

**Structure of Global Governance:
Explaining the Organizational Design of Global Rulemaking Institutions**

Preliminary Draft

Jonathan GS Koppell

Yale School of Management

Email: jonathan.koppell@yale.edu

Abstract:

Global governance organizations (GGOs) create rules and regulations in a diverse array of policy domains from accounting to health to communications. This paper is part of a broader project considering the design and administration of such organizations. Specifically, the focus is on the structure of GGOs with attention to the scheme for representation of organization members and the bureaucracy charged with carrying out the organization's activities. The relationship between key aspects of GGO structure and a set of independent variables (including the sector, funding, "technicality" and rule type) is explored. This is a preliminary draft of the chapter that will be revised substantially as the results of qualitative and quantitative assessment of relevant hypothesis are compiled.

This draft was prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, March 1, 2007.

Structure and Administration of GGOs

Global governance organizations are at once captive to and free from a wildly diverse set of expectations. They are captive to sets of beliefs regarding the proper design of governmental systems with normative understanding of proper schemes of representation and bureaucratic process. Failure to comply with such norms will almost certainly bring scolds of disapproval (or worse).

And yet, in a perverse way, this may be liberating because it is clear that any global governance organization facing the world's expectations will almost certainly disappoint the vast majority of people. This paper explores the structural choices made by global governance organizations (GGOs) in two senses. First, the political-representational structure is considered. Second, the bureaucratic-administrative structure is examined. The paper is part of a larger project examining the design and administration of GGOs, entities that attempt to create and implement regulation on a global scale.

The diversity of organizational structure among global governance organizations is such that it is impossible to analyze every difference observed across the population included in this study. Like bureaucracies within a single governmental system, each GGO has developed its own unique patterns of administration with respect to human resources, procurement, workflow, communications and so on. It may be wrong to assume that such differences are of secondary importance; Still, it is practical necessity to keep our attention on broader considerations.

More fundamental dimensions of organizational structure also reveal substantial variation across organizations. These variations are explored in this chapter in the hopes of understanding how and why global governance organizations look different from each other. And it is a highly heterogeneous group! [\[summary statistics\]](#)

The most important area of variation for the greater project is in the rulemaking process, a topic that receives the full attention of Chapter 4. The lion's share of entities adopt a highly inclusive process – at least from the perspective of affected industries – that looks quite different from conventional domestic rulemaking procedures. But among the GGOs, the differences in basic approach to organizational design are profound.

Many global governance organizations resemble self-contained narrow-purpose governments; they include a legislative (representational) and executive (bureaucratic) function within the overall organization. In considering the design of GGOs, therefore, it makes sense to consider both the “political” and “bureaucratic” elements of the organization. In other entities, these functions are not clearly distinguished; participants are represented within the apparatus of the organization itself and it is harder to make a sharp distinction between the bureaucracy and representative elements of the entity.

The significance of the representational arrangement may be more obvious in terms of typical discourse around government and governance. Students of politics have long understood that the institutional arrangements defining the rights and responsibilities of members can have significant implications for the substantive output of the organization. [cites]

Generally, the choices with respect to bureaucratic structure receive less attention. The design of bureaucracies can be as important to understanding the creation and implementation of policy as the organization of legislatures or other representational bodies. Indeed, it may be more important (particularly in the context of global governance) because the representative body is often quite removed from the operations of the organization.

In fact, some GGOs do not truly have a representational element. Even GGOs that do adopt a “legislative” model place a great deal of authority in the “executive branch.” Although this chapter will consider the small set of global governance organizations that are more “legislatively-centered,” there is no GGO that would be described as having a strong legislature if we were to describe them in terms used to describe national governments.

Consistent with the approach in other sections of the project, this paper considers the representational and administrative design of GGOs as both dependent and independent variables. An explanation for the structural choices is sought by considering attributes of GGOs as independent variables. In the conclusion, the consequences of those choices are explored with respect to the process and output of GGOs. Before delving into the two aspects of GGO structure to be considered, the independent variables considered as explanations for all variation in GGO structure are introduced.

Independent Variables and GGO Structure

This paper is part of a larger project examining the structure and administration of global governance organizations (GGOs). The aim of the study is to better understand the design of GGOs – with an emphasis on the rulemaking process – and the implications of the organizational structures and processes adopted by GGOs. In each of the sections making up the whole – chapters are devoted to rulemaking, enforcement, interest groups and administration – a set of general characteristics of the GGO and its policy arena are treated as “independent variables.”

This approach is carried over to this paper. The variables are SECTOR, FUNDING, “TECHNICALITY,” MEMBERSHIP, and RULE TYPE. Undoubtedly, each of these variables are somewhat endogenous. That is, they may, in fact, be as much *dependent* variables as they are independent. While it

is hypothesized that the causal arrow points in the direction implied by the label that is assigned, finding correlation among organizational variables is meaningful in itself.

Sector

One clear differentiating characteristic of transnational governance organizations is the degree to which they are “governmental.” As noted in the previous section, GGOs are, by definition, quite public in the functions they serve. The rules they promulgate regulate common goods and define shared commons. It is in this sense that they are involved in “governance.” Typically, we conflate governance and government because such functions are carried out domestically by government agencies.

The realities of global governance require disentanglement of “governance” and “government” (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Some GGOs are privately owned and operated without representatives of national (or sub-national) governments as members. For example, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is a non-profit entity based in London that creates and promulgates global accounting standards intended to facilitate easier cross-border investment. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) creates and promotes standards across a wide range of commercial areas including manufacturing, construction, and environmental quality. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) gathers firms in the Internet sphere for the purposes of developing shared standards to ensure the interoperability of the world’s computers.

As these examples might suggest, such GGOs are not all funded by appropriated tax dollars passed through by national governments. By conventional understandings of what constitutes “government,” these organizations are decidedly “non-governmental.” There are, of course, a great many GGOs that are governmental in the implied sense. The members of the organizations are nation-states and the members’ representatives are government officials. The World Health Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the and Universal Postal Union are all governmental in these senses.

Funding

GGOs finance operations based on different models. Some rely largely upon CONTRIBUTIONS from members while others derive significant revenue from charging FEES for services and goods provided. Naturally, within each of these two broad categories there is significant variation.

Contributions may be equal across members or proportional based on some type of formula. Note that GGOs often have distinct formulas that do not correspond with prior expectations (i.e.,

“rich” countries pay more). For example, contributions to the budget of the International Maritime Organization are based on the tonnage of each nation’s merchant fleet. Thus the top five contributors are Panama, Liberia, Japan, Bahamas and Greece (http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D7983/Basics2000.pdf, p.3). Some GGOs mix contributions and revenue to meet budgetary requirements.

Assuming that every GGO has an interest in maximizing – or at least maintaining – its financial support makes sense. Thus one would hypothesize that source of funds could influence the structure of the organization such that pursuit of this objective would be enhanced.

Technicality

There is some variation in the degree to which the work of the GGO is highly technical. That is, many GGOs are charged with presiding over fairly narrow substantive domains where the issues are arcane and require a high level of area-specific knowledge to facilitate participation. In contrast, some GGOs undertake more approachable work that is accessible to a wide array of individuals provided they are sufficiently briefed in the matters at hand.

In the highly technical category, the W3C is a relatively obscure body generating technical standards for Internet transactions. Most of the participants in W3C activities are engineers or programmers deeply enmeshed in the technical aspects of computer-based communications through their work in academe or the private sector. Many of the standards generated by the W3C are incomprehensible to the average well-educated individual (including the author) and the implications of one approach to another are not immediately obvious to the layman. Another GGO with a similar profile is the Unicode Consortium, a body devoted to ensuring that all computer languages utilize a common set of codes to represent different linguistic characters.

The well-known World Trade Organization (WTO), in contrast, implements negotiated trade agreements and hears disputes regarding the trade policies that allegedly disadvantage international trade in violation of treaties. While the disputes may hinge on fine legal points, the disagreements are generally well-understood by a general audience. Moreover, the implications of rules under consideration are quite transparent in contrast with the more technical work of some GGOs.

Membership

Unlike domestic governments, global governance organizations have “members.” Traditionally, we think of the membership of international organizations in terms of nation-states. The United Nations is, of course, the exemplar of this type of international organization.

Many contemporary GGOs have memberships that are not limited to – or even open to – government members. This variation is captured by the SECTOR variable laid out above. “Governmental” GGOs have nation-state members while “Non-governmental” GGOs have members that are companies, NGOs, interest groups and so on. Mixed membership GGOs bring the two types together.

The MEMBERSHIP variable is not concerned with the sector of the members. Rather it attempts to capture the nature of membership. Specifically, the variable codes whether the membership is *open* to any nation/organization that wishes to join or *selective*. Many GGOs allow any organization that agrees to adopt the organization’s standards to participate as a member. GGOs frequently rely on the United Nations to define eligible members (i.e., UN members are eligible to join).

Other GGOs screen or select members according to various criteria determined by the organization. Members of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation – the umbrella organization of the International Accounting Standards Board – are individuals appointed by the Board of Trustees for three-year terms based on an assessment of their professional expertise.

Rule Type

As discussed in an earlier chapter, this project focuses on a subset of all international organizations that has as its primary activity the creation and promulgation of rules. In essence the universe of global governance organizations is split among those that are positive – they produce some public good – versus those that are regulatory, using rules to promote desirable behavior from other actors. The “positive governance” organizations – Unicef might be a prototypical example – are the subject of this study.

Even within the population of organizations that seek to assert some sort of regulatory authority on a global scale, there is significant diversity of approaches. It is necessary to distinguish roughly the approaches to global rulemaking because each approach might be correlated with a particular organizational structure, both in terms of representation and bureaucracy. At the risk of downplaying difference within each set, the approaches to rulemaking are considered to be one of three types: treaty, regulation, and standard.

Treaty – This represents a legally binding agreement between states. In the context of this study we are concerned with treaties that call for the implementation of a set of rules that apply beyond the state. Only treaties that require the state to impose some set of rules or regulations are considered an instrument of global rulemaking in this research.

Regulation – Regulations are adopted by global governance organizations to order behavior in a set of areas that provide for application to entities carrying out some transnational activity (e.g, shipping, communication). IN some cases, the regulations are adopted by domestic (or sub-national) entities while in others the GGO has some ability to implement the regulations unilaterally.

Standard -- Several GGOs regulate behavior through the adoption and promulgation of standards for practices in a wide variety of policy domains (from accounting to manufacturing to protection of intellectual property). These standards sometimes are given force of domestic law when incorporated into legal frameworks but often the only pressure for adherence comes through market demand for uniformity.

The approaches to rulemaking are not mutually exclusive. Some global governance organizations utilize more than one. The World Health Organization, for example, recently pushed through the Framework on Tobacco Control which took the form of an international treaty. It has previously published the International Health Regulations covering a variety of subjects and also issues standards covering levels of care and lists of drugs that are deemed essential to human health. Generally, however, global governance organizations do focus on one approach or another.

Political-Representational Structure

One of the most striking differences between global governance organizations and domestic government agencies is the importance of membership as a consideration. Generally, we do not think of governments as having “members” in the sense that we speak of GGO members. In a democratic context, governments are intended to serve and respond to “the people.” No citizen is excluded from this set.

GGOs are generally different. Although they aspire to create rules that apply broadly and beyond the ranks of members, their structure creates a class of parties who are part of the organization.

Each global governance organization is unique in its manner of structuring the participation of members. Indeed, there are a small number of GGOs that are not organized around a membership at all. These organizations have ruling bodies made up of individuals who do not “represent” anyone or anything. Generally, however, global governance organizations have designed arrangements that allow for members -- countries, firms or other entities -- to send representatives to participate in the governance of the GGO.

This leaves room for significant variation. In this section, three areas of variation in the political-representational structure of global governance organizations are considered:

representation scheme, apportionment of formal influence, and the balance of legislative-bureaucratic power. Each of these areas subsumes variation on specific aspects of representation but some differences among GGOs must be overlooked. In general, those items that elude treatment do so because there is not systematic distribution of the variations. That is, in each of the areas to be examined, there are “types” to which all GGOs conform (more or less).

Representation

The first aspect of variation considered is the structure of representation. It may surprise those new to the topic that there is such diversity among GGOs in this rather basic facet of organizational design. Part of the explanation may lie in the potential variety of purposes in choice of representational scheme. Four approaches to representation are identified: a standard model, specialized, task-oriented and non-representative.

Standard model of representation

The “standard model” of the GGO political structure involves three layers. A representative body made up delegates chosen by all members is the overarching entity responsible for the organization. Generally, the representative body meets rarely (once a year, at most). Its primary responsibility includes selection of an intermediate body made up of representatives of some sub-set of the members of the representative body and selection (or ratification) of the organization’s leader.

The intermediate body is more actively involved in the oversight of the organization, meets more regularly and often is routinely engaged in the decision-making. Intermediate bodies, for example, are most commonly charged with reviewing and approving GGO budgets. In some cases, intermediate bodies participate as a final approving entity in the rule-making process. Some GGOs actually have multiple intermediate bodies with the responsibilities divided among them on a substantive basis. This will be considered as a variation on the standard model below.

Finally, the standard GGO model includes a secretariat or permanent executive function that manages the day-to-day operations of the organization and takes a lead in crafting policy. As shall be addressed in the discussion of administrative structure, there is great variance in the size of the permanent organizational bureaucracy and its relationship with the representational bodies. In some cases, the executive function (often referred to as the secretariat) is essentially the entirety of the bureaucratic apparatus. In other instances, there is a large non-executive bureaucracy.

The World Health Organization is an example of a GGO following the standard model. The World Health Assembly is the representative body for the entire organization. From this body, 34

countries are elected for three-year terms as members of the “Executive Board.” Each country is responsible for designating an individual board member.

Specialized representation

While the “standard model” of global governance organization emphasizes representation through some form of legislative body with oversight responsibilities, many GGOs feature representation on smaller bodies with a substantive emphasis. There are essentially two models of structuring this substantive representation. The first is referred to as *specialized representation*. The alternative, *task-oriented representation*, is described below.

Specialized representation involves the creation of two or more intermediate bodies that retain representational and oversight responsibilities for the activities of a global governance organization with a specific substantive area. Unlike the ad hoc representative bodies described below, the specialized representative bodies are not involved in the creation of rules or the more administrative functions of the organization. They have a legislative function that is circumscribed.

Entities that employ a specialized representation scheme may not have a general representative body at all. That is, member participation in the global governance organization is channeled only through the specialized body. There is no forum where all members convene as a whole. In place of such a general representative body, a small group made up of representatives of all specialized bodies, oversees the organization as a whole.

ICANN is a GGO that utilizes this model of specialized representation. Its primary constituent bodies are the three “ICANN organizations:” Address Supporting Organization (ASO), Country Code Names Supporting Organization (ccNSO), Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO). In ICANN’s case, these specialized bodies – and a few other bodies -- elect members to a Board of Directors that oversees the entirety of the organization. This Board, which includes other members selected through an nomination process, performs many of the functions carried out by a representative or intermediate body under the standard model.

In some cases, the specialized representative bodies are effectively intermediate bodies, reporting to the representative body rather than the primary means of representation. The membership of the specialized body may be chosen in part or in entirety by the representative body. Thus this is seen as variation on the standard model rather than the specialized model.

Task-oriented representation

This model calls for the creation of bodies (often called working groups, committees, or task forces) that are charged with generating the actual rules and/or working with the bureaucracy as it develops new standards or rules. This narrow form of representation is referred to as task-oriented because the representation takes place through substantively-oriented bodies charged with specific rulemaking tasks. This is not to imply that such committees are temporary or transient. For many GGOs, the narrow bodies are quite permanent, having been established by the GGO and granted formal stature. Thus it should not be seen as “ad hoc” or fluid. The organization may add additional working bodies as necessary thus opening new avenues for participation and representation as the organization tackles new fields.

The clearest use of this model is by the standards-setting organizations such as the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Organization for Standardization and the International Telecommunication Union. In each of these organizations, there are technical committees with specific areas of responsibility. Each of these organizations have committees that are essentially as old as the organizations themselves. Technical Committee 1 of the IEC, for example, was created to come up with standards for “terminology,” a good starting point for any standards-setting body. In all three cases, however, there are also more general representative bodies and intermediate representative bodies.

The use of task-oriented representation is an approach quite distinct from a legislative model. Members of technical committees or working groups are directly engaged in the business of the GGO. As is discussed in greater detail in the chapter on rulemaking, this involves negotiation and crafting of language acceptable to multiple constituencies. As such it is a political process and the representation of interests is an important part of the process.

Non-representative

Some GGOs are governed by bodies that are made up of individuals who are not, formally at least, representing any institutions. Thus while organizations may be members of the GGO, they are not truly “represented” in the governing, representative body. The International Accounting Standards Board, W3C are examples of such non-representative entities.

One must maintain a healthy skepticism regarding the distinction between a non-representative arrangement and a more standard model. In practice, it seems that non-representative GGOs are careful to include representatives from every region, for example. Key industries also seem guaranteed seats at the table, although the guarantee is not explicit.

Once again this type of “non-representation” can mix with other models. The members of ICANN’s specialized bodies do not represent member organization *per se* although they sometimes do represent smaller constituent organizations (such as a regional sub-group of ICANN).

Preliminary findings and explanation

As hypothesized, the strongest connection is between GGO sector and mode of representation. Governmental GGOs generally adopt a representational arrangement consistent with the standard model. This makes sense for several reasons. First, it is consistent with the arrangement of the United Nations. Almost every governmental GGO is at least loosely affiliated with the UN. Second, the standard model accords status to nation-states in the structure of GGO. This seems important in ensuring that the organization is consistent with principles of representation in the domestic sphere.

The governmental explanation would create a similar connection on other independent variables closely correlated with SECTOR.. Entities that make treaties will always have a standard model because it will require the ratification by nation-states. The FUNDING variable also does not appear to have any explanatory power separate from SECTOR.

GGOs that employ specialized representation or task-oriented representation are generally non-governmental in character. Examples include the ISO, IASB and IEC. They have non-governmental members instead of (or alongside) governmental members. This is suggestive of the demands of such a membership. More industry-driven membership seems keenly interested in substantive representation related to key areas of concern while nation-states have more generalized interest in the organization and thus the standard model satisfies their interests.

Very few organizations adopt the non-representative approach to representation. Those that do are highly technical in nature. As mentioned above, the W3C, Unicode consortium and the IASB all reflect this approach. Other Internet governance bodies such as ICANN and the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) generally downplay institutional affiliation in their governance.

Apportionment of influence

A critical issue for any political system concerns the distribution of power. As with all organizations, the distribution of influence in global governance organizations is a critical element in understanding outcomes. But mapping power within an organization is a notoriously difficult task. The formal institutional arrangements represent only a portion of the story. There are subtle ways in which the influence of GGO members varies that are not reflected in the organizational by-laws.

Still looking at formal voting rules is the best way to examine the differential power of organizational members. It is not fraught with ambiguity and lack of transparency. And, perhaps most importantly, there is variation in the institutional arrangements chosen by GGOs.

The population of global governance organizations divides between three or four models of influence apportionment: one country-one vote, proportional voting, special powers to select members. The ambiguity regarding the number of models concerns the non-representational model of representation introduced in the previous section. Non-representational models do not link membership in the decision-making body with a specific institution. That is, the governing body is made up of individuals in a non-representative role. Thus it is awkward to impose a judgment of institutional influence based on the apportionment of power among these individuals.

The subject of voting and apportionment of influence is also treated in the chapter on rulemaking. In that chapter, the focus is on the decision-making processes involved in the consideration and adoption of a new rules, standards or regulations. Global governance organizations also confront governance decisions outside the rulemaking process (e.g., budget) and the decision-making rules are not necessarily the same. In this discussion, the emphasis is on the more general organizational governance decisions outside the rulemaking process.

One member (country), one vote

It is not surprising that the majority of global governance organizations treat the nation-state as the unit of organization. Even GGOs whose members are not national governments typically have structures that reflect national affiliation as an organizing element. This reflects the most widely-shared political view of the world: a whole made up of countries.

This may seem a rather banal observation but there is no reason, of course, why nation-states must be utilized in the organization of global governance. Indeed, some GGOs have experimented with structures that do not place any weight on national affiliation. In such cases, general geographic representation usually has some role; continents retain some significance even when nation-states are de-emphasized.

When membership is based on nation, the apportionment of influence generally follows one of two paths. The first alternative is to assign all nations equal formal influence. Note that this can manifest itself differently in terms of actual voting rules. A majority-voting system that provides each nation with a vote equal to that of every other nation is one form of equality. Some global governance organizations employ a consensus-based approach giving every member the same effective veto power

as every other member. Either decision-making rule provides each nation – regardless of population, monetary contribution, stake in the substantive area – with the same influence.

The formal apportionment of voting strength in this fashion does not, of course, indicate parity of actual influence. Smaller nations may be inclined to follow larger states. Countries with a disproportionate interest in a certain area may take the lead within the relevant organization. The formal apportionment of influence nevertheless is significant for it alters the dynamics of member participation.

A contemporary example illustrates this point. The World Intellectual Property Organization utilizes a one country / one vote structure like almost all governmental GGOs. They also operate by a consensus norm. This gives any country the ability to effectively halt organizational processes. This is currently preventing the organization from moving forward on a patent harmonization agreement as the Brazilian representative (and other sympathetic representatives) would like to see action on issues of importance to them *before* the patent matter is taken up.

Proportional influence

The alternative to equal assignment of influence to each country is some proportional system that differentiates among members in the assignment of voting power. Within this broad approach, there are many possible variations in the bases for the assignment of influence.

One approach is to regard the fundamental unit of organization as human beings and thus representation should be linked to population. Interestingly, there is no [check] global governance organization that apportions power in this fashion. In one sense, this is not surprising given that the most economically and militarily powerful nations of the world are considerably “outpopulated” by other countries. Most obviously, the United States has only a quarter of the population of China and India. The G-7 nations rank behind such developing countries as Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria. It is difficult to imagine the acceptance of governance system – particularly for organizations creating rules affecting commerce – that didn’t jibe with the distribution of economic power.

In another sense, however, the avoidance of population-based apportionment is striking because it is so commonly accepted as the default arrangement in the domestic political context. In the United States, for example, there is a lengthy history of debate and litigation surrounding the requirement for equality in the population of districts for legislators. This is particularly striking given the centrality of a contradictory structure in the United States Senate which assigns equal voting influence based on geographic boundaries rather than population. The U.S. Senate represents the “one

country, one vote” model commonly seen in global governance (and other federal arrangements around the world).

In proportional systems, influence is not apportioned as a function of population but rather in relation to members’ importance in the substantive area overseen by the GGO. Often this is measured by the monetary contribution made by the member to the organization. Thus voting influence is a direct function of the amount of money contributed to the organization’s budget. There are two approaches to the determination of the budgetary contribution. In some cases, the required contribution is determined by some measure of the country’s size or share of relevant market. [example]

In other cases, however, the contribution is discretionary. That is, each member determines for itself what level of contribution is appropriate. Thus the level of influence for each member is a direct function of its own determination regarding the importance of the GGO. A member seeking greater influence can increase its contribution and wield proportionately more power. [example]

One would be correct to surmise that proportional systems of influence generally assign greater to the wealthier, developed nations including, naturally, the United States. This is not, however, *always* the case. [example]

Special powers to select members (i.e., security council model)

A third model of representation blends features of the first two by providing equal weight to each members vote as a general matter but reserving special powers to a select set of members. The expression of this model is most familiar in the construction of the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council has five permanent members with veto authority (US, UK, Russia, France and China) that is not possessed by other countries, even the rotating members of the council.

The “special powers” model creates a two-tiered system of membership. The implicit premise of such an arrangement, of course, is that such a differentiation exists in reality. The apportionment of influence merely reflects this fact. Often this takes the form of guaranteed membership in the more engaged and influential intermediate body that involves a select number of representatives. It is unusual to see such a selective body – whether it is called a council, a board, or something else – that does not include representatives of the United States and other economically powerful nations.

An interesting question to consider in evaluating the emergence of “special powers” is under what conditions this pattern is formalized. By the account of participants in the governance of all GGOs, the “special powers” arrangement is, to some extent, a fact of life. It is difficult for global

governance organizations to move forward when pivotal members object. This is consistent with the analysis of the legitimacy and authority in Chapter 2. It is not clear, however, why some organizations would enshrine this reality in the organization's constitution while others do not.

Non-representational influence

This category does not map neatly alongside the first three. Still it is necessary to acknowledge a type of organization that does not conform to any of the previously described models. As noted earlier, a number of GGOs do not have governing bodies that are "representative" in any sense. There is a supreme board or council but the members of this body are recognized as individuals rather than representatives of some other entity (country, firm, interest group).

As these individuals do not stand for countries or organizations, their relative power cannot be apportioned as a function of this association. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an example of a GGO fitting this description and the inapplicability of the first three models is clear. [description of IASB]

As with all formal arrangements, the non-representative governing body is a formal structure which may not reflect the informal realities of the organization's governance. The IASB is case in point. It is widely recognized that the concerned American bodies – the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, a private industry association – wield significant influence over the IASB. Indeed, some would argue that the IASB represents a *de facto special powers* model organization.

Preliminary findings and explanation

In keeping with the findings with respect to representation, SECTOR is a significant variable with respect to apportionment of influence. In formal construction, GGOs with governmental membership are likely to be one-country/one-vote. Contrary to expectations there are no GGOs with a formal veto power given to a select set of countries or members. This "check" is achieved informally in one of two ways: the GGO operates on a consensus norm that effectively grants all members a veto *or* it is widely known that certain members must agree with an organizational decision in order for the GGO to operate smoothly.

These dynamics generally do not pertain to the non-governmental organizations. Nor are they typically associated with highly technical organizations. In both cases, influence is not apportioned in such a fashion to protect any members from undesirable outcomes.

As expected, organizations adopting some type of “special powers” are more likely to be open in membership. This makes sense inasmuch as the core members would be concerned about the GGO being “hijacked” by certain groups. Thus ICANN which is less permeable than it had been in earlier incarnations, maintains a great deal of power for certain key constituencies.

Balance

The balance of power between “branches” varies for global governance organizations as it does among all governments. In some cases, this is reflected in the formal organizational structure. For example, it is reasonable to infer that a representative body that meets only once a year (or less) is weak relative to the permanent bureaucracy. In such cases the influence of the entire “legislature” may be delegated to a subset (referred to generically as the intermediary body) of the membership. Thus the balance between legislative and bureaucratic power may be relatively even. In other cases, however, it seems the power has simply been delegated to the permanent staff, the bureaucracy.

This represents an important dimension of variation among global governance organizations. First, it reveals how the business of governance is actually carried out and in whose hands the day-to-day decisions rest. Even when the legislative body retains core decision-making authority, GGOs that display a bureaucratic-centric model clearly vest a large amount of control in the permanent staff. This includes agenda-setting power, deployment of resources and control over communications.

Second, the balance between legislative and bureaucratic power reveals something about the way in which the members regard the organization. One might hypothesize that a GGO that is bureaucratically-dominated is of lower salience to members. The members are content to let the entity run on a “semi-automatic” basis and watch only for signs of unwanted activity. Legislative engagement suggests an ascription of importance that justifies assignment of resources necessary to participate on a more engaged level.

Legislative dominance

Attempting to characterize governmental systems in the broad brushes implicit in this variable is challenging. Every case presents ambiguity – even the most seemingly clear cut – as a result of aberrant examples or subjective sets of facts. To be clear, the term “legislative dominance” is meant to suggest that the locus of power lies in the legislative organ of the global governance organization. It is not intended to communicate absolute control or “micro-management.” Even the GGO with the most dominant legislative will see a significant share of responsibility and authority in the hands of the bureaucracy and senior leadership of the entity.

Legislative dominance is indicated when initiative for organizational activities is found in the representative body, when the administration and routine activities are closely monitored and when all significant decisions are considered by the representatives of members without strong influence from the administrative establishment. Conventionally, legislative dominance is typically juxtaposed with executive control. That dichotomy would be somewhat misplaced with respect to GGOs; there is no model of a strong chief executive in the space. This may be because in the universe of GGOs, unlike most governance systems in which the legislature and executive are both elected, the leader of the GGO is generally chosen by the representative body (i.e., the legislature). Thus it makes more sense to consider legislative dominance in terms of the latitude granted to the bureaucracy (including the leadership).

The International Labor Organization has one of the most interesting and unique representational structures in the GGO universe. Although its membership is categorized as following the standard model because it has a general representative body (International Labor Conference) structured around nation-states. It is unique in that each delegation includes representatives of government, employers (business) and workers (labor). The conference selects members of the Governing Body which also includes, as permanent members, the representatives of ten “States of chief industrial importance.” There is a significant permanent bureaucracy (International Labor Office) but a significant portion of the staff supports the representatives and facilitates their everyday engagement.

Bureaucratic centric

The classic British television show “Yes, Minister” may exceed any academic prose as a description of the “dominant bureaucracy” model of government. It depicts all-knowing career bureaucrats bemusedly tolerating the elected official ostensibly placed in charge of the ministry. The legislature carries on making noise and smoke but achieving little while the truly knowledgeable and understandable career civil servants make the trains run on time.

This notion translates easily into the global governance realm. Many of the governmental officials appointed to represent member states at GGOs have minimal background in the substance of the issues before them. For representatives of smaller countries, responsibilities likely include representation to multiple GGOs clustered in Geneva or Bonn compounding the difficulty in staying properly versed in the issues confronting each GGO.

Thus the permanent staff of the GGOs do seem, in many cases, to possess the true ability to “make things happen” and understand “how things work” in a way that the legislators do not. There is also a formal quality to this type of balance. The “legislature” might be at such a disadvantage under

the best of circumstances but the arrangements in some cases seem to preordain such an outcome by limiting the representative body to very few meetings, limiting the nature of questions that come before this assembly and granting the bureaucracy wide latitude without permission of the assembly. The International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization seem to follow this pattern more than some other GGOs.

Preliminary findings and explanation

As in other aspects of political-representation structure, one would hypothesize that SECTOR is an important independent variable with respect to *balance*. Governmental GGOs generally assume the standard model and thus typically adopt structures that would allow legislative dominance in the domestic context.

At a minimum the relationship between government sector and legislative dominance is less robust than it was for *representation* and *apportionment of influence*. The reasons for equivocation lie in the realities of legislative participation. As noted above, the representatives often have limited resources and attention span for the workings of global governance organizations. So while the representative bodies are given the opportunities to review budgets and intervene in all sorts of matters, this doesn't appear to be frequently exercised in many cases.

Some of the exceptions – the World Health Organization seems to be a GGO with an active legislature – seem to be associated high-profile or high salience policy issues. So, for example, issues regarding distribution of pharmaceuticals or the policies on birth control and abortion arouse great interest from national governments. Consequently, the representatives are deeply concerned with the activities of the WHO secretariat in related matters. They intervene regularly, particularly when alerted by a concerned interest group.

Organizations dealing with highly technical subject matter tend to be more “bureaucratic” in orientation. However, as these GGOs are generally structured as task-oriented (i.e., representation takes place through the substantive work of the GGO), the reality is that these organizations challenge very distinction being set forth here. A good portion of the “bureaucracy,” the people that do the actual work of the organization, *is* the membership for GGOs like the ISO, IEC, W3C, and so on. Thus the strength of the bureaucracy cannot be seen as creating a corresponding weakness for the legislature.

Contrary to expectations, the FUNDING variable does not appear to offer much insight with respect to *balance*. It was hypothesized that organizations capable of generating revenue to cover a

significant portion of costs would be more independent of the member representatives performing the legislative function. There is no evidence for this once one recognizes that many more self-funded GGOs are associated with non-standard models of representation.

Administrative Structure

Generally overlooked in the discussion of global governance, the structure of the bureaucracy charged with carrying out the organizations' responsibilities varies quite a bit. In part these variations are captured in the previous discussion of representation. The global governance organizations that employ a task-oriented form of representation essentially demand a supporting role for the permanent bureaucracy. With members of the organization involved in the actual creation of rules and standards, the very line between member and bureaucrat is blurred. Thus one would expect some of the relationships between features of the GGO and representational structure to carry over to the administrative structure as well.

In this section, broad aspects of administrative structure are considered. There are myriad specific bureaucratic features that could be examined but such specific features – budget rules, personnel practices, and so on – seem less likely to substantively affect outcomes. Still many of these features are being coded as data on GGOs is being compiled so patterns may, in fact, emerge. For the time being, however, three aspects of GGOs' administrative structure are considered: the *permanence* of the organization, the *centralization* and the *scale*.

Permanent (functional) vs. Ad hoc (supporting) Organization

The roles of each GGO's administrative staff are shaped by the division of responsibilities between member organizations and the GGO bureaucracy.

Permanent organization

Many global governance organizations look and “feel” more like traditional government bureaucracies. These organizations are relatively fixed with assignment of roles and responsibilities set by formal requirement. Many of the functions of such organizations have been routinized and are carried out without the direct involvement of members – or even senior leadership.

The most important characteristic of permanent GGO bureaucracies is that it is this workforce, the regular staff of the organization, that carry out its core tasks. Many of the venerable global governance organizations fit this model including the WHO and WIPO. Both have sizeable

secretariat's that develop new proposed rules, bring together members for purposes of education and negotiation and generally drive the process.

Permanence does not necessary imply inertia through size. There are several GGOs that are small in staff number but still traditional in the location of responsibility. The International Maritime Organization, the International Seabed Authority and the International Civil Aviation Authority all fit this description.

Ad hoc organization

Organizations which place a great deal of day-to-day rulemaking responsibility in the hands of members through working groups and technical committees obviously shift some responsibility away from the permanent bureaucracy or (at the very least) alter its function. Under such arrangements, the principal role of the bureaucracy, particularly in terms of the rule-making, is to support the work of the representative members.

This is a different type of bureaucratic function than that typically associated with the administration of governance organizations. The *ad hoc* label may be misleading (and fated to disappear in future drafts of this paper) but it reflects the responsive nature of the permanent staff's role. Authority is vested in a set of members for task-oriented GGOs. If the responsibility shifts to different members, the permanent administrative staff shift along with it.

It cannot be assumed that the bureaucracy lacks influence under such arrangements. There are still opportunities for influence even in a member-driven GGO. Permanent staff serve as advisers and sources of institutionalized knowledge for the members of working groups. In GGOs like the ISO and IEC, the permanent staff members are almost always more familiar with rules and procedures associated with rule-making than members of technical committees. Thus they are relied upon to provide guidance as the rulemaking process proceeds. Moreover, the staff often acts as a mediator, helping to resolve conflicts among participants.

Preliminary findings and explanation

The description of the categories is suggestive of the hypothesis to explain why organizations adopt either a functional or supporting approach. Organizations that employ a task-oriented type of representation, placing a significant responsibility for rulemaking in the hands of members, require a permanent bureaucracy in the supportive mode. These GGOs are almost always associated with generation of standards rather some other RULE TYPE. In terms of SECTOR, these organizations are generally non-governmental.

Conversely, the more traditional functional administration is associated with governmental GGOs. They work on treaties or regulations rather than standards.

One might observe that the younger organizations seem more likely to adopt an *ad hoc* model. This quick conclusion does not seem to hold up to more rigorous inspection. Many of the newer GGOs such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) or ICANN look more like older functional GGOs than the supporting GGOs. Moreover, some of the supporting GGOs are considerably older than most peers. The IEC, for example, was created in 1906.

Distributed vs. Centralized Organization

Some GGOs have a “centralized” headquarters where most of the permanent staff is based and most operations are conducted. Other GGOs, in contrast, have a more “distributed” model with work carried out in multiple offices around the globe.

Centralized

Not much needs to be said to create a good understanding of what is implied with this label. The centralized bureaucracy is the most traditional model of public administration. The collection of monolithic edifices in the international section of Geneva has a familiar feeling to anyone who has navigated the governmental districts of many cities, from Washington, D.C. to New Delhi.

The physical manifestation is only part of the story. Centralization also implies a way of doing things, a process that more often than not requires participation and approval of central authority.

Some of the oldest GGOs are the best models of this type of administration. The Universal Postal Union has a relatively small staff based in Berne, Switzerland that carries out most of the functions of the body. The IMO, based in London, is similarly self-contained relative to most standard-setting bodies. The International Labor Organization (ILO), a much larger Geneva-based GGO also carries out most of its activities internally.

Distributed

The alternative model is the distributed organization. The distinction may not be quite as sharp as has been implied. Most, if not all, of the working groups and technical committees that make up “ad hoc organizations” work through organizational headquarters (many of which are also located in Geneva). Although their work is carried out around the world – and the leaders of working groups will set up headquarters in their own countries – the rulemaking processes inevitably call for some clearance process back through headquarters.

The distributed model is not limited to the ad hoc organizations. Some of the more permanent organizations also eschew the centralization typical of the older global governance organizations. The IEC has already been offered as an example. The ITU has a similarly distributed approach to administration. This reflects the realities of the tasks before GGOs and the political demands of members who may want a regional presence rather than a distant central office.

Preliminary findings and explanation

The SECTOR variable does seem to have explanatory power here. Governmental GGOs do seem more likely to adopt the centralized approach to administration. But the approach to representation may be the key intermediary variable to explain this finding. Government representatives may need to represent one country before several organizations. This is especially true for smaller countries that cannot afford to support delegations to every GGO. Thus there is strong reason to group all functions of a GGO in one place – to make tracking and interaction easier.

It also explains the desirability of clustering many GGOs in one Swiss city. Many of the global governance organizations with a large, stable administrative workforce are situated in a single location so that one representative can be responsible for multiple GGOs. In carrying out research for this volume, the author was able to conduct numerous interviews by spending time in Geneva, Switzerland, the unofficial world capital of global governance.

Contemporary technology clearly allows for greater physical diffusion of people working together on a common project. The emergence of the Internet and other communications technologies has accelerated the use of distributed governance approaches. It has made collaboration across thousands of miles a rather mundane matter. Thus the youth of a GGO would likely explain distributed approaches. Those staff members at older standards-producing GGOs who preceded the Internet revolution have not a marked increase in the independence of the participants from the central office. These GGOs have, essentially, gotten more distributed as a function of technological evolution.

Scale

Scale is not perfectly correlated with the permanence and centralization of the global governance organization as one might expect. Naturally, the more the organization relies directly upon members to carry out core responsibilities, the smaller the number of bureaucrats that will be employed by the organization. Of course, if one considers the members of the working groups and technical committees to be effectively part of the organization's staff – not unreasonable given the roles they are

performing – these ad hoc, distributed organizations are actually quite large. They are also difficult to measure.

Even among global governance organizations that do not rely upon ad hoc groups, there is significant variation in size. Some are quite small in scale. The size of such entities – the UPU, for example, employs fewer than 200 people – may reflect the limit of the organization’s mandate, the relative stability in the rules the organization promulgates or other factors that shall be explored.

At the other end of the size spectrum are the formidable bureaucracies associated with some of the most venerable GGOs such as the World Health Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization. These entities pale in comparison to many national government bureaucracies but with several thousand employees, they are quite a bit larger than the average GGO.

It is important to be careful in comparing scale to be cognizant of the great variance in the narrowness of mission for global governance organizations. In this study, the focus was upon organizations with a primary function of generating rules, standards or regulations. Many of the organizations included in the set of GGOs do, however, carry out other tasks. The WHO, for example, has a far broader mandate than most of the GGOs discussed here and thus many of the bureaucrats at WHO headquarters have nothing to do with rulemaking whatsoever.

Preliminary findings and explanation

Smaller organizations tend to be associated with narrower purpose global governance organizations. This is entirely intuitive. The more tightly circumscribed the mission of the organization, the less need or opportunity for expansion. Similarly, organizations working in relatively stable policy fields (postage, shipping) reflect the lack of instability in a modest organizational scale.

One implication of this observation is that a common conception of the drivers of bureaucratic size does not appear to hold here. Governmental GGOs do not appear to be systematically bigger than their non-governmental peers. This is especially true if you focus on rulemaking functions. Governmental GGOs are less likely to be purely rule-generating than non-governmental GGOs thus a higher proportion of their staff should be excluded from any headcount for purposes of fair comparison.

While more “ad hoc” organizations may have fewer employees, they likely have many more people involved in the rulemaking process through committees, working groups or the like.

Implications and Conclusion

The three independent variables with the most explanatory power for the structure of representation and administration by GGOs are SECTOR, TECHNICALITY and RULE TYPE. Governmental membership in GGOs drives models of representation and many other aspects of bureaucratic design follow as a consequence.

Highly technical rule content seems to demand a task-oriented form of representation and member participation. This too spills over into other aspects of organizational design.

Rule type is associated with both these variables. Treaties are made only by governments thus any body capable of this approach must have the structural attributes of a governmental GGO. Since standards are more common for highly technical subject matter, it is likely that such rule type will be associated with a distributed, task-oriented approach to governance.