorist groups, and sensationalist media.

The United States must take the lead in doing everything possible to achieve a peace settlement, or, in the words of the Clinton administration, get caught trying. For the moment, we have lost our traditional status as a fair and honest broker between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In the negotiations leading up to Security Council Resolution 1701 in August 2006, many around the world saw America as representing Israel and saw France as standing with the government of Lebanon and representing Arab interests. For the United States credibly to stand for liberty under law throughout the world, we must be, and be seen to be, as attentive to the suffering and deprivation of rights of Muslims as we are to those of any other people. That does not mean forcing a peace settlement on Israel, even if that were possible, but it does mean working intensely and continuously to bring the parties to the table and to hammer out an agreement or a series of agreements between them.

The United States can and should work with the European Union in this effort whenever and however possible. Acting together, America and the European Union can claim more credibly to take all sides into account. Moreover, if they present a united front they will have more clout in the region, uniting military and civilian power. U.S.-E.U. cooperation would also thwart efforts by bad actors in the region to continually drive a wedge between U.S. and E.U. politicians and publics on key regional issues, thereby thwarting progress on the central issues at hand.

The United States should also directly engage Saudi Arabia, building on the Saudi peace plan put forward by King Abdullah of Jordan in March 2002. That plan proposed that the Arab world establish “normal relations” with Israel and recognize the Arab-Israeli conflict to be concluded in exchange for

Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, Israeli recognition of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a just solution for Palestinian refugees. Leadership in the search for peace, and for the individual freedom, order, and prosperity that will come with it, means pursuing every lead and seeking genuine partners wherever they can be found.

SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

Persistent insecurity is a key driver of instability in the Middle East, particularly for Israel, the Palestinians, and Iran. The United States and the European Union – ideally acting together through NATO in order to include Canada and Turkey – should explore imaginative ways to generate additional security across the region. Different kinds of security partnerships can be an important part of the equation, offered as part of a broader settlement of outstanding issues.

ISRAEL

The United States already enjoys a close but informal alliance with Israel. Israeli membership in NATO is not a practical means of deepening these ties, but NATO could offer Israel a security partnership as part of an Israeli final settlement with the Palestinians and possibly Syria. Such a partnership could include a number of benefits to give Israel additional comfort with the settlement, including access to sensitive technologies, access to real-time intelligence, joint exercises, interoperability activities, and participation in some NATO decision making.

PALESTINIANS

NATO also could offer the Palestinians some important benefits in the context of a Palestinian agreement with Israel. Since any Palestinian state will not have a significant military force, NATO benefits could include police and law enforcement training, some level of intelligence sharing with respect to Palestinian interests outside the Middle East, and participation in joint exercises where appropriate.

In addition, NATO could offer both sides forms of on-the-ground participation that can build confidence. For example, it could monitor security-related provisions of the agreement – provided the two sides had also agreed on accountability standards and dispute-resolution processes. NATO could also coordinate trilateral security mechanisms, such as joint operations centers and joint patrols. Finally, it could oversee dispute resolution mechanisms similar to the Israel Lebanon Monitoring Group, an arrangement that operated during the mid-to-late 1990s, with some success, to prevent escalation of low-level violence.

IRAN

Relations between the United States and Iran will play a major role in shaping the future of the Middle East and reducing or increasing the likelihood of further regional conflict, which would be immensely damaging to all sides. America must negotiate with Iran and recognize that it is in the interests of both nations to reach an agreement that allows for peaceful coexistence and the protection of each country's vital interests. For our part, any agreement must require Iran to be nuclear-weapons-free.

While recognizing the severely limited utility of military options, we ought to be prepared to take considerable risks to achieve this goal. However, we must also be willing to take reasonable steps to construct an environment in which Iran would feel secure without nuclear weapons.

To the extent that Iranian behavior is driven or shaped by a sense of insecurity, the United States should be willing to offer Iran assurances that assuage its legitimate fears. These assurances might include a negative security assurance – a promise not to attack Iran except in response to Iranian military action or direct Iranian support of a terrorist attack against the United States, Europe, or Israel. This offer would hinge on an Iranian commitment not to pursue a nuclear weapons capability and Iranian willingness to allow that commitment to be verified by the IAEA. The deal would most likely have to include an Iranian commitment not to develop a uranium enrichment or reprocessing capacity in return for the provision to Iran of fissile materials from an external source.

A negative security assurance would make it harder for the Iranian government to stifle domestic dissent in the name of national unity against a foreign threat. This positive spillover benefit could be enhanced further if the United States and the European Union outlined a clear path to the normalization of relations and greater international influence for a nuclear-weapons-free Iran. Such a move could effectively counter Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who is playing a classic game of focusing all attention on the “Zionists” and their American backer and portraying himself as standing for the Iranian people and the larger Muslim world against external aggressors.

Extending the hand of friendship is an important carrot. However, the United States ought to clearly spell out the consequences of nuclear rivalry, emphasizing that it is a high-cost, high-risk game of brinksmanship that would be a very expensive proposition for Iran. That future is almost guaranteed if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. Russia also has an important role to play in convincing the Iranians that a cost-benefit calculus tips firmly against pursuing nuclear weapons.

BUILDING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Liberty under law within states must be accompanied by a framework that establishes liberty under law among them, setting clear rules and expectations about their behavior, and ensuring that a bilateral military assault will quickly trigger a multilateral response. The history of Europe since 1945 tells us that institutions can play a constructive role in building a framework for cooperation, channeling nationalist sentiments in a positive direction, and fostering economic development and liberalization. Yet the Middle East is one of the least institutionalized regions in the world. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council are both weak, and no institution represents all of the countries in the region.

The United States should encourage a steady process of institution-building in the region, building on the cooperation through multilateral negotiations that followed the Madrid peace conference in 1991 and the economic summits at Casablanca, Amman, Cairo, and Doha that sought to build public-private economic and business relationships. Relationships in the region range from frayed to non-existent, so the development of informal regional networks must likely precede the establishment of more

formal institutions. Still, several ideas for broader regional institutions have been floated and should be explored.

One possibility is to create a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME), modeled after the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).²⁰ The OSCE requires member states to make commitments about the treatment of their own people. Initially many experts dismissed these commitments as insufficiently strong, but over time ordinary citizens in Eastern Europe began to hold their governments to account, with the assistance of emerging civil society organizations like Helsinki Watch. A similar approach in the Middle East would require all member states to couple mutual security pledges with commitments to minimum standards of human rights and to a rudimentary regional monitoring mechanism. A CSCME could also be connected to OSCE as a sister organization, allowing government officials and citizen watch groups to engage with each other, exchange best practices, and offer assistance and support. The organization could thereby help inject more accountability into the domestic politics of Middle Eastern states.

A second possibility is to establish a Gulf Security Council that includes Iran, all Arab states in the Gulf, and the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.²¹ This institution could provide a framework to facilitate security assurances; provide Gulf States with a forum to hold Iran to its commitments on proliferation; and give Iran and other states an opportunity to provide positive, rather than coercive, leadership in the region. Over the longer term, the United States and our partners must seek a way to create a regional security organization that includes Iran and Israel, but that possibility obviously requires a thawing of relations between those two states. Nevertheless, it is a goal worth striving for.

A NEW STRATEGY FOR IRAQ

The situation in Iraq is so fluid and volatile that it is difficult to offer proposals that will not be quickly dated by events on the ground. However, the specter of civil war is stalking the country; many observers argue that civil war is already taking place. At the same time, Iraqi politics are becoming increasingly intertwined with the broader politics of the region, as illustrated by the demonstrations led by Muqtada al-Sadr in favor of Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, growing Iranian influence in Iraq, and rising Sunni Arab concern around the Persian Gulf about that influence.

American strategy should proceed on two fronts. First, we must have a candid discussion with the Iraqi government and as many representatives of various warring parties as we can engage. The United States bears major responsibility for the present state of Iraq, both because of a failure to adequately provide order after major hostilities ended and because U.S. officials made critical strategic errors, such as the dismantling of the administrative state through de-Baathification. But the Iraqis themselves must also take responsibility. Coalition troops were able to strike a blow for liberty with the toppling of Saddam

²⁰ Craig Dunkerley, "Considering Security Amid Strategic Change: The OSCE Experience," *Middle East Policy* Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 2004): 131-138.

²¹ Flynt Leverett, "The Gulf Between Us," *New York Times*, January 24, 2006, A21.

Hussein. But we have proved unable to establish the order necessary to allow Iraqis to enjoy that liberty under a functioning government and legal system, absent a full-scale occupation with far more troops. In the end, it is up to the Iraqis themselves to determine whether they wish to establish such an order now or after a civil war.

The United States should make clear that we remain willing and ready to do everything we can to rebuild Iraq and to train and support a government that is up to PAR, but that this will not be sustainable in the context of a full-scale civil war. In cooperation with the Iraqi government, we should establish a series of benchmarks that would allow U.S. forces to redeploy inside Iraq – to places where they can be useful in building order and avoid becoming entangled in internecine civil conflict – and to outside Iraq. We should remain available to defend Iraqis against foreign threats, but we cannot fight Iraqi internal battles. We should also help evacuate civilians from the worst war zones and protect against destabilizing movements of refugees into neighboring states.

Second, we should adopt a strategy of containing whatever conflict rages within Iraq to Iraq itself. Iraq has the potential to become a second Lebanon, albeit on a much larger scale, with Iraqi civilians at the mercy of a wider war between adjoining states. As Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack have recently pointed out, this would carry the risk of refugee crises, terrorism, radicalization of neighboring populations, copycat secessions, foreign interventions, and the triggering of civil wars elsewhere.²²

We must work with the European Union and Russia to mediate among the regional powers and prevent spillovers that threaten U.S. interests and the stability of the international order itself. Our approach must include the provision of incentives to regional powers to behave responsibly and the imposition of real costs on those countries that exacerbate the Iraq crisis. Over the long run, the real conflicts of interest that drive the risk of regional collapse must be addressed and reconciled in a comprehensive way.

COMBATING RADICALIZATION

Much has been made recently of the tendency for elections in democratizing states to empower radical groups. In the 1940s and 1950s a similar problem confronted the United States. We worried about the spread of communism in Western European societies. Successive administrations addressed this danger by supporting efforts at European integration and by making a distinction between socialists and communists – a de facto recognition that the left was not a monolithic movement.

We need to be similarly imaginative today. We should make every effort to open up domestic space for fundamentalist groups that reject terrorism and other forms of civic violence. We should emphasize that we are willing to work with Islamic governments and Islamic/Islamist movements, including fundamentalists, as long as they disavow terrorism. Working with them and pushing them to support the rule of law, accountable government, and basic civil rights and civil liberties would help demonstrate

²² Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, “The Middle East Domino Theory,” *Washington Post*, August 20, 2006, B01.

that liberty under law is not limited to any one culture, region, or historical epoch. It would also show that our quarrel is not with Muslims but with global terror networks of any disposition. Drawing that line more clearly will help us create a bulwark against violent radicalism and win the critical battle for hearts and minds.

GLOBAL TERROR NETWORKS

Al Qaeda has mounted a series of attacks on Americans throughout the 1990s, culminating most dramatically and horrifically with the four attacks on September 11. Since then different terrorist groups and cells associated with or inspired by al Qaeda have carried out terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Casablanca, Istanbul, Mombassa, Bali, Jakarta, Najaf, Madrid, London, Dahab, and elsewhere. Other terrorist groups with al Qaeda connections operate against our troops in Iraq.

Al Qaeda is “the foundation” of a small and unrepresentative strain of radical Islamist thought that seeks to resuscitate the Islamic caliphate of the 14th century, purge Islam of all modernist influences, and remove American influence from much of the world. It presents a multidimensional threat, emanating partly from the Middle East and partly from the West, particularly Western Europe. The former is the source of the ideology, but the latter will increasingly be the source of its strength. The attacks in Europe, including those that have been foiled – such as the planned mid-air bombing of multiple jetliners leaving from Heathrow Airport in the summer of 2006 – are the work of homegrown terrorist cells that represent an increasing threat independent of al Qaeda.²³

One of the greatest dangers facing the United States, in terms of prospective loss of life and destruction of our way of life, is a potential nexus between al Qaeda or one of its associated movements and nuclear weapons. This would pose a danger truly unique in history – for the first time a non-state actor would possess the means of mass violence that had hitherto been monopolized by only the world’s most powerful states.

Danger also looms in the potential formation of a radical arc of Shi’ite Muslim governments from Iran to Palestine that would deliberately sponsor terrorism against the West and seek to further destabilize the Middle East. One of the greatest risks flowing from Iran’s potential development of nuclear weapons is that the Iranian government could be much less effectively deterred from supporting radical terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, and from seeking power across the region and fundamentally shifting the balance of power between Sunni and Shi’a. Hezbollah does not share the same ideology as al Qaeda; on the contrary, the two groups have traditionally been enemies. Yet Hezbollah could one day pose a significant terrorist threat to America.

²³ Increasingly, terror networks are comprised of second and third generation West Europeans. For an account of the process of alienation and radicalization of these individuals see Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

As these examples illustrate, developing a strategy to counter the threat of terrorism first requires identifying more precisely the exact nature and source of that threat. It is not terrorism itself, a tactic which has been used by many different groups around the world and across history. America and many other countries have suffered individual terrorist attacks for a long time; such attacks are a clear danger but do not amount to an existential threat.

Nor is the threat one particular ideology. Different terrorist cells, even those affiliated or inspired by al Qaeda, strike at different times for different reasons. But they increasingly share tactics, training, access to ever more lethal weapons, and the ability to link up around the globe. It is quite possible that other groups with very different agendas, such as violent anti-globalization groups in Latin America or Asia, will form their own terrorist networks.

The threat to U.S. national security thus comes from global terrorist networks, which combine the use of terrorist tactics with a global ideology and reach. A network like al Qaeda is a cross between an armed insurgency and a global criminal network; it is a global insurgency with a criminal core. Like insurgents, these terrorists kill in the name of a political cause and use the tactics of asymmetrical warfare. Indeed, many of the members of these networks are also members of nationally-based insurgent groups, such as the Chechen rebels or Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. At the same time, they are decentralized and linked together, similarly to global arms or drug trafficking networks, such that if they are defeated in one place they can quickly shift their operations to another location, making it very difficult to defeat them once and for all.

A related threat, often overlooked, is the reaction that terrorists provoke – which can lead to exponentially more destabilizing outcomes than the terrorist violence itself. One observer has drawn a parallel to anarchist groups in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They only killed a couple of thousand people over several decades, but one of their victims was Archduke Franz Ferdinand. That assassination provided the spark that remade the world.²⁴ It is thus not only the number of deaths that matters but also the terrorists' ability to dictate the global agenda.

What these global terrorists are *not* is warriors, except in their minds. Countering them by waging a highly publicized war on terror plays into their preferred conception of an apocalyptic struggle between good and evil. Accepting the labels that our enemies use to describe themselves lends them legitimacy that is not deserved. To take one example, Muqtada al-Sadr named his private militia the Mahdi Army. Sunnis and Shiites agree that “Mahdi” is the equivalent of a Messiah, so when U.S. officials refer to the Mahdi Army they confer status upon al-Sadr's gang.

A smarter counter-terrorism strategy would remind people around the world at every opportunity that al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks are criminal enterprises run by people who are no better than gangsters. They may be criminals with a cause, but they are still criminals – the plotters, aiders, abettors, and perpetrators of deliberate mass murder of innocents.

²⁴ David Kilcullen, quoted in James Fallows, “Declaring Victory,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2006.

We must also be wary of equating terrorists with Islamic fundamentalists, jihadis, Islamists, or even Salafists or Taqfiris. Each of these categories includes many non-violent practicing Muslims – just as some violent Christian or Jewish sects are fundamentalists, but the vast majority of Christian or Jewish fundamentalists are not violent. Pushing into contentious religious territory to borrow various terms for sub-groups or apostates is precisely to wade into the realm of religious war that we seek to avoid. Since 9/11 the Bush administration has sought to convince ordinary pious Muslims around the world that America seeks no quarrel with them. The best way to start is to take Islam itself out of the equation.²⁵

Forging a world of liberty under law is a long-term strategy to defeat global terrorist networks; in such a world it would be much harder for specific grievances and fanatical ideologies to take root and grow into global violence. To this end, we and the European liberal democracies must ensure that Muslims see themselves as real stakeholders in our societies. More immediately, however, we must fight existing global terrorist networks through a combination of the tactics we use against global criminal networks and against insurgencies. That means developing a global counterinsurgency strategy that builds on a global law enforcement capacity and the more traditional tools used to fight insurgencies.²⁶

In a counterterrorism strategy informed by counterinsurgency experience, the target can be usefully thought of as a series of concentric circles. At the center of all the circles are the key fighters in active global terror networks. These fighters, who probably total no more than a few thousand worldwide, are willing to martyr themselves to infiltrate Western societies and kill large numbers of people. In the next circle is a larger group that is willing to conduct suicide operations in the Middle East or against soft U.S. or U.S.-allied targets (e.g. in Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, Spain, or Indonesia). Around this group is a larger circle of sympathizers who actively support terrorist operations financially or in kind. The next circle consists of fellow travelers who sympathize with the terrorists without providing active support, and the circle beyond that contains people who are indifferent politically, but who could provide intelligence either to the terrorists or to us depending on their day-to-day reactions to events. Last are outer circles of people who are currently sympathetic to America or to U.S.-allied governments in varying degrees.

The key to the strategy's success is to neutralize as many of the hard-core fighters as possible while peeling away the supporters in the outer circles. We must also avoid alienating people already sympathetic to the United States through our policies or actions, even when these may be justifiable on their narrow merits. In other words, when deciding whether or not to approve the use of military force, we must consider how the use of force would likely affect the wider political struggle. We must also demonstrate that we are willing to fix errors quickly, come down hard on misconduct by our officials or troops, and

²⁵ It has been suggested that U.S. officials use language that translates into a pejorative term in Arabic, such as “unholy war” (*hirabah*), “terrorists” (*irhabists*) and “evildoers” (*mufsidoon*) in the same way that the words “genocide” and “war crime” were employed to supplement the catch-all phrase “combat.” See quotes from Jim Guirard, in Fallows, “Declaring Victory.”

²⁶ For ideas that informed the authors' thinking on a global counterinsurgency against terror networks see Kurt Campbell and Richard Weiss, “Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned From Past Counterinsurgencies” (working paper, Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005), <http://www.wps.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/counterinsurgency.pdf>; and Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

make recompense where appropriate. This approach will help us win the battle for hearts and minds, which will ultimately be more important than the immediate effort to capture and kill the terrorists.

THE INNER CIRCLES

To stop the terrorists and their supporters in the innermost circles, we should focus on developing and strengthening global law enforcement networks of investigators, intelligence agents, prosecutors, police, financial regulators, and other government officials operating on the ground at the national, regional, and local levels. These networks have produced our biggest victories against terror networks by enabling us to foil attacks and apprehend many terrorists. An emphasis on tracking down terrorists as criminals will also help us win the battle for hearts and minds, because it rejects the view that terrorists are warriors and resistance fighters. Technological innovation in detecting and tracking terrorist movements, payments, and weapons transfer is also critical.

Focusing on law enforcement does not rule out the use of military power, but we should only employ such measures in cases where it is clear that law enforcement efforts will fail, as in Afghanistan after 9/11, or in which the benefits of destroying critical terrorist infrastructure and killing specific terrorists (Osama bin Laden himself, for instance) would clearly outweigh the costs of using force in ways that will be perceived as illegitimate in the Muslim world and that are likely to result in the killing of innocent people as collateral damage.

Excellent intelligence is the key to success. Without it, our effort becomes indiscriminate, counterproductive, and doomed to failure. The United States must work closely with foreign intelligence agencies and build and train autonomous intelligence organizations in friendly states that currently lack adequate intelligence capacity. This capacity building and decentralization is much easier and more efficient than to try to do and run everything from the United States, even though it will ultimately imply a lack of direct control.

Our law enforcement networks must also extend beyond the usual suspects, to countries where the government is weak and corrupt. We should build more explicit and stronger regional and global networks of government officials central to counterterrorism efforts. Doing so will help channel more resources, training, technical assistance, and moral support to agents on the ground from Kazakhstan to Kuala Lumpur, who can help find and stop terrorists at various phases of their activities.

THE OUTER CIRCLES

Success in the battle for hearts and minds ultimately requires that we offer a positive vision of the future to combat the vision offered by the insurgents. That offer must demonstrate that the United States is unswervingly committed to ending the plight of the Palestinians through a lasting two-state settlement,

as described above. It also must include cooperation with our European allies to find better ways to integrate disaffected Muslim youth into their societies and to address the broader concerns of Muslim communities worldwide, including in the United States.

The effort to influence the views of individuals in the outer circles is often described under the general rubric of “public diplomacy.” Yet in the words of this project’s working group on anti-Americanism, the United States should think about all of its actions in terms of a sales approach rather than a public relations approach.²⁷ While public relations suggests a one-way broadcast communication to shape opinions and correct misperception, a sales approach requires understanding the recipient of a message and that recipient’s reaction to the message. For the United States, the sales targets must include a variety of audiences, and our salespeople must tailor messages to the particular concerns of each of those audiences. Confidence in our own good intentions is not enough. We must also make greater progress in generating large numbers of foreign service officers fluent in Arabic, Farsi, and other languages pertinent to the struggle against terror networks.

Finally, and most broadly, the United States must take every opportunity to demonstrate to Muslim families that a brighter economic and social future is possible for them through deeper connections to the global economy and international society. The Persian Gulf states are working to create world-class universities and professional schools to train future generations of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and scientists in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia is even opening its first private university. The United States should work with these governments to develop the institutions and the know-how necessary to build much more diversified economies and societies that offer opportunities for building lives of purpose and meaning beyond fanaticism and violence.

THE PROLIFERATION AND TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The world is on the cusp of a new era of nuclear danger. The non-proliferation regime is in crisis: Iran is seeking the capacity to build nuclear weapons; North Korea has a small nuclear arsenal; the nuclear “haves” have failed to live up to their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); the “have nots” are questioning their continued participation in the regime; and the NPT itself is in a state of limbo following the failure of the 2005 Review Conference. In the resulting vacuum, it is not difficult to envisage a proliferated world in which non-nuclear powers in the Middle East and East Asia follow Iran and North Korea and join the nuclear club.

We should not be fooled into thinking that life in a nuclear crowd would be as stable as life during the Cold War. The success of mutually assured destruction is often exaggerated; the world came close to catastrophe at least once. According to a former secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, “we lucked

²⁷ *Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism* (Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005), <http://www.wps.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/AA.pdf>.

out.” One must assume that the risks of miscalculation would only be higher in a proliferated Middle East or East Asia where it would be unclear who was deterring whom. Moreover, the Cold War is not an experience we should hope to emulate unless absolutely necessary. The U.S.-Soviet arms race was unprecedented in history, half of Europe was enslaved behind the Soviet deterrent, and the fate of freedom held in the balance for two generations.

Perhaps the greatest danger in a proliferated world, though, involves the collapse of a nuclear-armed state, which would immediately raise a question mark as to who has custody of that country’s nuclear weapons. An entrepreneurial general might seek to enrich himself by selling them on the open market or a terrorist group might take advantage of the chaos and steal one or more of them. This scenario is becoming all too plausible as increasing numbers of unstable autocracies acquire the bomb.²⁸

Even without state collapse, weapons of mass destruction or the materials to produce them could be transferred to terrorists. It is helpful to distinguish between deliberate and inadvertent transfer. An extreme regime has many reasons not to deliberately transfer fissile materials to terrorist groups or surreptitiously attack the United States with WMD. It would lose control over when the weapons would be used; it would have no guarantee that the weapons would not be turned on itself; and it could be held accountable if the transfer were detected. By far the trickier problem is the inadvertent transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons materials to non-state actors. These states are corrupt and shrouded in secrecy. There are few guarantees that the regimes responsible are taking every possible step to ensure the safety of their programs. As the A. Q. Khan affair demonstrates, it may not even matter much if the regime is friendly towards the United States.

Although the danger of state failure looms large, we still need to be concerned about extreme regimes using their strength to cause trouble. As discussed in the section on the Middle East, a state like Iran could brandish a nuclear weapons capability to deter an effective response to any coercive or limited regional aggression that it chooses to instigate.

Ultimately, though, this threat will not be solved by dealing with a “rogue” or two, or by portraying the problem as one of good states that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and bad states that cannot be. Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft has observed that “where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character of regimes and governments... such an approach opens up divisions among the world’s nuclear powers, with each making a list of ‘friends’ who can be trusted with nuclear technology, and ‘foes’ who are dangerous risks.”²⁹ Instead, specific problems must be seen in the overall context of a breakdown of non-proliferation norms, including provocative policies on the part of the United States and other legitimate nuclear powers.

²⁸ The collapse of a nuclear state may give rise to stabilization and nation-building missions by the U.S. military. Addressing this contingency is the subject of a paper commissioned by the Princeton Project. See Michael O’Hanlon, “Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear Armed State” (working paper, Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005); <http://www.wps.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/ohanlon.pdf>.

²⁹ Brent Scowcroft, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions – A Modest Proposal,” *The National Interest*, Spring 2006.

In reforming the non-proliferation regime, it is particularly important to strike a bargain that states can sell to their citizens – both for those countries that are already up to PAR and need to explain why they choose not to acquire nuclear weapons and for autocracies that complain about the inequities in the current regime. The United States faces two major obstacles in an effort to stem the tide of proliferation – general anti-Americanism and the perception that the treaty regime is unfair. Thus, we must demonstrate our commitment to the overall goal of non-proliferation while ensuring that we maintain enough nuclear capacity to serve as a deterrent, as we live in a world where force is still necessary.

A robust and effective NPT is vital to the mission of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty has its shortcomings but, as Ashton Carter has written, the United States should “take the lead in fixing the NPT, not disparaging it.”³⁰ The NPT is a nearly universal organization – only North Korea, Israel, India, and Pakistan are not members – and it is unique among international security agreements in that it has an administrative body charged with monitoring and enforcement, namely the IAEA.

Any reinvigoration of the NPT must involve revision of Article IV, which gives all member states an “inalienable right” to acquire nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The central weakness of this article is that due to new technologies and the dissemination of knowledge, it allows the building of enrichment and reprocessing facilities that can be quickly converted into a military capability. In a world of powerful and dangerous non-state actors and turbulent domestic politics in many states, the peaceful atom understanding must be revised to allow nuclear energy but not nuclear capacity. And where nuclear capacity exists, states must bear a heavy responsibility for safeguarding it and supplying others with nuclear energy. Specifically, a new deal must provide for:

- No additional enrichment or reprocessing facilities can be built in countries other than those where they already exist.
- A credible international fuel supply regime for access to low-level fissile material at a fair price. The key issue here is energy security – i.e. establishing a reliable supply of peaceful nuclear materials to non-nuclear weapons states.

This modification of Article IV would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons while guaranteeing that states can build a nuclear energy capacity.³¹ All signatories would accept tighter constraints but get assured access to legitimate needs. The United States should also work with other states to strengthen the capacities of the IAEA. This entails looking closely at increasing its funding and enlarging its mandate.

³⁰ Kurt Campbell ed.: *The Challenge of Proliferation; A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group* (The Aspen Institute, February 2005).

³¹ This proposal is spelled out in more detail elsewhere. For example, see George Perkovich, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon Wolfsthal, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2005); and *The Challenge of Proliferation: A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group*.

Of course, Iran is a signatory to the NPT and may seek to prevent a renegotiation; in that case, we should not allow the process to be held hostage and must seek to rally all other states to an equitable agreement. It is in the context of a revived non-proliferation regime that we can bring more pressure to bear on regimes that continue to illegally pursue a nuclear weapons capability; this may include building a coalition to isolate and contain these states – politically and diplomatically – with a view towards generating a fundamental change in their behavior. The most obvious crisis points are Iran and North Korea, although others could emerge in the future.

However, revising Article IV is only one half of the story. Many non-nuclear weapons states believe that the United States and other nuclear weapons states are not living up to their obligations under Article VI, which requires a good faith effort to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. A series of benchmarks were laid out at the 2000 Review Conference – the so-called 13 steps – to guide the policies of these states, but the United States has ignored many of them.

The United States should signal its intention to fulfill its part of the NPT bargain by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), working with Russia to de-alert nuclear missiles on both sides, building on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) with Russia to move ahead with further cuts in nuclear arsenals, and reducing stockpiles of weapons-usable materials on a global basis. The last of these steps is particularly important to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it will take a special effort on the part of the United States since several countries with a civilian non-military nuclear program oppose a global clean-out of highly enriched uranium. With respect to the U.S. nuclear posture, while it is important to maintain a research and development capacity to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons are safe and continue to act as a deterrent, we should exert great care and caution to ensure that nothing is done that would erode the global norm of nuclear non-use.³² As mentioned in the section on the Middle East, we should also be prepared to offer negative security assurances to regimes that agree to eschew nuclear weapons.³³

Reviving the NPT is an important element of a non-proliferation strategy, but it is not the only element. The United States must also engage in a range of counter-proliferation measures. These should include:

- Reinvigorating and fully funding the Nunn-Lugar program to lock down “loose nukes” in Russia, which continues, after all these years, to be the most likely source of a terrorist weapon.
- Strengthening and expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, which allows an international coalition to interdict WMD and missile-related shipments to break the trade in proliferation.
- Pressing ahead with the development of a working missile defense system.

³² Up to the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review the United States has lacked a functioning nuclear weapons research and development program. Instead, it relied on legacy forces from the 1980s.

³³ These assurances would contain clauses rendering them inapplicable in the case of external aggression or acts of genocide.

- Tailoring deterrence to the unique cultural context of America's adversaries.
- Prioritizing counter-proliferation mission capabilities in the Department of Defense.
- Developing comprehensive plans to intervene to confiscate nuclear weapons and materials if a nuclear weapons state were to collapse.

THE RISE OF CHINA AND ORDER IN EAST ASIA

The rise of China is one of the seminal events of the early 21st century. China's rapid economic growth and active regional diplomacy are already transforming East Asia – and Beijing's geopolitical influence is growing. Economically, China's commercial and energy ties are expanding worldwide. China is at the center of proliferating regional and bilateral trade agreements and the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade. Beijing's capital reserves are a major source of American borrowing. Politically, China plays a leading role in the six-party talks on North Korea. It seeks to shape the region's emerging political-institutional contours, encouraging movement toward an East Asian community that excludes the United States. Militarily, China has embarked upon a major military build-up since the mid-1990s, apparently sparked by continuing economic growth and the 1997 crisis across the Taiwan Strait.³⁴ The combination of these trends suggests that China is on track to rapidly regain its historic great power status.

The United States has had no experience managing a relationship with a country that is potentially its principal economic and military rival; during the Cold War, our economic peers were our closest allies. In the Sino-American relationship political and economic frictions can intersect and exacerbate one another, particularly when no institution exists to facilitate discussions and resolutions of contentious issues, such as outsourcing and Chinese state-financed takeovers of American companies. Further, China is an increasingly important purchaser of U.S. debt and a de facto financier of the U.S. economy. Problems can also emerge if China's economic performance lags; even a moderate slowdown could make the Chinese government less willing to undertake more accommodating exchange rate and intellectual property policies or to reduce the army's influence in Chinese policies.

It is unclear, and probably unknowable, how China's intentions and ambitions will evolve as it becomes more powerful. As a result, China's neighbors worry that its rise will compromise their autonomy and freedom of action, while the United States is concerned that China's increasing influence may come at America's expense. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Zoellick posed the question sharply: "So, how should we view China at the dawn of the 21st Century? . . . There is a cauldron of anxiety. . . Many countries hope China will pursue a 'Peaceful Rise,' but none will bet their future on it."³⁵

³⁴ Department of Defense, *The Military Power of the People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC: July 2005).

³⁵ Robert Zoellick, "Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility" (remarks, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, September 21, 2005).

Historically, the rise and fall of great powers has been one of the most important dynamics in the international system, a dynamic that has frequently been a source of instability and conflict. These classic historical dynamics are not inevitable, though. China's relations with the outside world have not followed a pattern of growing conflict so far. On the contrary, China is in many ways playing by Western rules: its growth is powered by its move towards a market economy, it has begun to engage international institutions like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, it is not driven by an aggressive ideology, and it does not appear to have expansive territorial ambitions beyond Taiwan. Moreover, China's economic growth directly and substantially benefits the United States.

Still, managing the rise of China is one of the most important challenges confronting the United States and the international community. America's goal should not be to block or contain China, but rather to engage it in ways that help it become a responsible stakeholder, in Robert Zoellick's phrase, in the regional and global system. We must engage China in areas of mutual interest and look for opportunities to strike strategic bargains at various moments along the shifting power trajectories and encroaching geopolitical spheres.

America must also recognize that China is not the only potential source of destabilizing change in Asia.

- Japan's search for a mature sense of national identity and statehood and for the traditional rights of sovereignty and self-defense that come with it – what some have called the “normalization of Japan” – is causing considerable concern among its neighbors, particularly China and South Korea.
- America's own changing global security priorities and strategic thinking, increasingly organized around the war on terror, have created new uncertainties and doubts in Asia about the U.S. commitment to the region. In particular, America's allies wonder if their interests and concerns still matter in Washington and whether the United States will be there for them should events take a bad turn.
- The rise of India and the resurgence of Russia have brought broader Eurasian great power politics into the expanded geopolitical space of Asia. A central part of this new power politics concerns the pursuit of energy, featuring India and China as competing consumers and Russia as a pivotal supplier.

All of these changes occur against the backdrop of massive economic growth in Asia – shared disproportionately throughout the region – and the deep integration of East Asia into the global economy.

THE STRATEGY

America's primary task is to manage the Sino-American relationship in such a way that China can continue to achieve its legitimate ambitions within the current international order. The centerpiece of

American strategy must be to foster and strengthen a regional order that is trans-Pacific, rather than pan-Asian – that is, one in which the United States plays a full part.

To accomplish this goal, the United States must develop a combined economic and political strategy. Politically, we should offer China greater status and position within the regional and global system. In return, we should expect Beijing to accept and accommodate our core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. Over the long run, we need to foster conditions within which China will increasingly make choices to embrace liberty under law both for the Chinese themselves and in the international system.

Economically, we must formulate policies based on the principle that sustained economic growth and development in the rest of emerging market Asia (notably India and Vietnam) is the key to the management of China's rise. At the same time, we must maintain cooperative economic ties with the European Union, rather than moving towards greater U.S.-European economic rivalry. Otherwise, China will have room to play the United States and the European Union off against each other in the economic and diplomatic spheres.

More broadly, American relations with other developing countries around the world – and with failed or occupied states in particular – must always include a positive economic component. Such a component will help prevent the emergence of an unwanted “division-of-labor” that repeatedly makes China, the European Union, or even anti-American oil exporters, such as current Iranian or Venezuelan regimes, the apparently generous benefactors and the United States appear to be a militarist bully by comparison.

Specifically, U.S. strategy should include the following steps:

- America should strive to establish an East Asian security institution that brings together the major powers – China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States – for direct and ongoing discussions about regional security issues. This forum would provide a mechanism through which China and the regional powers could signal restraint and register commitments to the peaceful settlement of disputes.
- The United States should strengthen its ties with democratic allies in the region – in part because the future of China and the region are uncertain. We should deepen bilateral ties and supplement them with new multilateral initiatives to address common challenges.
- America should actively compete for regional influence, while seeking to keep competition with China within peaceful bounds. We should enter this competition confident that we can offer an attractive model of international order that will fare well against all conceivable alternatives.
- As part of the competition for influence, we must recoup the credibility that we lost in some Asian quarters during the Asian financial crisis and since 9/11, by demonstrating that we are

acutely concerned with the needs of the region. We should be willing to define our national interests sufficiently broadly, beyond counterterrorism, to encompass the provision of collective goods and a form of regional order that serves the interests of most Asian states.

- The United States should accompany creative institution-building with the maintenance of a strong military capability that is not directed overtly at China but is designed to dissuade it from regional hegemonic ambitions and deter it from acts of aggression.
- America should take serious steps to address its large and growing current account deficit, which has depended upon China's enormous purchase of U.S. debt and is not sustainable. The solution to this challenge must involve changes at home and abroad. We must adopt policies that increase the national savings rate and encourage our economic peers to adopt policies that will increase global demand as our contribution to global demand growth wanes. China itself must begin to shift its strategy for economic growth – in a gradual but sustained way – from exports, which have prospered thanks to the artificially low value of the renminbi, to consumption. These adjustments are essential to reduce the risk of a major shock to the global economy.³⁶
- The United States should continue to make the U.S.-Japan alliance the bedrock of American strategy in East Asia. This alliance plays a critical role in reassuring Japan's neighbors, including China and South Korea, about Japan's intentions. However, we should encourage Japan to move very cautiously in revising Article 9 of its postwar constitution and to do so only in tandem with a new multilateral framework through which it can consult and reassure South Korea and China. Such a framework could serve to embed a stronger Japan within a more cooperative Asia, similar to the way that German reunification occurred in the context of deeper European integration.
- In Asia more generally, America should build on the Bush administration's efforts to deepen its relationship with India, the other emerging power in Asia. India has enjoyed rapid economic growth, possesses the largest middle class in the world, and is becoming a more confident player on the international stage. Unlike China, of course, India is a democracy. Perhaps more importantly, India's national concerns – about Chinese power, combating Islamist extremism, preserving an open international economy, and protecting energy supplies – closely mirror our own. The United States and India have few direct clashes of interests. However, India is unlikely to be as reliable a friend as Britain or Japan has been and it may seek to triangulate between the United States and China. This possibility should provide a note of caution to those who believe that India may be a panacea for all of our strategic concerns in Asia.

³⁶ See Brad Setser (testimony, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, August 22, 2006).

The U.S.-China relationship may be the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century. We must plan on its continued uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity. On the one hand, China is not now a threat; treating it as one could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the worst case, U.S. policy could trigger a new Cold War – unnecessarily. On the other hand, important strategic implications flow from China’s rise. Failing to deal with these implications will only increase national security risks in the medium to long term.

A GLOBAL PANDEMIC

American national security in the 21st century – as at virtually any time in our history until the age of vaccines and antibiotics – is likely to be threatened by pathogens as much as people. New diseases and antibiotic-resistant strains of old ones are on the rise; AIDS is already a devastatingly deadly global pandemic. Today national and international health experts warn of the apocalyptic danger of an avian influenza pandemic.

Infectious disease is already the number one killer of humans. Even so, avian flu is special. A variant killed fifty million people in 1918-19, including 675,000 people in America, or 6 percent of the U.S. population. The current strain circulating around Asia may even be more dangerous – it is estimated to have over a 50 percent fatality rate. Casualty estimates for an avian flu pandemic range up to the hundreds of millions of people. Many of these victims could be American. For this reason alone, it constitutes a national security threat of the first order.

An outbreak also poses other dangers, even if it is kept out of the United States. The global economy could grind to a halt, if not collapse entirely. Stock markets would fall, travel would cease, trade would be inhibited, and productivity would decline precipitously. In addition, the costs associated with directly tackling the crisis would be astronomical.

Worse still would be the consequences of differential dying. As Laurie Garrett notes, “resources are so scarce that both wealthy and poor countries would be foolish to count on the generosity of their neighbors during a global outbreak....[I]t is doubtful that any of the world’s wealthy nations would be able to meet the needs of their own citizenry – much less those of other countries.”³⁷ In other words, we can plan on huge global disparities in the nationality and socioeconomic status of victims. The repercussions of a catastrophe with such disparities would likely linger, fester, and cause rage for generations. Even in the industrialized world, trust might be obliterated as individual states hoard and nationalize vaccines that can be produced within their borders (influenza vaccine is currently only produced in nine countries).

In a post-pandemic world, the U.S.-led global order on which we have placed so much importance might simply not survive. Independence, not interdependence, would become the coin of the realm, and dangerous patterns of interstate behavior might emerge that resemble those prevalent before World War II.

³⁷ Laurie Garrett, “The Next Pandemic,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84, No 4 (July/August 2005): 3-23.

This threat is compounded by the fact that, despite some useful moves by the Bush administration, the United States and the world remain woefully unprepared. The SARS virus was not as infectious or as lethal as an outbreak of avian flu is likely to be, yet it spread to five countries within twenty-four hours of its appearance in Hong Kong. AIDS already poses a grave security threat by devastating weak states, killing large numbers of people, and exacerbating other security problems – but the international response has been found wanting.³⁸ If that failure is a portent of things to come, we could be in for a very rough ride.

An appropriate response to the threat of a pandemic must be based on flexible, inclusive, and action-oriented networks and organizations. Our emphasis has to be on preventive action where possible; the emergence of a risk anywhere on the planet must be treated as an imminent danger to all states.

At home, we must make critical investments in our public health system and improve the capacities of our first responders. These actions could save thousands and even hundreds of thousands of lives in a crisis. Abroad, we must build frameworks of cooperation with other countries that allow for preventive action and build the political and social capital necessary to guarantee strong support in a crisis. Doing so represents the most effective way to lower the temperature of international politics and develop the collective capacity needed to tackle many different global health problems.

The countries most likely to give rise to a pandemic are often the least equipped to deal effectively with an outbreak if it occurs. Thus, the United States and our allies should provide sufficient resources and assistance to build capacity overseas and create an incentive structure in at-risk countries to ensure that effective measures, such as culling of animals, can be taken in a timely fashion. Indeed, in this area the claim by the project's working group on reconstruction and development that our foreign aid should be recognized as national security assistance rings very true.³⁹ We should bolster our support for reconstruction and development efforts in post-conflict, failed, and fragile states as part of a collective effort to build a global public health system that will serve the interests of all nations.

Matters of global health deserve and necessitate sustained high-level attention at all levels of government, particularly in the White House. We must broaden our understanding of national security so that health and development experts are included at every stage of the threat assessment and decision-making processes and not just consulted after the outbreak of a crisis. The government should also help build awareness in the media, the business community, and foreign governments – some of the key actors that may not be sufficiently attuned to the common dangers we face and the measures required to tackle them.

ENERGY

When the United States purchases large amounts of petroleum from the Middle East, two things happen. First, an enormous amount of wealth is transferred from Americans to autocratic regimes, stifling reform in those countries and possibly strengthening the military capabilities of some of

³⁸ Laurie Garrett, *HIV and National Security: Where are the Links* (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005).

³⁹ *Report of the Working Group on Reconstruction and Development*, 2.

our potential adversaries. Second, the oil we consume – at over \$150 per barrel, when U.S. defense spending dedicated to keep oil flowing is factored into the price – contributes to climate change and the degradation of our environment.

Breaking up this axis of vice must be a key priority for America. If we do nothing, not only will things not improve, they will get dramatically worse.

World energy consumption is projected to grow by 50 percent over the next fifteen years, largely as a result of economic growth in Asia, with petroleum playing an increasing role. According to the National Intelligence Council, China will have to boost its energy consumption by 150 percent and India will have to double its consumption by 2020 just to maintain their current rates of economic growth. Since these countries lack plentiful domestic sources of supply, their competition for energy will play itself out on a global scale.

Greater oil consumption will contribute to worsening levels of climate change. After many years of prevarication in parts of our society, a consensus is emerging: climate change is happening, it is accelerating, and it is in large part the result of human activity. The likely consequences of climate change are extremely serious and include an increase in the scope and intensity of extreme weather events; the loss of land to rising seas; political, economic, and social instability in the worst-hit regions; and the spread of diseases like West Nile and malaria. Some scientists also predict a heightened risk of sudden and catastrophic shifts in the Earth's climate, such as a redirection in the Gulf Stream.

Even in the face of these growing portents of disaster, we lack an effective global framework for tackling the problem. The United States must take the lead in bringing the developed and developing countries together to agree on a common framework for action that includes mutual commitments. If we do not act, nothing will get done and the danger of dramatic climate change will only grow. If we do act, success is by no means guaranteed, but at least it becomes a possibility.

We must begin by clearly understanding the challenge. Sometimes the issue is framed in the United States as a need to decrease the country's dependence on foreign oil. This is a false premise. Oil is a fungible commodity, traded in a global free market. Finding sources of oil closer to home, or in more friendly parts of the world, will do little to reduce our vulnerability to price shocks and instability in the Middle East.

The only solution is to decrease our dependence on oil regardless of its source. Success in this endeavor would have immense national security benefits. It would reduce our exposure to events in the Middle East, dampen competitive pressures in East Asia, and dry up some of the sources of funding for terrorism.

Towards this end, we recommend the introduction of a gasoline tax that would start at fifty cents a gallon and increase by twenty cents per year for ten years. This measure should be accompanied by stricter fuel efficiency standards to encourage automakers to achieve a higher number of miles to the gallon, including by manufacturing hybrid cars. The effect of these steps should be to reduce American consumption of oil and provide incentives for investments in alternatives.

The United States should also change course by organizing the international community to deal with climate change. We should seek a third way between the Kyoto Protocol's requirements for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and outright opposition to any binding constraints. Options worth exploring include:

- A mandatory domestic cap on emissions that permits domestic trading of emissions allowances.
- Bilateral or multilateral deals with major developing country emitters, such as China, India, and Brazil, that provide for trades in emission allowances on financial terms that are attractive to both sides.
- U.S. re-entry into international negotiations for a long-term emissions target and discussions of near-term obligations.
- Encouraging the European Union to move forward with implementation of Kyoto while negotiating with countries that are not party to Kyoto to develop a framework for after 2012 that would be flexible enough to be merged with the bilateral and multilateral framework described above.
- Stepped-up transfers of environmentally friendly technology to the developing world, which would shift the global focus from short-term reductions in carbon emissions to the development of an architecture that encourages and rewards carbon-free innovation.

BUILDING A PROTECTIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

The final section of this report applies to all the threats and challenges facing America today. Based on the principles of maximum impact and multiple use, we must build a much stronger protective infrastructure – one that gives us a better chance to prevent threats from reaching us and to limit their impact if they do. We need to build this infrastructure throughout our society, our government, and the wider world.⁴⁰

In our society, we must bolster our capacity to handle disasters once they hit. In our government, we must develop a sophisticated process of threat assessment and integrate our stovepiped decision-making structures, creating joined-up government. In the wider world, we must expand our safety zone, working closely with foreign officials to expand our border protections beyond our actual physical borders.

⁴⁰ The recommendations in this section are drawn from the Princeton Project's working groups on relative threat assessment, economics and national security, and foreign policy infrastructure and global institutions, <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/index.html>.

STRENGTHENING OUR SOCIETY

Protecting ourselves requires making our society more resilient and capable of dealing with disasters. We must start by vastly improving our public health system. Our health facilities and personnel must be capable of identifying, treating, and quarantining patients suffering from terrorist-induced or naturally occurring pandemic disease; treating victims of catastrophes ranging from hurricanes to nuclear explosions; and increasing the quality and lowering the cost of widespread preventive and routine care, thereby contributing to a stronger and more competitive economy.

Second, we must build better communications systems throughout government – not only among first responders, but also among the many officials required to manage large-scale disasters ranging from epidemics to floods to attacks on the transportation system. Five years after 9/11, we have made some improvements, but not nearly enough. Building and maintaining a strong communications capacity will also pay additional dividends by providing spill-over benefits to our economy and the fabric of our society.

Third, we must invest more in our public education system at the secondary and post-secondary levels so that students acquire the skill sets needed to achieve our national security objectives in the coming decades. This requires focusing on math and science as well as placing greater emphasis on the learning of strategically important languages, including Arabic, Farsi, and Mandarin. It is deplorable that our government still has far too few people who speak these languages, despite countless warnings, recommendations, and pleas. The costs of this shortcoming are felt every day – in Iraq, Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, and America’s daily diplomacy with the rest of the world.

IMPROVING OUR GOVERNMENT

Our government is organized like a department store in an era of Internet shopping – consumers, but not citizens, can demand information, comparisons, and products from multiple sources at any time. Government departments and agencies are stovepiped, such that “national security” is the province of the Pentagon, the White House, and the State Department, but not the Treasury, the Justice Department, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the Departments of Energy or Education. We lack an integrated system for assessing threats and prioritizing our responses. And we do not adequately employ knowledge management systems that enable us to not only “know what we know,” but also to generate new knowledge and solutions to collective problems in real time.

The starting point must be a change of mindset; we must think of public health, economics, and other fields when we think of national security. Towards that end, as this project’s working group on threat assessment recommended, the United States should expand the Quadrennial Defense Review process to include agencies and departments other than the Defense Department, creating what could be called a Quadrennial National Security Review.⁴¹ Such a review could help disentangle politics from

⁴¹ In addition to the report of the Princeton Project’s working group on threat assessment, see Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “Strategic Planning for U.S. National Security: A Project Solarium for the 21st Century” (working paper,

threat assessment by presenting Congress with a more authoritative and less partisan set of proposals for funding homeland security. It might also enable us to fully integrate our hard and soft power, which is crucial if we are to effectively combat anti-Americanism and other long-term threats to our national security.

We must integrate economic policy and perspectives into national security policymaking too. Just consider the implications of conflict in the Middle East for the oil-fueled revenues of autocratic regimes, or the consequences of a standoff in the Taiwan Strait for global markets. National security affects the economy; the economy also affects national security. This project's working group on economics and national security has proposed a number of reforms that would help get the right people to the table so that our government can make economically informed national security decisions. But changing mindsets is more important than changing any organizational chart.

Our frequent failure to integrate economic and national security is but one instance of a far larger problem. Across government, stove piping is the internal enemy of a unified national security effort. Achieving joined-up government requires changing organizational cultures, which can hamper cooperation among organizations. Consolidation is not necessarily the answer, however; as the experience of the Department of Homeland Security shows, this problem can worsen if many agencies are lumped together without adequate forethought and planning.

Instead of creating new bureaucracies, the United States must link existing ones in innovative ways, such as informal networks, dual-hatting, and cross-agency training. Technology holds the key to a whole range of new solutions, allowing the creation of an "open enterprise" model of problem-solving that is faster, more flexible, and more effective than endless inter-agency meetings – meetings that are often not even where important decisions get made.⁴²

Finally, the growing array of threats to the homeland requires integrating the private sector into homeland security efforts more effectively. Such integration is necessary not just because of the private sector's central role in key areas like nuclear power plants, oil refineries, and chemical plants. Businesses also possess knowledge and capabilities to respond to threats that the government sometimes lacks. Yet without prodding from government, the private sector may be reluctant to spend adequate funds on a protective infrastructure that detracts from its profit margin in the short term. Designating business leaders as national security partners and involving the business community more generally in national security briefings would help to strengthen our government and improve government planning.

Princeton Project on National Security, September 2005); <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/interagencyQNSR.pdf>.

⁴² See Joseph M. Firestone and Mark W. McElroy, *The Open Enterprise: Building Business Architectures for Openness and Sustainable Innovation* (Hartland Four Corners: KMCI Online Press, 2003).

EXPANDING OUR SAFETY ZONE

Tending to our own nest is necessary but not sufficient in a globalized world. We must ensure that our protective infrastructure extends beyond our borders. Working through networks of customs, immigration, police, and other homeland security officials, we must develop uniform measures, best practices, and instant information exchange to contain immediate threats before they reach our physical borders. In many cities, states, and ports these networks are already well advanced, but they should be an integral part of our national security thinking and planning. Over time, these overlapping networks and institutions could provide the equivalent of preventive care, significantly reducing the likelihood of full-scale disasters.

Recent political controversies have highlighted the vulnerability of American ports. To reduce this vulnerability we should consider defining our borders beyond those established by land and sea. Just as legal contracts have long shifted liability from a seller to a buyer at the moment that goods are shipped from a foreign land, rather than when they arrive, so too can U.S. borders be defined for some purposes as extending to the port of shipment rather than the port of entry. Creating an outer perimeter around our physical borders would offer an extra measure of protection, and give our public officials added incentives to work closely and effectively with the officials of the countries in which the physical ports of shipment are located. Those incentives, in turn, would extend to a broader American incentive to strengthen the quality and capacity of a foreign government to control its territory and enforce its laws.

CONCLUSION

One of the initial goals of the Princeton Project was to find a single overarching concept that would anchor and orient U.S. national security strategy for the 21st century, in the way that containment anchored and oriented our national security strategy for the second half of the 20th century. A turning point in the project came after its second major conference, when all of the working groups had presented their papers and it became clear that such an organizing principle – such as containment, enlargement, balancing, or democracy promotion – would not be forthcoming. Indeed, no one overarching concept fit because no one danger facing the United States is the overarching threat.

Before 9/11, the rise of China was seen in many circles to be *the* threat; after 9/11 terrorism has been *the* threat, to the point that one of the major recommendations of the project's grand strategy working group was to turn away from the Middle East and back toward China and the rest of Asia. During the project's first conference in May 2004, seven participants were each given ten minutes to convince the audience that their issue – e.g. economic collapse, climate change, failing states – was the most important threat facing the United States. When Laurie Garrett presented the horrific prospect of an avian flu epidemic, the audience shuddered, but the prevailing consensus still centered on more traditional inter-state threats. Two years later, avian flu was front-page, national security news. And some project participants who come from the most traditional national security backgrounds are now debating whether avian flu or climate change is the most serious threat facing the nation in terms of a calculus of potential lives lost and disruption of our way of life.

Yet a strategy cannot consist simply of responses to many different threats. As Henry Kissinger observed in 2002, “the war on terror is not the ultimate test of U.S. foreign policy, which is, above all, to protect the extraordinary opportunity that has come about to recast the international system.”⁴³ The Princeton Project seeks to help America grasp this opportunity to lay the foundations for advancing America's interests on every front, rather than just vanquishing one enemy.⁴⁴ While America's tactics and short-term policies must take the world as it is, a long-term strategy should strive to shape the world as we want it to be. That positive vision should serve as a plumb-line through crises and changing administrations.

This report's vision of a world of liberty under law grows out of both knowledge and conviction. As demonstrated by both reason and social science, a world of liberal democracies would be a safer and better world for Americans and all people to live in. It is thus in America's deepest interest to pursue such a world. But America must also pursue a values-based foreign policy to be true to itself – the cold calculations of realism, in its eternal quest for a balance of power, can never long satisfy the American people.

⁴³ Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* 318.

⁴⁴ See Richard Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2005).

Nor should they. America was born of a belief in universal values – the rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness that belong to all people simply by virtue of their humanity. We have often been clumsy and counterproductive in pursuing these values; some would say arrogant and reckless. We have also been naïve, not recognizing that as a nation we will and must be held accountable by the world for our results rather than our intentions.

Still, some of the greatest moments in our history have come from standing for our values and defending them on behalf of others as well as ourselves. We have recognized at those moments, as we should recognize today, that we have to stand *with* other nations rather than above them, and that we must play by the same rules that they do if we are to achieve common goals. And if we truly believe that our values are universal, then we cannot think that we have a national monopoly on their interpretation or implementation.

Pursuing liberty under law both within nations and among them is a grand strategy for making America more secure. But it is a strategy with many different elements and prescriptions, depending on the context. Recognizing the complex balance that must be struck between order and liberty to secure true liberal democracy means engaging some governments on securing order and others on promoting liberty, but without sacrificing order. Recognizing that order must come through law and that the rule of law requires ordinary citizens to have a stake in upholding the rules means paying attention to those citizens' most basic economic and social needs around the world. Helping both governments and citizens themselves try to meet those needs also means building an infrastructure of engagement and cooperation that gives the United States multiple points of contact with other countries, maximizing our soft as well as our hard power.

In the international sphere, recognizing the value of holding all nations to their obligations means that the United States must lead by constraining itself, and by ensuring that international institutions created with a 20th century mindset actually work to address 21st century problems. These are institutions open to all nations, an essential part of international order. But building a liberal international order also means creating institutions and partnerships that give liberal democracies the collective capacities to protect themselves and solve common problems, both within and alongside existing international institutions. Anthony Lake has pointed out the ways in which such institutions would expand the power of all the world's democracies while reducing the resentment and suspicion of any one.⁴⁵

Finally, forging a world of liberty under law means understanding the role of force in upholding the law and enforcing the order necessary for liberty to flourish. System-wide, the need actually to use force will be reduced if liberal democracies maintain a predominance of military power. We must find ways to update deterrence. And in specific cases, the preemptive, and even preventive, use of force may be necessary to avoid the murder of millions by a single group of individuals determined to die, or by a deranged leader heedless of the fate of his or her own people. Such cases, however, would require multilateral authorization based on the satisfaction of strict criteria.

⁴⁵ Anthony Lake (remarks, Princeton Project on National Security, Princeton, NJ, May 21, 2004).

The world we seek will not emerge overnight. Indeed, spreading liberty under law may still be an apt guide for American national security policy at the beginning of the 22nd century. Yet Dean Acheson once remarked that it would be a foolish gardener who tore up his plants each morning to see how much they grew overnight. Instead, the gardener should seed the garden and wait. George Shultz, one of Acheson's successors, also emphasized the importance of gardening – cultivating relations with other nations on a regular basis and tending to little problems before they become big problems. The process is slow; the results take time.

Yet if we, as Americans, understand that our great democracy, as imperfect as it is, itself depends on the twin pillars of liberty and law, we will have reason to be steadfast and patient. We will be willing to look beyond the presence or absence of elections in charting our relations with other countries. We will be far more skeptical of our ability to impose or even to build democracy at a stroke. We will seek to look beyond labels and assess the overall degree of individual liberty within particular societies and the extent to which that liberty is safeguarded by law rather than enabled by anarchy and weakness. And we will recognize that if we seek to lead a world of liberty under law, then we must lead by example, as a bastion of ordered liberty and a champion of liberal order.

APPENDIX A: CHARTER FOR A CONCERT OF DEMOCRACIES

1. The Parties pledge never to use military force, and never to plan to use military force, against one other.
2. The Parties commit to hold multiparty, free, and fair elections at regular intervals.
3. The Parties commit to uphold internationally recognized civil and political rights for all their citizens and to make these rights enforceable by an independent judiciary.
4. The Parties recognize that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberative starvation and exposure to disease – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the international community.
5. The Parties undertake to contribute to the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by promoting liberal democracy as a model of government and by bringing about a better understanding throughout the world of the principles upon which democratic institutions are founded.
6. This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way, the rights and obligations under the U.N. Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Possible Future Amendments Should Security Council Reform Fail

7. Action pursuant to article four and consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, including the use of military force, may be approved by a two-thirds majority of the parties.
8. Action to enforce the purposes of the United Nations in the wake of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, may be approved by a two-thirds majority of the parties.

APPENDIX B: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF WORKING GROUP REPORTS

The Princeton Project working groups presented their findings on September 29, 2005, at a conference entitled “National Security in the 21st Century.” The working group co-chairs drafted the following executive summaries in August 2006 for inclusion in the project’s final report. Full text of the working group reports can be found on the project website at: <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/index.html>

WORKING GROUP ON GRAND STRATEGIC CHOICES CO-CHAIRS: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND G. JOHN IKENBERRY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The coming decade is likely to present the United States with both an unprecedented opportunity and truly historic dangers. On the one hand, America’s preeminent power position gives it a unique chance to promote change in the international system. On the other, a series of important trends in the international system have given rise to novel threats and challenges – including proliferation, the emergence of catastrophic terrorist groups, and the shifting distribution of power in the international system. Moreover, there is a real risk that the very act of tackling these menaces may exacerbate America’s security problems.

The overarching message of the *Report of the Working Group on Grand Strategic Choices*, which draws on views from foreign policy experts across the political spectrum, is that the United States must shepherd welcome change in the international system while also acting in a manner consistent with the common interest of the international community. America’s long-term security depends both upon U.S. global leadership and widespread international acceptance of that mission. The key to reconciling these twin impulses is to shape, consolidate, and strengthen a 21st century global order that is free, open, stable, and cooperative.

The report’s main findings include:

- East Asia is likely to pose the greatest challenges to the United States over the coming three decades, challenges that have been exacerbated by America’s relative lack of interest in tending to the region. The United States should move towards an Asia-centric grand strategy that consolidates and strengthens the American-led regional order and heads off trouble before it occurs. A central part of this strategy should be an effort to compete with a rising China for regional influence while seeking to integrate it into a trans-Pacific order. The report proposes a “competitive engagement” strategy that seeks to strengthen the institutional architecture of the region in ways that encourage a peaceful and integrative rise of China but also hedges against less desirable outcomes.

- The key to this strategy is a need to supplement America's existing bilateral ties (particularly the U.S.-Japan alliance) with new multilateral arrangements, to ensure that ASEAN Plus Three (which excludes the United States) is not the only game in town. The basic design decision is whether to include China from the start – e.g. to turn the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program into a permanent five power organization to provide an OSCE-type forum for discussing regional security issues – or to set up an organization of market democracies focused around good governance and a U.S.-Japan Free Trade Association that could one day include China but in the meantime serves as a hedge against an aggressive China. The report proposes doing both simultaneously.
- It may seem fanciful to speak of the centrality of Asia at a time when the United States is fully engaged in a hot counterinsurgency war in Iraq. However, one way to think about this recommendation is to view Iraq as the near-term danger but Asia as the long-term challenge. In other words, the United States must transition to an Asia-centric grand strategy, but first it is imperative to deal with the security challenges in the Middle East.
- The United States stirred up a hornet's nest by invading Iraq and dealing with the aftermath in the way that it did; military power is not an appropriate tool to transform the Middle East. However, it is also clear that the consequences of failure in Iraq, now that America is there, could prove to be catastrophic, leading to further American casualties, a failed state in the Sunni region which could serve as a launching pad for terrorism, a civil war that could come to include neighboring states, a diminution of American prestige and credibility, the potential for an isolationist turn in American public opinion, and the continuing preoccupation of the United States with the Middle East. There are no easy or obvious answers; the United States should be very slow to adopt a strategy that abandons the goal of a stable, functioning government and it must be careful not to allow the preferable to be the enemy of the tolerable.
- The war on terrorism is a global counterinsurgency campaign, not a clash of civilizations or a conventional conflict. The objective is to kill the hard core, while peeling off their potential supporters through a hearts-and-minds campaign, rather than wage a larger war against a totalitarian enemy comparable to the World Wars or the Cold War. The center of gravity of this struggle is in the Middle East, but Western Europe is also a battleground, where the primary challenge is to integrate disaffected Muslims.
- The preventive and preemptive use of force against terrorists is a necessary tool in the global counterinsurgency, but it should be used discriminately and considerable effort should be dedicated towards developing strong internal controls to ensure we get our facts right. The costs of being wrong, as the Iraq War demonstrates, are very high. The use of force against rogue states is a very different matter. Preventive action may have unintended consequences that could result in that which the United States is trying to prevent (e.g. proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). While the United States should not eschew this option entirely, it only ought to be an option in the most extreme cases, where there is no other option and the prospects of achieving American objectives are overwhelming.

- The past decade demonstrates that what happens inside states matters to the United States because it can give rise to catastrophic terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, global instability, and massive human rights abuses. However, it also demonstrates that the United States is ill-equipped to influence the domestic development of an adversary or rival, both because other states are suspicious of American motives and because of the limits of relying primarily upon military power. Squaring this circle is a necessary and critical step if the United States is to adequately tackle the security challenges of the 21st century, a feature of which is the dissemination of the means of mass violence to small actors. The United States should lead the international community to develop and use international institutions to engage and reach inside states without using force and influence their development in a positive direction. These institutions, including a community of democracies, can bring more resources and skills to bear upon the problem and they can conceal America's role, showing that good governance is not an American project but a widely accepted step towards modernity.
- Americans have a tendency to view multilateralism as synonymous with the United Nations, projecting its faults and limitations onto all institutions. However, some are more effective than others. It is important to appreciate the great range of multilateral tools available to the United States, which enable it to enlist others in its cause, legitimize its power, inhibit organized resistance from other states, and create a peaceful, prosperous and relatively just international order. These tools will prove increasingly important in dealing with China, stabilizing failing and rogue states, and rebuilding the Western order as long as the United States has the maturity and self-confidence to use them. The United States and its partners should look for ways to renew, adapt, and expand multilateral institutions to new realities – putting America's imprint on 21st century governance institutions.

WORKING GROUP ON STATE SECURITY AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

CO-CHAIRS: PETER BERGEN AND LAURIE GARRETT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

To understand the vulnerabilities the United States faces in the 21st century, the United States must consider transnational threats along side more traditional threats, as they both have the potential to seriously disrupt our internal life. Of the numerous transnational threats in the world today, global conventional terrorism, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear and biological terrorism), highly infectious pandemic disease, and U.S. dependence on oil will require the most sustained and intensive national security attention from the United States in the 21st century. However, national and multilateral approaches to these concerns are still inadequate. To address these four key issues, policymakers must strive to build broad-based governance and societal resilience within the United States, other countries, and the international system generally.

Because non-traditional, transnational threats will continue to expand in foreign policy and national security significance for the United States over the course of this century, this working group's mandate was important to the Princeton Project on National Security's objective of strengthening and updating the foundational premises of U.S. national security. As the George W. Bush administration's 2002 *National Security Strategy for the United States of America* acknowledged, an effective response to the events of September 11, 2001, requires building a new, lasting security perspective that recognizes threats neither controlled nor necessarily supported by any particular state.

To identify the most serious threats, this working group challenged traditional definitions and conceptions of U.S. national security, which historically have focused primarily on military threats, and then analyzed a host of transnational threat candidates, including terrorism, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, drug trafficking, resource scarcities, and natural disasters.

Traditional definitions of U.S. national security have focused almost exclusively on the potential of violent attack by other countries on the United States, its citizens, and its vital overseas interests. This state-centric "violence paradigm" offers no room for transnational threats, even violent threats posed by non-state actors such as terrorists, to be considered national security issues. Without a framework that transcends the violence paradigm, most transnational threats cannot, by definition, be considered national security issues.

In contrast, much of the "new thinking" on national security sought to broaden the concept of national security away from the state-centric violence paradigm so that serious threats not emanating from the military forces of other states could be analyzed as security concerns. For example, national security strategies compiled by the executive branch have identified, with increasing frequency since the late 1980s, many transnational problems as national security issues.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ See full working group report Appendix D: Chart of Transnational Threats in National Security Strategies: Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush. Available at <http://www.wps.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/SSTT.pdf>.

Exploring the gap between traditional national security frameworks and the new thinking on national security constitutes both a minefield and a quagmire. The minefield exists because moving beyond traditional notions of U.S. national security to evaluate transnational threats still proves controversial and often provokes skepticism or hostility. Incorporating the threat of transnational terrorism into the violence paradigm has actually made it more difficult to argue that other transnational threats, such as infectious diseases or resource scarcities, are security issues. The quagmire results from the fragmentation of non-traditional approaches to national security into diverse approaches that are not easily reconcilable. In addition, broader notions of national security often fail to provide parameters to guide a determination of which transnational threats represent national security threats as opposed to foreign policy challenges.

The challenges brought forth by the minefield and quagmire require a critical examination of what exactly national security policy protects. George Kennan's definition of national security as "the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers" became a starting point for deliberations on the meaning of national security. However, transnational threats and globalization forced the working group to broaden the categories of sources of "serious interference" in "internal life" beyond rival states.

U.S. national security policy operates to secure primary public goods that are at the heart of the social contract between the people and its government: economic prosperity, governance continuity, ideological sustainability, military capability, population well-being, and territorial integrity. The environment that influences the production of these primary public goods is critical, and the United States must understand how radically different the context for producing these goods is in the 21st century compared to the Cold War. The structure and dynamics of Cold War international politics have given way to the "networked anarchy" of globalization.

In the 21st century, the United States is unlikely to face an existential threat from another state the way it did from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States does, however, face an existential threat in the form of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, networked anarchy exposes every aspect of the internal and external functioning of the United States to transnational processes and effects. This exposure creates the potential for serious transnational threats to inflict extraordinary direct and indirect damage to the primary public goods at the heart of national security policy.

In deciding which transnational threats might contain the potential to cause the United States extraordinary damage, policymakers should consider factors such as the overall scale of the direct material and psychological impact of the threat; the speed and mobility of the threat; the duration of the threat and its impact; and the adequacy and sustainability of response capabilities. Applying these indicators to the wide range of transnational threats present in the world today, global conventional terrorism, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear and biological terrorism), highly infectious pandemic disease, and U.S. dependence on oil emerge as the transnational threat categories requiring the most significant national security attention from the United States in the 21st century.

Even as it identifies these major threat categories, the United States must recognize that the nature of networked anarchy and the complexity of transnational threats mean that the “breakout” potential for other transnational issues is significant, requiring very close coordination between foreign policy and national security. Ultimately, the challenges presented by transnational problems illuminate the need for more high-level consideration of the inadequacy of existing national and multilateral approaches to these concerns and for building broad-based governance and societal resilience within the United States, other countries, and the international system generally.

WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY CO-CHAIRS: ADAM POSEN AND DANIEL TARULLO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The integration of economic and national security policies is critical to the United States' interests for three reasons. First, long-term economic and demographic trends are gradually but steadily shifting the geopolitical weight of power towards Asia and away from Europe, and the United States must prepare for the security implications of this shift. Second, economic relations between countries increasingly define the overall tone and depth of their relationship. Third, both a nation's military capacity and its citizenry's well-being depend on that country's economic performance.

Despite these compelling reasons for policy integration, U.S. policymakers have had difficulty achieving it conceptually or operationally. Yet, success or failure in each of these policy areas easily reinforces and advances developments in the other. American leadership in the multilateral economic system, the management of China's economic rise, and broader adaptation to the shift in power from Europe to Asia are central to the achievement of both U.S. economic and national security goals. The United States is more likely to achieve these goals if the connections between economics and national security are well understood.

IMPROVING CURRENT THINKING ON ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The conventional wisdom on economic and national security policy contains both valid assumptions and significant misperceptions. Correctly, the conventional wisdom recognizes that: globalization increases U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities simultaneously; the ability of the United States to restrict commerce and technology transfer is severely limited; successful economic development in and integration of poorer countries enhances U.S. security; and economic policy mistakes at home and abroad can rapidly undermine American security.

At the same time, widespread mistaken perceptions persist among U.S. policymakers that: relatively faster economic growth in other countries threatens the United States; the process of economic development abroad always enhances American security; globalization makes the American economy highly vulnerable to the policies of other nations; globalization increases the effectiveness of economic sanctions and export controls; and the economic capabilities of countries are changing rapidly. All of these assumptions are flawed.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

The United States faces five main security-relevant challenges in international economic policy. First, the United States needs to integrate economic and national security policy more strategically. Although the end of the Cold War has increased the importance of international economic policy as a means of

statecraft, the United States has a less dominant economic position today from which to achieve its foreign policy goals than it possessed in the immediate post-war period. Furthermore, the United States confronts a more privatized and turbulent economic system and a rising set of costs, such as terrorism and expanding entitlements. With such limitations on economic tools while demands on those tools rise, it is essential that the government coordinate economic and national security policies.

Second, the United States must undertake that integration in a multi-polar economic environment with a novel set of characteristics. The emergence of a multi-polar economic system characterized by the inclusion of countries at very different levels of development and the rise of Asia ex-Japan puts the United States in rapidly shifting territory. In this environment, the United States needs to leverage the spillover benefits for national security policy from successful economic policy, and vice-versa. Multi-polar economics calls for a greater emphasis on diplomacy and for a greater dedication of resources to managing this complex set of economic relationships.

Third, in the economic arena, as in the security one, China's emergence will be the single most important challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the next several decades. The United States does not have experience managing a relationship with a country that is potentially its principal economic and military rival. The rise of China also produces a set of frictions different from those encountered in other U.S. economic relationships. For instance, many of the concerns prompted by China's rise, such as pressures on the jobs and wages of low-skilled labor and increasing competition for energy supplies, lie outside of the mandates of existing institutions. Problems can also emerge if China's economic performance lags; even a moderate slowdown could make the Chinese government less willing to undertake more accommodating exchange rate and intellectual property policies or to reduce the influence of the People's Liberation Army in Chinese policies.

Fourth, the extent of international economic leadership provided by the United States has been gradually but steadily declining over the last quarter century. This decline has had two deleterious effects on America's overall international position: 1) it has reduced positive spillover effects from U.S. economic leadership to American political influence and popularity in trading partners; and 2) other countries have gained opportunities and incentives to fill that leadership vacuum with regional or local initiatives, or to define themselves as following an indigenous model in opposition to U.S. policies.

Finally, the slow but steady shift in economic influence from Europe to Asia will present the United States with one of two situations within the next quarter century: 1) there may no longer exist another economic power with which the United States can cooperate to pursue a positive global economic agenda, or even to maintain the current multinational framework; or 2) there may exist an economic power—either China alone, or China leading an integrated Asian regional bloc—with the requisite heft but without the incentive to partner with the United States.

To deal with these challenges, the United States must integrate economic and national security policymaking on an ongoing basis. This would entail: recognizing that economic interests represent important national security interests; convening the right mix of people and agencies for policy decisions rather than separating the “silos”; and assessing regularly the economic—and thus fuller security—costs of proposed foreign policy measures. Such a commitment is required more from the mindset of the policymakers involved than any specific reorganization of the relevant U.S. decision-making apparatus. The United States must also exercise greater leadership of the multilateral economic system, while working within its institutions.

Strategically, the United States must formulate policies based on the principle that sustained economic growth and development in the rest of emerging market Asia (notably India and Vietnam) is the key to geopolitical management of China’s rise. Simultaneously, the economic relationship with relatively declining European powers must be managed to maintain interactions that are essentially cooperative rather than trending towards rivalry. Otherwise, China will have room to play the U.S. and European Union off against each other in the economic and diplomatic spheres. American relations with other developing countries around the world, and with failed or occupied states in particular, must always include a positive economic component—not least so that a ‘division-of-labor’ does not emerge that repeatedly makes China, the European Union, or even anti-American oil exporters (such as current Iranian or Venezuelan regimes) the apparently generous benefactors, and the United States the militarist bully by comparison.

More than just adequate economic growth is required to sustain long-term capacity for economic and technological leadership, as well as sufficient resources to pursue American national security interests. At home, the United States must: rectify its irresponsible fiscal policies; reallocate enough of our limited public resources to provide sufficient economic security for American workers to assure equitable and politically sustainable global economic integration; modulate the post-9/11 restrictions on foreign visitors, especially of students in technical fields; and replace outdated practices in education, training, and research, and development.

WORKING GROUP ON RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CO-CHAIRS: FREDERICK BARTON & MICHAEL FROMAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the aftermath of 9/11, a strong, largely cross-party consensus emerged in the United States that weak states and war-torn societies could represent direct threats to American national security, thus placing reconstruction and development at the center of the U.S. response. The many challenges of the ongoing reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the importance of applying lessons from those experiences to reformulate U.S. reconstruction and development approaches. More effective reconstruction and development initiatives will also win new friends for the United States and strengthen America's capacity to influence events abroad.

The United States must recognize foreign aid for what it truly is: national security assistance. Poverty increases the likelihood of civil conflict, state collapse, authoritarian leadership, environmental catastrophe, and pandemic diseases – all of which can threaten American security. The linkages between reconstruction and development challenges and national security are logical.

Reconstruction and development are essential tools for bolstering America's ability to lead overseas. Their potential to mitigate threats that marinate in poverty and fragile states and to generate goodwill and counter anti-Americanism make them vital elements of U.S. national security. When conducted effectively, they serve as crisis prevention efforts as much as crisis response activities.

With its immense resources, unparalleled military capability, and democratic values, the United States has a unique responsibility to lead reconstruction and development initiatives. Addressing many emerging problems requires a richness of institutional and financial strength and human capacity that few countries can provide without American participation.

SETTING PRIORITIES

American engagement in reconstruction and development should focus on cases vital to U.S. national interests and should be evaluated based on what is necessary for success. Too often, the American approach to reconstruction and development has been ad-hoc, reactive, and ideological, all of which limit its effectiveness.

A more strategic approach should be guided by two principles. First, the United States should engage in fewer places and on fewer issues but with greater intensity and efficacy. It should focus its resources in places that represent major threats to American security, provide opportunities to demonstrate success, or present moral imperatives for action consistent with American values. Within those places, the United States should focus on: strengthening the rule of law, personal freedoms, and democratic governance; expanding educational opportunities for women and youth; and building public health

capacity to respond to disaster and disease. This tighter focus should be accompanied by stepped-up efforts to measure the impact of U.S. initiatives so that dollars only get allocated to programs with proven results.

Second, the United States should leverage its efforts and resources by favoring regional burden-sharing arrangements and empowering local actors. American policymakers should consider carefully in each case the likely consequences of acting alone or acting through a multilateral framework with partners who possess valuable resources and expertise, such as the European Union, Japan, and the United Nations.

INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS

The United States can increase the effectiveness of its reconstruction and development efforts by establishing greater integration between civilians and the military as well as among various government agencies. Multidimensional challenges require integrated responses. To improve collaboration, create clearer lines of authority, and foster better strategic planning, the government should establish a second national security advisor dedicated to reconstruction and development. The huge reconstruction and development portfolio will only grow more complex, and it requires high-level, full-time, and focused attention.

The United States should also streamline funding sources while giving policymakers the flexibility to transfer funds rapidly from one program to another. The government should use some of this funding to build integrated and deployable teams of well-trained military and civilian personnel, including soldiers, police, judges, defense lawyers, prison wardens, and community organizers.

BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT

Dedicating greater resources to the demonstration of success will increase the American public's support for reconstruction and development. To build a lasting domestic constituency, the government must: articulate clearly the importance of reconstruction and development for U.S. national security interests; develop goals and strategies for making U.S. involvement more focused and effective; improve government leadership, coordination, and financial readiness; and inform the American people of the positive results of reconstruction and development efforts.

WORKING GROUP ON ANTI-AMERICANISM CO-CHAIRS: TOD LINDBERG AND SUZANNE NOSSEL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Public opinion polls show that anti-Americanism has risen markedly over the last three years in much of the world. Notably, unfavorable views of the United States in Western countries are more heavily concentrated among young people. While President George W. Bush's policies have been a spark for negative attitudes, America's image problem is increasingly much bigger than its current Administration.

Within the rubric of anti-Americanism, there exists a great variety of different motivations, attitudes, and criticisms of the United States. As Robert Keohane and Peter Katzenstein have described, these forms of anti-Americanism include: liberal Anti-Americanism, born of liberals' frustration and disillusionment with America's failure to live up to its supposed ideals; sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, reflecting opposition to superpower intrusions on national sovereignty; radical anti-Americanism, which views every form of American influence as pernicious; cultural elitist anti-Americanism, which considers Americans and American culture to be boorish and crass; and legacy anti-Americanism, rooted in resentment over historical wrongs. These variants of anti-Americanism intersect and overlap, such that attitudes toward the United States among any particular population can manifest many different "Anti-Americanisms."

An upswing in measured anti-Americanism does not necessarily entail an upswing in near-term, measurable negative consequences of anti-Americanism. We must be careful neither to understate nor to overstate the severity of problems anti-Americanism poses or contributes to.

THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

Several potential effects of anti-Americanism are of greatest concern: 1) anti-Americanism can feed terrorism and violence toward the United States; 2) anti-Americanism can harm U.S. commercial interests abroad; and 3) anti-Americanism can harm U.S. political interests by making it more difficult to rally support for specific U.S. policy objectives.

Anti-Americanism can fuel violence by motivating terrorist recruits, making people more willing to harbor and assist terrorists, and undermining global counterterrorism cooperation. Looking at evidence from the Middle East, anti-Americanism does appear to play a significant role in the recruitment of some participants into violent terrorist movements and in the choice of others to abet terrorism. Because many other countries share an interest in combating terrorism, it is not clear that anti-Americanism has hampered U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

There exists considerable debate and limited empirical evidence on whether anti-Americanism has significantly affected U.S. economic interests. Some corporate chief executive officers, such as the founders of Business for Diplomatic Action, are seriously concerned about the economic impact of anti-Americanism. While available evidence does not demonstrate negative economic consequences resulting

from anti-Americanism, there are signs that perceptions of U.S. companies and brands are affected by attitudes toward the United States. Accordingly, the possibility that persistent negative perceptions of the United States will erode American economic influence is hard to dismiss.

Similarly, evidence demonstrating that anti-Americanism compromises U.S. political influence is mixed. That the political impact of anti-Americanism is difficult to isolate reflects the fact that the foreign policies of other countries are determined by many factors. The economic and military strength of the United States means that other countries may opt to cooperate with Washington despite anti-American attitudes at home. Nevertheless, there are signs that anti-Americanism inhibits U.S. policymaking by causing the United States to scale back its requests in inhospitable environments, rather than risk possible rejection. In parts of the Muslim world especially, the discourse of anti-Americanism helps to fuel a culture of anti-modernity because key ideals of modernity are associated with the United States. Anti-Americanism has also contributed to a climate in which other powers whose interests are not aligned with Washington have succeeded in expanding their economic and political influence around the globe. In these ways, anti-Americanism can interfere with the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives writ large.

RESPONDING TO ANTI-AMERICANISM

Combating anti-Americanism is vital to stemming the flow of terrorist recruits, protecting the American economy, and increasing U.S. diplomatic and political influence. To the extent that anti-Americanism per se contributes to these problems, there is an urgent need for steps to address it. While a raft of sound proposals on public diplomacy measures have been written and issued, the Bush Administration has been unable to sustain a visible and effective drive to implement these ideas and show results.

It is especially important that clear responsibility for devising strategies to address anti-Americanism is assigned to an official invested with sufficient authority and resources to do so effectively. This official should lead a government-wide effort to integrate public diplomacy by providing training in communications, culture, and public diplomacy to every person serving the United States overseas or dealing with government detainees. The effort cannot be limited to an isolated cadre of public diplomacy officers without direct policy influence. This effort would be advanced by the establishment of regular listening tours in which representatives of all major Cabinet departments meet with their counterparts overseas along with nongovernmental organizations, citizens' groups, and students.

In addition, the United States should shift its public diplomacy efforts from a public relations approach to a sales approach. While public relations involves one-way communication strategies, a sales-based approach requires understanding what motivates the recipient of a message to "buy" or inhibits the recipient from accepting and embracing the ideas being proffered. The United States could improve its understanding of foreign populations and the effectiveness of its sales pitch by conducting face-to-face meetings with communities overseas, recruiting more Muslim-Americans to participate in public diplomacy efforts, evaluating foreign service officers and military personnel based on their public diplomacy record, promoting greater education in Arabic and other strategic languages, and providing scholarships to encourage young Americans to study in the Middle East.

WORKING GROUP ON RELATIVE THREAT ASSESSMENT CO-CHAIRS: CHRISTOPHER CHYBA, HAROLD FEIVESON & DAVID VICTOR

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States faces three classes of threats: 1) those where there is an identifiable enemy agent, such as a government or terrorist group; 2) those that derive entirely or in part from human action but not from hostile intent, such as climate change, accidental nuclear war, or emerging diseases; and 3) those that stem from natural disasters, such as earthquakes or asteroid impacts.

THREAT ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE

Most threat assessments have focused on the first class of threats – those originating from a hostile enemy. These assessments have tended to overemphasize enemy capabilities without much sustained attention to enemy motives or intentions. The best threat assessments connect instead three principal foci of analysis – enemy capabilities, enemy intentions, and U.S. vulnerabilities – to provide a full picture of the origins and consequences of actions that threaten U.S. interests. Such assessments can then be used effectively to set priorities for national security strategy and budgets.

In practice, bureaucratic and commercial incentives have a strong influence on the threats that are considered and treated seriously by the United States. These incentives include agency interests, organizational modes of operation, and political pressures. The structure of incentives in government agencies and the private sector frequently magnifies some threats while overlooking others; thus, threats without bureaucratic or private sector champions are often overlooked.

Other factors influence government responses to threat assessments as well. The government sometimes overlooks: threats involving very low probability events, even when the outcome would be catastrophic; poorly imagined threats, such as the possibility before 9/11 of using airplanes as bombs; and threats overshadowed by other, more salient threats.

Threat assessments can have unidentified (and undesirable) consequences. This possibility is illustrated by the ongoing biological assessments underway in the United States, the consequences of which run the gamut from the risk of inadvertently creating pathogens that could eventually be appropriated by real enemies, to the rise of a large number of “insiders” with knowledge of how to make the pathogens, to the danger of an arms race with other countries suspicious of the United States.

A growing number of national security threats require the engagement of the private sector, especially in the realm of homeland security, and have three immediate implications. First, the knowledge and capabilities needed to understand and respond to the threats do not reside solely or even mainly with the government. Second, the means to address the threats often involve large costs that private actors may be reluctant to expend. Third, the methods for analyzing threats and the metrics for success tend to

differ systematically between the private and public spheres. To strengthen public-private cooperation in threat assessment and mitigation, the government should grant security clearances to key personnel in the private sector, relax certain anti-trust and freedom-of-information regulations, and establish rapid communication channels between corporations and government security agencies.

IMPROVING ASSESSMENT METHODS

A proper assessment of many new threats requires the involvement of experts from disciplines and institutions that are outside the traditional practice of threat assessment. To tap this expertise, the United States needs efficient mechanisms for promoting collaboration across government agencies and engaging, beyond government, the scientific and business communities. By conducting a quadrennial national security review, in which all agencies involved in national security would perform assessment and strategic planning jointly, the government could take an important step toward overcoming the bureaucratic stove-piping of assessments. At the same time, it could engage scientists outside government more effectively through institutions such as the National Academy of Sciences.

Threat assessments must be organized to avoid the perils of groupthink. Analytical exercises modeled after President Eisenhower's Project Solarium, which tasked teams of experts to advocate for alternative national security strategies, can help ensure that assessments consider competing perspectives. Assessments should also make fuller use of social scientific methods and should include assessments of confidence in findings, with outlier opinions as well as more likely estimates.

**WORKING GROUP ON FOREIGN POLICY
INFRASTRUCTURE AND GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS
CO-CHAIRS: JOSEPH S. NYE AND ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States faces a range of transnational and state-based threats, including catastrophic and conventional terrorism, highly infectious diseases, a global financial meltdown, the rise of China, and dependence on a handful of states for oil. These threats, although different in origin, present common challenges for national security infrastructure. They require a set of national security institutions that can: process, integrate, and analyze vast quantities of information; generate new knowledge collectively on demand; work effectively with each other and with other relevant agencies; adapt continually to changing circumstances; draw on and deploy both hard and soft power; collaborate with foreign counterparts and international institutions on a real-time basis; and partner successfully with the private and nonprofit sectors.

To achieve this capability, the United States must transform existing government institutions and build greater capacity within and beyond government.

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED FOR THE INFORMATION AGE

The effective collection, production, analysis, and distribution of information are central to the success of any national security strategy. The United States must use information more effectively in all aspects of policymaking and implementation, from planning to monitoring to evaluation.

The first challenge in meeting a threat is to understand what we know. The United States needs information networks that make information available to those who need it when they need it. The long-standing model for cooperation across agencies is the interagency working group, created to address specific problems. Today, a need exists instead for continuous networking, information sharing, and collaboration among individuals working on the same issues in different parts of government.

The second challenge is to produce new knowledge effectively and efficiently on demand. Government networks must do more than disseminate information. They must produce new knowledge by allowing participants to work together in the solution of common problems. To this end government must employ second-generation knowledge management tools that have been developed by the private sector. These tools emphasize knowledge production as much as knowledge retrieval and integrate new technology and innovative techniques of collective learning. The government can break down its stovepipes most effectively not by enabling individuals to find out what others know, but by providing them with the technology and practical experience of joint problem solving.

JOINED-UP GOVERNMENT

The United States needs far more interagency capacity to focus on crosscutting problems and to enable its

public officials to work simultaneously with foreign counterparts. Joined-up government requires moving from an organizational framework centered in separate departments to a new model that connects different parts of government quickly and effectively by function.

A successful effort to meet the threats of the 21st century will engage virtually all parts of government, not simply the federal agencies and congressional committees that have traditionally conducted and overseen foreign affairs. Currently, critical national security capabilities and responsibilities, including soft power resources, are fragmented across scores of agencies, with inadequate direction and coordination of the whole. Effective interagency management requires a joined-up approach to strategic planning and government budgeting, funding mechanisms that enable dollars to be moved quickly from one program to another, and stronger and more integrated congressional oversight. The United States needs better metrics for evaluating the success of its national security policies too. Once again, new knowledge management technologies and approaches can help.

Joining up government also means fusing hard and soft power. Hard power is the ability to get what one wants through coercion or payments, whereas soft power is the ability to get what one wants through attraction. To integrate these different forms of power, the United States must devote as much attention to bolstering the civilian components of its national security infrastructure as it devotes to strengthening the military. One valuable step would be the establishment of a National Security Career Path that provides civilian and military personnel with incentives to seek interagency experience, education, and training.

A joined-up U.S. government will be able to work with foreign officials more effectively through trans-governmental networks. The government must ensure that it is organized to participate fully in these networks and that networks exist in all areas where they can advance American security.

JOINED-UP GOVERNANCE

To meet today's security challenges, the United States must harness the capacity, expertise, and commitment of private businesses, nonprofit organizations, and think tanks. In forming new partnerships and managing existing partnerships with these institutions, government must ensure that they are effective and accountable.

Global challenges of the magnitude facing the United States cannot be met by government alone. Joining up with private corporations and nonprofit organizations enables government to tap their resources, skills, and know-how. The government also would benefit from the establishment of new national security research partnerships with think tanks and universities. Joined-up governance requires as well that the United States facilitate efforts by individuals to move in and out of government during the course of their careers.

If partnerships are not carefully monitored, they can waste taxpayer dollars and undermine U.S. national security. Government should therefore engage the private sector and nonprofits to develop norms and standards that regulate their behavior in partnerships. In establishing these guidelines, Congress and the president must ensure that such contracts advance the public interest.

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