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Research Note

PMCs, Human Security and Global Governance in Global Public Sphere

-Against GASC:Global Armed Societal Conflicts-

1. Introduction

At first glance, PMSs: private military companies, NGOs: non-governmental organizations and terrorist groups belong to totally separate categories. In reality, they differ surprisingly little in terms of functions, organization and even purpose. From the standpoint of the state, they all share the common characteristic of being non-state actors which potentially threaten to overthrow existing states and the inter-state system to which they belong. In analyzing the reasons why these non-state actors have been appearing in global political scene particularly since the end of the cold war, this essay considers their impacts on the traditional international security system, and the prospects of whether they are conducive to giving birth to human security in global public sphere.

In consideration of this problem, we will use the analytical framework of global governance, which covers the “public,” the public space independent of the “private,” and the global public space. In analyzing the characteristics of the public sphere, we will refer to the concepts from Jürgen Habermas’s idea of “die Bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit” (publicity in liberal civil society), and its critique by Eike Hennig, the idea of “Faschistische Öffentlichkeit” (a fascist public, publicity) in order to employ the concept of non-liberal, non-civil publicness. Moreover, we will redefine human security as public security, namely, global governance security. We will try to grasp important issues in public security such postmodern terrorism, organized crimes, ethnic struggles, religious conflicts and so on, as an incidence of Global Armed Societal Conflict (GASC) in the public sphere; based on the notion of global non-civil public as opposed to that of global civil public, this GASC should be recognized as a violent expression of identity politics which seeks “recognitive justice” relating to honorary values, rather than a “distributive justice” relating to welfare values.

In regarding global governance as politics in the global public sphere (global public politics), human security, which tends to be considered as a substitute for public and national security, or a complement to “particular security”ⁱ or security for the individual, can be grasped as human security as an independent category, and not as a substitute

nor as a complement. Similarly, in analyzing terrorism, organized crimes, ethnic or religious conflicts emerging in the post-cold war era, we can depart from the old state-centric analytical perspective of Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) between states and armed non-state actors, and gain a new viewpoint on such postmodern conflicts as Global Armed Societal Conflict (GASC) by armed non-state actors in global public sphere. PMC is one of the armed non-state actors to tackle GASCs with "benevolent" NGOs pursuing public interest.

This research note will take a completely different outlook from the traditional argument on ways to deal with PMC: Private Military Company, that is, from the new perspective of global public sphere, human security as global public security, PMC as one of armed non-state actors to cope with GASCs.

2. Historical Transformation of Public Sphere

The origin of modern security that makes the state the actor of security is found in Hobbes's *Leviathan*. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes supposes the state of nature and considers how to safeguard the security of the natural man or the multitude. The primal state of nature Hobbes assumed was "the war of everyone against everyone." The natural man in a state of war must protect themselves with their own hands from "continual fear, and

danger of death by violence.”ⁱⁱⁱ An individual cannot ensure his or her own particular security due to the limits of power available. In order to overcome this difficulty, Hobbes invents the state (commonwealth) as the actor to safeguard particular security for everyone, based on a “covenant” between individuals. In this way, the individual’s security came to be safeguarded as the security of a subject of the commonwealth.

On the other hand, the state became the personification of Leviathan, and international society in which multiple Leviathans were supposed to coexist was in a state of war of “every nation against every nation.” The debate became embattled between national security, to safeguard the security of individual nations in international society in a state of war, and international security, to secure order in international society. The government was to maintain the state of nature and order of a nation’s internal society through laws and to safeguard the security of its subjects from external threats; while all nations were to maintain the state of nature and order of international society chiefly through military power and to prevent external threats to safeguard the security of their states and people. Thus, the foundation of today’s nation-centric security system, in which the nation is the subject of security while the people the object of security, was established by Hobbes.

The cardinal point of Hobbes’s thought of security was to remove the public sphere

so that, based on a public-private dualism, the “private” would swear allegiance to the “public,” and, as compensation of such obedience, the “public” would safeguard the security of the “private.” Hobbes separated the public world of the middle age, not yet divided into the sacred and the secular, in a state of chaos from civil war and religious wars, into a public region of the nation (the secular world), and a private region (the religious world); and created a national security system to safeguard the security of nation and people. Hobbes’s national security system, based on this public-private dualism, persisted into the mid-twentieth century. This was due to the fact that, although the public sphere emerged in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries for a time, a long impasse prevailed until mid-twentieth century, due to the following two factors.

The first reason was the birth of the nation state. Under a monarchical state, the majority of the general people were subjects who, in exchange for swearing allegiance to the monarch, were guaranteed their security; they were merely objects of the monarchical state. Only a small number of people who held economic power became independent as citizens, and formed what Habermas called the civil public sphere. Before long, through the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century, each subject became a national citizen with sovereign rights. As sovereignty passed from the

monarch to the citizens, and with the introduction of a democratic system, the privileged civil public sphere, which mediated between monarch and its subjects, was absorbed into the public sphere of the nation state ruled by a representative of the people in place of the monarch. Unlike the monarchical state, in which the monarch ruled the subjects, in the nation state, in which the people rule themselves, there was virtually no room for the public sphere mediating the public and the private to be born.

The second reason was war. War in the age of the monarch was limited warfare between or among monarchs themselves; the subjects in general, as a financial asset of the monarch, were mere objects to be protected from war. With the birth of the nation state, the nature of war changed drastically. People all bore the obligation to protect the nation, and the age of total warfare began in which all citizens fighting, as people soldiers became the actors of war. In a total war, the nation seeks the allegiance of the people to the nation, even intervening in the people's private domain; on the other hand, total devotion to the public at the expense of the private becomes a motto for the people, and room for the public sphere to emerge grows all the more smaller. Such a total war systems continued until the end of what could be called WWIII, the Cold War.

Because the public sphere was at an impasse for a long period, Hobbes's public-private dualistic national security system continued until the end of the Cold War.

3. The Emergence of the Global Public Sphereⁱⁱⁱ

The national security regime had already begun to unravel during the total war period.

In the nineteenth century, in which weapons were still hand-made tools, the sacrifice of people was limited even in total wars. However, since WWI, and the beginning of real total war of the industrial age, with the mechanization of weapons, the mass production of chemical gunpowder, and the invention of nuclear weapons, the loss of people increased significantly. The nation was no longer able to always safeguard the security of the people; national security and people's security became separated.

The decisive failure of the national security regime began with the introduction of nuclear missiles. Due to nuclear missiles, nations were no longer able to completely claim to safeguard the security of the people. To make matters worse, in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) to mutually limit their defense in order to obtain a strategic balance, that is, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The security of the people was supposed to be protected, but establishing MAD meant that the people would have to be handed over as hostages. Protecting the security of the people, in spite of being the first obligation of a nation, became almost impossible with the contradiction that in order to protect the

security of the nation, the people must be sacrificed in a total war under the nuclear deterrent, MAD strategy. As a result of a total war system, the nation, which was required to protect its people, sacrificed an enormous number of people's lives in WWI and WWII. Furthermore, during the Cold War, the human race stood on the verge of extinction. People of countries around the world, gripped by a sense of crisis, rose in protest movements against nuclear weapons in order to safeguard their own security by their own hands. Thus, in the field of security, a window of opportunity opened in the domestic public sphere impasse. The recognition as human beings existing as a species forming the human race, which is the presupposition of human security, was bred through the fear of extinction of the species; a trend of international anti-nuclear movements transcending the borders gave birth to an international public sphere, albeit mainly in the Western world. This public sphere, however, was after all intertwined in the Cold War structure, and did not spread extensively throughout the Western world; what is more, the public sphere did not spread to the countries of the East, where the "private" was absorbed into the communist ideological "public," and in which only the public world prevailed.

What spelled the end of the long impasse of the public sphere was the conclusion of the Cold War. Toward the end of the Cold War, the public sphere, which had gradually

been freed from the spell of the Cold War, gradually expanded in east European countries and set off the east European revolution, finally toppling the Berlin Wall. Subsequently, the remarkable advances in information and telecommunications through the IT revolution, as well as the development of air travel network, burst the shell of national boundaries, and domestic society ballooned into global society. Through the internet, a new virtual public sphere was born in a cyberspace without national borderlines. While this kind of Gesellschaft-like public sphere bloomed, there was also the Gemeinschaft-like public sphere of ethnicities and tribes becoming prominent in some areas, such as nations being dismantled through the collapse of the communist order in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or governments losing their power to rule, descending into an ungovernable state, in African countries, or rupturing national economies from the expansion of the global economy. These phenomena reflected the tendency to erase the shell of national borders exposing domestic society within of ethnicities and tribes, which substitute the nation or the public.

The basic cause for this revival of the public sphere is in the malfunction of the modern nation state as founded by Hobbes. At least four functions of the modern nation must be fulfilled: safeguarding the security of the people by the nation state as a security community; governance of the nation as a political community; development of national

economy as an economic community; and maintaining the identity of the people as a cultural community. It has, however, become difficult for a nation to achieve all these functions. The function as the security community has become paralyzed by nuclear missiles and the threat of mega-death terrorism such as the 9.11 incident; the function as the political community is weakened by the interpenetration of international politics and domestic politics; the function as the economic community is diminished by the pervasiveness of the market economy; and the role of the cultural community is unfulfilled especially in multiethnic countries because of the advances in information and telecommunications and the rise of multiculturalism.

These malfunctions of the state have reproduced the public sphere in a new garb, resembling the public world of the middle ages as existed before the formation of the modern state. This public sphere has expanded globally due to the progress of globalization as seen in the respective fields of global democracy, economy, and security, to form a global public sphere.^{iv}

4. Characteristics of the Global Public Sphere

The new global public sphere as a global society can be divided into the abovementioned *Gesellschaft*-like public sphere and *Gemeinschaft*-like public sphere.

The former is a public sphere structured by information exchange through newspapers, books, television, radio, film, the internet, and so forth. In a broad sense, this is civil society. This informational public sphere can be further subdivided into two public spheres, each having the characteristic of civil publicity and non-civil publicity. The “standards for admission” into the liberal civil public sphere have not changed today from those of the eighteenth century: “education and wealth.” Specifically, one is required to have sufficient culture and education to be able to read, and to communicate through letters and conversation, transcending the language barrier: one also needed to have the wealth, both in terms of time and economy, to attend conferences and projects around the world despite the geographical distance, just as eighteenth century citizens gathered in salons and cafes, and to participate in unpaid volunteer activities. People creating a civil public sphere are liberal self-motivated citizens who seek the justice of freedom, equality, and fairness, and who are awakened to such missions as the diffusion of democracy and protection of human rights, eradication of poverty, prevention of war, and maintaining peace. For the sake of “public profit,” they make the formal media the main venue of their activities, such as broadcasting, publishing, and “good” NGOs, who at times resist the state. In this context, the civil public sphere is, in a narrow sense, the so-called “civil society.”^v

On the other hand, the “admission standards” into the non-liberal, non-civil public sphere, which should be called today’s fascistic public sphere,^{vi} can easily be fulfilled by having the “wealth” to have access to the radio, television, and computer, and the “education” supporting linguistic capabilities enough to comprehend the information through these channels. Just as radio propaganda broadcasts and street demonstration played an important role in the formation of the fascistic public sphere after WWI, it is essential for the formation of today’s non-civil public sphere to have the television in addition to the radio, and the virtual street space created on the internet in addition to the actual streets. In virtual streets, which have no spatial limits, a great number of people can assemble, incomparable to real streets, and the expression of opinion and dialogue has become possible. What Hennig calls fascistic public sphere is manifested in the internet’s virtual space. This is not just confined to the virtual space. Urged by information from the internet, many people take to the streets today to participate willingly in demonstrations and assemblies. People who form non-civil public sphere are the selfish, exclusivist “non-civilians” who are devoted to their own thoughts to pursue their own self-interests, even if this implies at times opposing the “public interest”; unlike citizens, they do not necessarily embrace a sense of mission such as the pursuit of universal justice, the dissemination of democracy and the protection of human

rights. Specifically, they are anti-foreign political groups such as the Neo-Nazis, ethnocentric ethnic groups who became the main players in post-Cold-War ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalist groups regardless of religion, extreme human rights protection groups, and environmental protection groups. A part of them belong to illegal organizations such as crime organizations that are “malignant” NGOs, and drug organizations, or hackers who conduct cyber crimes or who slander and agitate others on the internet. These non-liberal “non-civilians” who constitute fascistic public sphere we will designate for the time being as non-civil society.

There is one last public sphere called the non-informational public sphere, which has no access to information media such as newspapers, radio, television, or the internet, and lacking the linguistic capability to comprehend the information even if temporary access were available, their public sphere is constituted only by direct communication with people. This public sphere’s “admission standards,” a far cry from “wealth and education,” consists in being deprived of justice and human rights. The people who form this public sphere, having no wealth, living in poverty and hovering over the line of death from hunger, and not having enough education to read, robbed of an opportunity for education because of discrimination based on ethnicity, race, religion, class or sex, are, for example, the subaltern, ethnic minorities, refugees, and

women in some localities. All are the powerless in the face of injustice and human rights abuses. Many of them cannot even speak of their own situation, or even if they are able to, have no power to change the situation. As a result, they have no choice but to form a closed, oppressed society of religious, tribal, ethnic, and refugee groups who are only able to communicate directly to those who are close at hand.

The violence of the global public sphere, characterized above, becomes manifested in GASC. Specifically, this includes conflict between and among tribal, ethnic, and religious groups, such as the opposition between the Tutsi and the Hutu in central Africa, violence from organized crime organizations such as the Mafia and Snakehead, xenophobic violence by Neo-Nazis against refugees and immigrants, violence against women in the home and communities that sustain discrimination against women, and violent language in cyberspace over the internet. Another form of GASC is the postmodern terrorism of Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda.^{vii}

5. The Power Structure of the Global Public Sphere and GASCs

The problem of the global public sphere is in the power structure. Three power relationships are determined in the global public sphere through information/knowledge. Civil society gives rise to power relations of rule and subordination between civil society, which holds the most information/knowledge, and

non-civil society; civil society and non-civil society in the informational public sphere give rise to similar power relations of rule and subordination against the oppressed society in the non-informational public sphere. This is like power relations between states in today's information age, which are determined by information. The United States' growing imperialism is made possible because it can overwhelm other countries with information; developing countries, on the other hand, stand on the verge of collapse because they are alienated from information. Similarly, civil society, with its admission standards of "wealth and education," in the global public sphere, overwhelm non-civil society and oppressed society with information/knowledge, and has seemingly become an empire of information/knowledge. Through information/knowledge superiority, civil society defines what "public interest" is and it possesses the power to discriminate against people who, as non-civilians, oppose this "public interest." This power of civil society is precisely what creates the power structure, a cause of GASCs like postmodern terrorism in the global public sphere.

In order to define "public interest" and to discriminate against the "non-civil," some form of a value judgment is necessary. The problem is the self-righteousness and one-sidedness of the values, as well as the arbitrary nature of the judgment. "Public interest," in spite of the rhetoric, is it not in actuality civil society's exclusive interest?

The justice of freedom, equality, and fairness—in reality, the peculiar justice of Western Christian civilization—is it not lacking in universality? The concepts of democracy and human rights as well, differing as they do according to civilization, culture, country, and region, are not monistic but pluralistic, are they not? How can civil society continue to enjoy “wealth and education” in spite of the rhetoric on the eradication of poverty? Even if civil society values were recognized as “public interest,” why does civil society have the authority to hand down such a value judgment? Why can’t non-civil society and oppressed society also participate in the judgment? Isn’t globalism itself, the underlying support of civil society, “public interest,” and so forth, nothing more than Americanism? And isn’t civil society interchangeable with American society, just as “public interest” is another way of saying America’s national interest? Such self-righteous, arbitrary value judgments based on monistic values of civil society gave birth to the power structure in the public sphere. And GASCs like postmodern terrorism is revealed as a statement of objection based on “recognitive justice” toward such value judgment.^{viii}

“Recognitive justice” is justice related to honorary values. A theory of justice that seeks to discover justice as -- you recognize that I am I; I recognize that you are you, and we mutually recognize our differences. Various differences, such as sex, religion,

race, ethnicity, and tribe based on “recognitive justice” are emphasized; activities of “recognitive politics” that seek to restore human rights and justice for people who have been persecuted and discriminated against because of these differences, have gradually become more powerful amid post-Cold-War non-civil society. By way of background, “distributive justice” and “recognitive justice” are inextricably intertwined,^{ix} and recognition is spreading that “distributive justice” cannot be realized by prioritizing it alone, as has been done in the past. For example, a suppressed society suffers from poverty not merely because of “distributive injustice” in the economic structure, including colonization and exploitation. It is because of “recognitive injustice” in the social structure, including race discrimination and ethnic discrimination, which lies behind colonization and exploitation. Accordingly, even if financial aid and debt cancellation is fulfilled so as to rectify the “distributive injustice” without the correction of the “recognitive injustice,” it may well lead adversely to concealing the “recognitive injustice.” In this sense, the theory that poverty is the hotbed of GASCs like terrorism, and that eradication of poverty can once and for all solve GASCs, must be called an argument that ignores the “recognitive justice.”

Many causes of GASCs teeming in the post-Cold-War public sphere can be found in the “recognitive justice.” For example, the essence of the Palestine problem is not a

problem of distributive injustice of welfare values such as territory problems or autonomy problems; it is a problem of the “recognitive justice,” that is, lack of a mutual approval of identities of Palestinians and Jews. The essence of ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Russia, or religious struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq is also a problem of the mutual approval of their respective ethnicity, or the correction of the “distributive injustice” based on ethnic discrimination. In addition, regional conflicts of Islamic groups occurring around the world, in Algeria, Sudan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, have a dimension of being conflicts to seek a correction of the “recognitive injustice” from non-Islam civilization.

6. Coping with GASCs

The key to resolving GASCs like postmodern terrorism is how to correct the “recognitive injustice” in the public sphere, and how to reform the power structure of civil society in the public sphere based on “recognitive justice.” To do so, civil society’s self-righteous and monistic sense of values must be reconsidered, and the process of arbitrary value judgments must be democratized.

In reconsidering the values involved, a rethinking of public philosophy is indispensable.^x There is not enough space in this essay to delve into this problem.

However, I would like to touch on the most important issue in rethinking public philosophy. That is, how to sublimate, or deny, monistic values and pluralistic values, in order to establish a philosophy of the diversity (pluralism), of unity (monism), and of the unity of diversity. For example, “distributive justice” and “recognitive justice” can be reduced to the problem of unity and diversity. If “recognitive justice” is stressed, there is the risk of falling into relativism, making it difficult for “distributive justice” to be implemented. On the other hand, if values of monistic unity are stressed, there is the risk of falling into absolutism, which denies “recognitive justice.” By the same token, globalism and localism are also the problem of unity and diversity. If globalism is thoroughly pursued, local problems such as agriculture are unrepresented. On the other hand, if localism is thoroughly pursued, global problems such as the environment are neglected. In this problem, the unity/diversity problem needs to be overcome, to establish glocalism (global localism or local globalism).

Democratizing the process of value judgment can be, in the end, translated as a pursuit of order without a government: this is the classic theme, repeatedly asked since Hobbes’s invention of the modern state, -- what is politics in the public sphere without a government? Theories on regimes and, in turn, global governance have grappled with

this problem.^{xi} There is no room here for a detailed debate on this problem, but I will limit myself to two problems associated with the global governance theory.

First, this theory lacks the viewpoint of pursuing order without a government in the public sphere, which non-state actors constitute. Global governance theory argues the politics of cooperative rule^{xii} or co-rule combining self-rule through the “private” (the individual) and rule through the “public” (the state). In the future, however, “public rule,” namely the politics of the public sphere, must additionally be considered.

Second, when globalism is taken to mean Americanism as explained above, the “public” politics that global governance pursues is American imperialistic rule; conversely, self-rule of the “private” might, with apprehension, be understood as American civil self-rule. The anti-American sentiment toward the Iraq problem is proof of this concern. In actuality, it cannot be denied that there is, in the arguments of global governance, a dimension giving legitimacy to American global rule. If the target of post-modern terrorism is America, then there is all the more reason to blame America’s global governance. If these two problems are overcome, global governance can be recognized as a “public politics” theory of radical democracy^{xiii}.

Human security is the argument on public security missing in the global governance theory. The only way to safeguard the security of the people in an oppressed society,

who cannot receive protection from the state, is through human security, and its importance is immeasurably great. Be that as it may, the biggest problem for human security is the unresolved dilemma of who will safeguard the security of the people and who the actors of human security are. Are the actors the United Nations, the state, the non-state actor like NGO, PMC, individuals, or all of them? This is a theme of pursuing order without a government discussed in the global governance theory, which is closely related to human security.

Global governance theory itself, after all, is vague as to who should be in charge of public rule, and this also applies to human security. It is clear in debating human security that the object of security is the human being as a whole. Since the actor is not always clear, however, sometimes it is the “public,” namely, the state, in which case human security becomes a matter of security through the state, leading at times to inconsistencies between national security and human security. Conversely, there are cases of the actor being the “private,” namely individuals or corporations such as private military corporations; here, there is concern that human security may conveniently be adopted to justify improper use of private violence. Since the actor of public rule is unclear, the actor of public security is also vague; hence, it remains unclear as to who should cope with GASCs. PMC might be or could possibly one of the

actor of public security instead of military or police of the state.

7. In Conclusion: Breaking the Spell of Hobbes

This essay has considered the problem of human security and GASCs in global public sphere a completely different angle from previous discussions. Unfortunately, the scope of this paper, at the stage of research notes, allows only an expression of the hypothesis. The hypothesis will require further investigation in the future as to how effective it is in understanding GASCs like postmodern terrorism.

Since the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks of 9.11, a great number of articles and works on terrorism have been published. Among them, theories of the cause of terrorism, one of typical GASCs, are self-evidently explained. That is, the argument that poverty and oppression are the causes or the hotbed of terrorism. Certainly, this argument is easy for most people to digest, and is an explanation easily understood. For this writer, however, there was one final unconvincing point. It hit me when I least expected it. As I spoke the words “the cause of terrorism lies in poverty and oppression,” I noticed that my own gaze was that of authority—that was it. That gaze itself—was it actually not the cause of terrorism? At that moment in a flash of insight, I realized that the most important thing in understanding terrorism is to expose the power

structure underlying anti-terrorist policies, informed by Foucault's theory of power relations and Habermas's theory of civil society.

The target of terrorism in the Cold War period was mostly the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the states of both camps. The target of postmodern terrorism in the post-Cold War world, especially Islamic terrorism, was thought to be the state such as the U.S. and other advanced countries, which engendered structural violence such as poverty and oppression. However, is it not the state itself that is the target but the civil society of the U.S. and other advanced countries? Is not the target of postmodern terrorism the gaze of those in the authority manifested by those in civil society that says, "the cause of terrorism is in poverty and oppression"? And is that not why policies against terrorism using military force of the state or the legal system are ineffectual? Is there no way to be exempted from the gaze of authority? Where these questions reach a conclusion is in human security positioned in global governance security. Having said that, the theory of human security has not been able to completely wipe away the gaze of authority. To wipe away the gaze of authority and to be able to cope with terrorism from the angle of security for all humans as a group, it is essential to solve the difficult problem of rule without authority. The answer depends, ultimately, on whether we manage to break Hobbes's spell of the dualism of the "public" and the "private."

After all, the emergence of non-state armed actor like PMCs in postmodern time poses us the same question as the one with which Hobbes tackled in medieval time, that is, who can and should control violence.

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- i. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996), p. 111.
- ii. *Ibid.*, p.84.
- iii. For a consideration of the emergence of a global public sphere from the perspective of a relativization of the state, see Saito Hideji, *Kokka o koeru shimin shakai* [Civil Society that Transcends the Nation], Gendai Kikakushitsu, 1998, pp. 212-217.
- iv. The global public sphere has two types, depending on either seeing the state as the private, or the non-state actor as the private. The former regards the state as private from the viewpoint of the state, and sees international society, where a world government as the public does not exist, as the public sphere consisting of states. Discussions on security in the theory of global governance in the past chiefly focused on national security of the private in the public sphere. The latter, the public sphere of the non-state actor, corresponds to the global society in which, from the angle of the world citizen, a world government does not exist. This essay considers the latter.
- v. For a concise analysis of the debate on civil society, see Endo Mitugu, *Shimin shakai ron* [Civil Society Theory] in *Kokusai mondai* July, 2000.
- vi. For a detailed introduction to Hennig's theory of fascistic public sphere, see Sab Takumi, *Fascist teki kokyosei* [Fascistic Publicity] in *Minzokukokka, ethnicity* [People, Nation, Ethnicity] *Iwanami Koza Gendai Shakaigaku* 24, Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
- vii. On postmodern terrorism, see my *Terror gendai bryoku ron* [Terrorism Modern Violence Theory], Chuo Koronshinsha, 2002.
- viii. On the problem of recognitive justice in civil society, see Saito Hideji, *Kokka o koeru shimin shakai* [Civil Society beyond the State], pp. 217-218.
- ix. On the dispute over the distributive justice and the recognitive justice, see Okawa Masahiko, *Seigi* [Justice], Iwanami Shoten, 1999, pp. 1-10.
- x. On public sphere philosophy, see Yamawaki Naoji, *Europe shakai shisoshi* [History of European Social Philosophy], Tokyo University Press, 1992; see also his *Shinshakai tetsugaku sengen* [New Social Philosophy Proclamation], Sobunsha, 1999, and *Kokyo tetsugaku to wa nanika* [What is Public Philosophy?], Chikuma Shobo, 2004.
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- xiii. On radical democracy, see Chiba Shin, *Radical Democracy no chihei* [The Horizons of Radical Democracy], Shinhyoron, 1995.